S P I 



be a neceffary agent, which is the very queftion begged that 

 was to be proved. 



The fecond argument, he fays, is, if poffible, ftill weaker ; 

 for, how does it follow, if God, according to his eternal 

 unerring purpofe and infinite wifdom, produces ditterent 

 things at different times, and i.i different manners, that, 

 therefore, the will and nature of God are changeable > It 

 might exaftly as well be argued, that if God (according to 

 Spinozi'sfuppolition) does always neceffarily produce all 

 poffible differences and varieties of thingi ; therefore his 

 will and nature are always neceffarily infinitely various, un- 

 equal, and difljmilar to themfelves. 



And as to the third argument, it is juft luch reafoning as 

 if a man (hould argue, that if all poffible eternal duration 

 be not always aftually exhaufl;ed, it can never be all ex- 

 haulled ; and that, therefore, fo the eternity of God is 

 taken away : a mode of arguing, the weakiiefs of which 

 muff be difcerned by every one at firft fight. Befides, the 

 affertion itfelf, that no thing, or mode of exiftence of any 

 thing, could poffibly have been made in any refpeft 

 different from whatsit is, is fo palpably abfurd and falle, io 

 contradiftory to experience and the nature of things, and 

 to the moft obvious and common reafon of mankind, that 

 of itfelf it immediately, and upon the firll hearing, fuffi- 

 ciently confutes any principle of which it is a confequence. 

 For all things in the world appear plainly to be the molt 

 arbitrary that can be imagined, and to be wholly the effefts 

 not of an abfolute neceffity of nature, but merely of a necef- 

 fity of fitnefs, or of wifdom and choice. Moreover, Spinoza 

 maintaining that the fupreme caufe is a neceffary agent, is 

 conilrained to expofe all final caufes as the fictions of igno- 

 rant and fuperllitious men ; and fo laugh at thofe who are 

 fo foolifh and childiffi as to fancy, that eyes were defigiied 

 and fitted to fee with, teeth to chew with, food to be eaten 

 for nouriffiment, the fun to give light, &c. a mode of arguing 

 to which reply is needlefs. See the article God. 



Againft Spinoz.i's fyffem it is allegLd by Mr. Bayle, 

 I. That it is impoffible the univerfe ffiould be but one fub- 

 ftance, fince every thing that is extended muff necelfarily 

 have parts, and what has parts mull be compounded. And 

 as the parts of extenfion do not fubfift in each other, it 

 follows either that extenfion in the general is not fub- 

 itance, or that every part of extenfion is a different fub- 

 ftance. Now, according to Spinoza, extenfion in general 

 is an attribute of fubltance. And he allows, with other 

 philofophers, that the attributes of fubitance do not differ 

 really from the fubllance itfelf. He muff, therefore, allow, 

 that extenfion in general is fubftance ; vifhence it will fol- 

 low, that every part of extenfion is a particular fubftance ; 

 which overturns the whole fyffem. 



2. If it be abfurd to make God extended, as this robs 

 him of his fimplicity, and makes him be compofed of parts, 

 it is ilill worfe to reduce him to the condition of matter, 

 the loweff: of all beings, and that vifhich molt of the ancient 

 philofophers ranked immediately above nothing ; matter, 

 the theatre of all fort? of changes, the field of battle of 

 contrary caufes, the fubjeft of all corruptions and genera- 

 tions ; in a word, the being, of all others, moft incom- 

 patible with the immutability of the Deity. 



The Spinozilts, indeed, maintain, that it is not fufcep- 

 tible of any divifion ; but the argument they allege in 

 proof of it we have elfewhere ftiewn to be falfe : it is, 

 that for matter to be divided, it is neceffary that one of 

 the parts be feparated from the other by a void fpace, 

 which is impoffible ; fince, they fay, there is no vncuum in 

 nature. See Vacuum. 



3. If Spinozifm appear extravagant, when we confider 



S P I 



God as the fubjeft of all the mutations, corruptions, and ■ 

 generations, in bodies, it will be found ftill worfe, when 

 we confider him as the fubjeft of all the modifications of 

 thinking. It is no fraall difficulty to unite extenfion and 

 thinking in the fame fubftance ; fince it is not an union 

 like that of two metals, or of water and wine, that will 

 ferve the purpofe : thefe laft require only juxta-pofition ; 

 whereas to combine thinking and extenfion, requires an 

 identity. Thinking and extended are two attributes iden« 

 tified with the fubftance, and, confequently, they are 

 identified with each other by the fundamental rule of all 

 logic. 



Again, when we fay, that a man denies this, affirms that. 

 Hies that, &c. we make all thofe attributes fall on the fub- 

 ftance of his mind, not on his thoughts, which are only 

 accidents or modifications of it : if, therefore, \rhat Spinoza 1 

 advances be true, that men are modahties of God, it would 

 be falfe to fay, Peter denies, likes, tvills, &c. ; fince, in 

 reality, on this fyffem it is, that God denies, wills, &c. ; 

 and, confequently, all the denominations which arife from 

 the thoughts, defires, &c. of men, fall properly and phy- 

 fically on the fubftance of God. From whence it alfo fol- 

 lows, that God affirms and denies, loves and hates, wills 

 and mils the fame thing, at the fame time, and under the 

 fame conditions ; contrary to the great principle of reafon- 

 ing, oppnjlta funt quie iff neque de fe invicem, neque ile eodem 

 tertio fecundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo atque tempore vere 

 ajirmari pojfutit ; which muff be falfe, if Spinozifm be true; 

 fince it cannot be denied, but feme men love and aiHrm 

 what others iiate and deny, under all the conditions ex- 

 preffcd in the rule. 



4. But if it be phyfically abfurd to fay, the fame fubjeft 

 is modified at the fame time with all the different thoughts 

 of all men ; it is horrible when we confider it in a moral 

 light ; fince it will follow, that the infinite, the all-perfeft 

 Being, is not conitant, is not the fame one moment, but is 

 eternally poffefled even with contrary paffions : all the 

 uniformity in him in this refpeft, will be, that for one good 

 and wife thought, he will have twenty fooliffi and wicked 

 ones. He will not only be the efficient caufe of all the 

 errors, iniquities, and impurities of m.cn, but alfo the paflive 

 fubjeft of them, ihe fubjedum inhufwnis. He muft be united 

 with them in the clofell manner that can be conceived, even 

 by a penetrative union, or rather an identity, fince the 

 mode is not really diftinft from the fubftance modified. 

 Bayle, art. Spinoza. 



SPINSTER, inZaw, an addition ufually given to all un- 

 married women, from the vifcount's daughter downwards. 



Yet fir Edward Coke fays, generofa is a good addition 

 for a gentlewoman ; and that, if fuch a perion be named 

 fpinfter in any original writ, appeal, or inftrument, ftie may 

 abate and quafli the fame. 



Spelman fays, that" anciently, even queens ufed the diftafF 

 and fpindle ; whence fpinfter Ijecame a common appellation 

 for all women. 



SPINT, in Commerce, a corn meafure of Germany. At 

 Bremen, a laft of corn, peafe, or beans, contains 4 quarts, 

 40 fcheffels, 160 viertels, or 640 fpints ; 50 fcheftels anfwer- 

 mg \o loi buftiels, Winchefter meafure. At Hamburgh, 

 a laft of wheat or rye contains 3 wifpels, 30 fcheffels, 60 

 faffes, 120 kimterns, or 480 fpints ; and according to the 

 ftandard meafure of the fafs, which is 21 |i inches in dia- 

 meter, and lOy inches deep, Hamburgh meafure, its con- 

 tents are 3872 Hamburgh cubic inches, or 3213 Engliffi 

 inches, i fcheffel or two faffes =i 3 bufliels, Winchefter 

 meaf^are nearly ; and I laft of Hamburgh = 89 IJ Engliffi 

 bulhels, or 1 1-,^^ Englifti quarters. 



SPIN- 



