TASTE. 



lonrs, and of every thing that might deceive or amufe, to 

 judge foundly. 



Tafte and judgment then (hould be tlie fame thing ; and 

 yet it is eafy to difcern a diffcrt-nce : the judgment forms its 

 opinions from rcfleftion ; the reafoii, on this occafion, takes 

 a kind of circuit to arrive at its end ; it fuppofes principles, 

 it draws confequences, and it judges ; but not without a 

 thorough knowledge of the cafe : fo that after it has pro- 

 nounced, it is ready to render a reafon of its decrees. 

 Taile obferves none of thefe formahties ; before it has time 

 to confult, it has taken its refolution : as foon as ever an 

 objeft is prefented to it, the imprelTion is made, and the 

 fentiment formed ; and we aflc no more of it. As the ear is 

 wounded with an harfh found, as the fmell is foothed with 

 an agreeable odour, before ever the reafon has meddled witli 

 thofe objefts, to judge of them ; fo the tafte is ftruck at 

 once, and prevents all refledtion. 



Refleftions may come afterwards to confirm this tafte, 

 and difcover the fecret reafonings of its conduft ; but it was 

 not in its power to wait for them. Frequently, it happens 

 not to know them at all ; and what pains foever we ufe, we 

 cannot difcover what it was that determined it to think as 

 it did. 



Tliis conduft is very different from that which the judg- 

 ment obferves in its decifions ; unlefs we choofe to fay, that 

 good tafte is, as it were, a firft motion, or a kind of inftinft 

 of right reafon, which hurries us on with rapidity, and con- 

 dufts us more fecurely than all the reafonings we could ufe. 

 It is a fu-ft glance of thought, which difcovers to us the na- 

 ture and relation of things, as it were, by intuition. 



In effeft, tafte and judgment are one and the fame thing, 

 one and the fame difpoiition and habitude of the foul, wlilch 

 we call by different names, according to the different manners 

 in which it afts : when it afts by fenfation, by the firft im- 

 predion of objeds, we call it tafte ; and when by reafoning, 

 after having examined the thing by all the rules of art, S:c. 

 we call it judgment : fo that one may fay, tafte is the judg- 

 ment of nature, and judgment is the tafte of reafon. 



Good tafte, as defined by Madem. Scudery aiid Madem. 

 Dacier, in an exprcfs treatife " Of the Corruption of Tafte," 

 is an harmony between the mind and reafon ; and a pcrfon 

 has more or lefs of this tafte, as that harmony is more or 

 lefs juft. 



One might, perhaps, improve on this hint, and fay, that 

 good tafte is nothing elfe but a certain ratio or relation be- 

 tween the mind, and the objefts prefented to it; Right 

 reafon cannot but be moved and aftefted with things con- 

 formably to it, and wounded by thofe contrary : there is, 

 then, a kind of fympathy, which unites them as foon as ever 

 they meet ; and at their union, their good underftandings 

 difcover each other — Make a fine difcourfe ; ufe only the 

 richeft and nobleft expreffions ; if they contain an unhappy 

 thought, or an incoherent reafoning, that thought, this 

 reafoning, will immediately be felt by a perfon of tafte : and 

 the antipathy will ftiew itfelf by a movement of averfion, as 

 fudden, as lively, and as natural, as that which nature in- 

 fpircs us withal for toads or fpiders. 



The term tajle, ufed generally, is equivocal, and is ufed in 

 at leaft three diftinft acceptations. It fometimes means that 

 peculiar mode of fenfation, which refides in the tongue and 

 palate ; fometimes, the power of difcriraination in the fine 

 arts, or the feeling aftbciated with it ; fometimes, in a fenfe 

 derived from the latter, it means hking or opinion in 

 general. 



It has been a fubjeft of much controverfy, whether tafte, 

 in the fecond fenfe, as we ufe the term in this article, be a 

 diftinft faculty, or merely a mode of judgment. The fad 



feems to be, fays an anonymous writer, that pleafurable 

 emotions are excited by certain objefts or conceptions, and 

 that, when we embody our feelings in words, we ufe ex- 

 prelTions of comparifon, and reference to a ttandard, as in 

 other propofitions. Feehng andjudgment therefore concur ; 

 but to which the word tajle fliould be peculiarly applied, it is 

 not eafy to determine. The primary feufe of the word, and 

 of its equivalents in modern languages, feems to imply the 

 former, as the word criticifm manifeftly refers to the latter 

 meaning. 



Dr. Gerard, in his ingenious and elaborate " Effay on 

 Tafte," obferves, that a fine tafte is neither wholly the gift 

 of nature, nor wholly the effeft of art. It derives its origin 

 from certain powers natural to the human mind, but thefe 

 muft be allifted by culture, in order to attain their full per- 

 feftion. Tafte, according to this writer, confifts chiefly in 

 the improvement of thofe principles, which arc commonly 

 called the powers of imagination, and are confidered by 

 modern philofophers as internal or reflex fenfes, fupplying 

 us with finer and more delicate perceptions, than any which 

 cnn be properly referred to our external organs. The 

 fimple principles of tafte are the fenfes of novelty, of fub- 

 limity, of beauty, of imitation, of harmony, of ridicule, and 

 of virtue. Any one of the internal lenfes, exifting in vitrour 

 and perfedion, forms a particular branch of tafte, and 

 enables a man to judge in fome one fubjed of art or genius ; 

 but all of them muft at once be vigorous, in order to con- 

 ftitute tafte in its juft extent. Tafte will alfo deri%'e con- 

 fiderable affiftance from another principle, diftind from all 

 the internal fenfes ; and this is fuch a fenfibility of heart or 

 deUcacy of paflion, as fits a man for being eafily moved, and 

 for readily catching, as by infedion, any paffion that a work 

 ii fitted to excite, to which we might add the influence of 

 cafual aflbciations on tafte. Moreover, the moft complete 

 union of the internal fenfes is not of itfelf fuf&cient to fonn 

 good tafte, even though they be attended with the greateft 

 delicacy of paflion. They muft be aided with judgment, 

 the faculty which diftinguifties things different, feparates 

 trutli from falfehood, and compares together objeds and 

 their qualities. — Good fenfe is an indifpenfible ingredient in 

 true tafte, which always implies a quick and accurate 

 perception of things as they really are ; and, as the poet 

 obferves, 



" Is, though no fcience, fairly worth the feven." 



Tafte, like every other human excellence, is progreffive 

 and improveable : and goodnefs of tafte lies in its maturity 

 and pcrfedion ; confifting, as Dr. Gerard fays, in certain 

 excellencies of our original powers of judgment and ima- 

 gination combined. Thefe may be reduced to four, ■viz. 

 fenfibilitv, refinement, corrednefs, and the proportion or 

 comparative adjuftment of its feparate principles. All thefe 

 muft be in a confiderable degree imited, in order to form 

 true taftck And this excellence of tafte fuppofes not only 

 culture, but culture judicioufly applied. Want of tafte un- 

 avoidably fprings from negligence ; falfe tafte from injudi- 

 cious cultivation. Scnfibility of tafte, we are told, depends 

 very much on the original conftrudion of the mind, and is 

 lefs improveable by ufe than any other of the qualities of 

 good tafte. Refinement or elegance of tafte is chiefly owing 

 to the acquifition of knowledge, and the improvement of 

 judgment. Refinement of tafte exifts only, where to an 

 original delicacy of imagination, and natural acutenefs of 

 judgment, is fuperadded a long and intimate acquaintance 

 with the beft performances of every kind. And as fenfibility 

 of tafte difpofes us to be ftrcngly affeded with whatever 

 beauties or faults we perceive ; and refinement of tafte 



makes 



