TASTE. 



makes us capable of difcovcring both, even when they are 

 not obvious ; fo correftnefs of. tafte prevents our being 

 impofcd upon by falfe appearances, and cither approving 

 lliining faults, or condemning challe virtues, and enables us 

 to affign to every quality its due proportion of merit or 

 demerit : thus diftinguilhing the various kinds, and meafuring 

 the different degrees of excellence and faultinefs. The lafl 

 finifhing and complete improvement of tafte, refult from the 

 due proportion of its foveral principles, and the regular 

 adjuftment of all its fentiments, according to their genuine 

 value, fo that none of them may engrofs our minds, and 

 render us infenfible to the reft. This due proportion of the 

 principles of tafte pre-fuppofes the correftnefs of each, and 

 includes, befides, an enlargement and comprehenfion of 

 mind. Dr. Gerard has alfo confidered, how far tafte de- 

 pends on the imagination, evincod the conneftion of tafte 

 with genius, and the influence of tafte on criticifm, illuf- 

 trated the objefts and the pleafures of tafte, and traced the 

 effe<Ss of tafte on the charafter and paffions. 



" Ingenuas didicifle fideliter artes, 

 EmoUit mores, nee finit effe feros." 



Nothing is fo improving, fays Hume on the fubjeft of 

 delicacy of tafte, to the temper, as the ftudy of the beauties 

 <?ither of poetry, eloquence, mufic, or painting. They give 

 a certain elegance of fentiment to which the reft of mankind 

 are utter ftrangers. The emotions which they ejJcite are 

 toft and teiader. They draw off the mind from the hurry of 

 hufinefs and intereft ; cherifh refleftion ; difpofe to tran- 

 quillity ; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all 

 difpofitions of the mind, is the beil fuited to love and friend- 

 ship. Befides, a delicacy of tafte is favourable to love and 

 friendfhip, by confining our choice to few people, and 

 ■Tiaking us indifferent to the company and converfation of 

 the greater part of mankind. 



Tafte, fays Gerard, may be conceived as employing 

 ■jttelf about nature, art, and fcience. With regard to nature, 

 which is the common fubjeft of the other two, tafte and 

 reafon are employed in conjunftion : as reafon inveftigates 

 the laws of nature, tafte alone difcovers its beauties. In 

 art, tafte is the ultimate judge, and reafon but its rainifter. 

 Scarcely any art is fo mean, or fo entirely mechanical, as not 

 :o afford fubjefts of tafte. But the finer arts, which imitate 

 the excellencies of nature, fupply it with more proper mate- 

 rials ; and thence derive their merit. Mufic, painting, 

 (latuary, architefture, poetry, and eloquence, (to which 

 may be added gardening, including the art of improving 

 jrrounds, and the ftage,) conftitute its peculiar and domeftic 

 territory, in which its authority is abfolutely fupreme. 

 In fcience, reafon is fupreme, but may fometimes reap 

 advantage from ufing tafte as an auxiliary which ferves 

 to judge, not only of the manner in which fcience is 

 ■ •ommunicated, but alfo of the fubjeft-matter itfelf. 



To this effay of Dr. Gerard are annexed three difTerta- 

 ;ions on the fame fubjeft ; one by Voltaire ; another by 

 M. D'Alembert, read before the French academy in 

 1757, and intended to (hew the great advantages of philo- 

 fophy in its application to matters of tafte, and to juftify 

 it from the accufations that have been brought againft 

 it by ignorance and envy ; and the third is a fragment of 

 Montefquieu. 



We obferve, that the arts above enumerated, are diftin- 

 guifhed from thofe that are merely mechanical, as well as 

 from the fpeculative fciences, by this circumftance ; that 

 their main end is neither utility, in the common fenfe of the 

 woi J, nor inftruftion ; but to minifter to the pleafures of the 

 imagination, by means of words, or of fenfible images, or of 



both of thefc combined. But their moft eminent charac- 

 tfriftic, perhaps, which runs through all of them, is, that 

 many of their principles, though in one fi nfe founded upon 

 nature, fince their only objetl is to delight the imagination 

 of men, are not derivd fi Jm ori'i.iary nature ; but require 

 a good deal of attention, and the formation of habits, before 

 they can be rehftied or undenlood. When we fay, that thefe 

 eight arts are the proper objefts of tafte, we do not intimate 

 that their principles are altogether in common ; or that he 

 who is thoroughly acquainted, t: g. with the theory of 

 painting, will be neceffarily a good judge of poetry or 

 architefture ; fince all of tliem have many rules originally 

 arbitrary, the accurate knowledge of which has bi-come in- 

 difpenfible to the man of talle ; and which, in many cafes, 

 fuggeil pleafures to the imagination, not inferior to thofe 

 which appear more direftly natural. Neverthclefs, a man 

 who has applied the accuracy of difcrimination, delicacy of 

 feeling, and habitual reference to an original ftandard, in 

 which the exercife of tafte confifts, to any one of thofe arts, 

 can hardly fail, by fuflicient attention and experience, to 

 become a judge of all the reft. This obfervation, however, 

 is liable to lome exceptions, particularly in reference to 

 mufic, which no one whofe car is naturally imperfeA, will 

 ever be able to underftand. After all it muft be allowed by 

 thofe who maintain the neceffity of admitting principles and 

 a ftandard of tafte, that a prodigious difference will be found 

 to remain in the fentiments of mankind, with regard to 

 matters of tafte; and this diverfity of fentiment in judging 

 concerning the produftions of art, may be afcribcd to three 

 caules ; viz. want of feeling, or inability to enjoy, in any 

 great degree, the pleafures of the imagination, as in the in- 

 ftance to which we have above alluded ; want of knowledge, 

 becaufe, as the principles of the fine arts are founded partly 

 on general nature, and partly on arbitrary rules, no juft 

 judgment can be formed of their general nature without 

 much attention and experience ; and the arbitrary rules per- 

 taining to all the arts are numerous and complicated, and 

 eafily confounded by unil^ilful judges ; and further, haflinefs 

 or precipitance of decifion, by which men are often mided. 

 Having already remarked, that .the laws of tafte are partly 

 natural, and pai-tly arbitrary, we here fuggeft, that under 

 the former fall, in poetry and eloquence, whatever fuggefts 

 affociations generally delightful and interefting, or awakens 

 fympathies, which the conftitution of mankind leads thenj 

 to feel ; in painting, truth of imitation, and forciblenefs of 

 expreffion ; in mufic, gratification of the ear and power over 

 the afteftions. Under the latter may be reckoned, what 

 is called, ftyle in writing, and the obfervance of thofe rules 

 with which critics are converfant, in the other arts. 

 Befides, independently of principles of approbation and dif- 

 approbation which exift in the objefts of tafte, all men are 

 more or lefs influenced by circumftances pccuhar to them- 

 felves ; and to this clals belongs a variety of accidental 

 affociations. 



A late excellent writer has defined tafte to be the power of 

 receiving pleafure from the beauties of nature and of art. 

 Though tafte, fays tliis writer, be ultimately founded on a 

 certain natural and inftinftive fenfibility to beauty, yet reafon 

 affirts tafte in many of its operations, and ferves to enlarge its 

 power. In this fenfe, it is a faculty common in fome degree 

 to all men. Quindlilian, however, { Inftit. lib. \-i, c. 3. ) feems 

 to include tafte under what he calls judicium. The cha- 

 raAers of tafte, when brought to its moft perfeft ftate, are 

 all reducible to two, delicacy, which principally rcfpeds the 

 pcrfeftion of that natural fenfibility on which tafte is 

 founded ; and correftnefs, which chiefly refpefts the im- 

 provement that faculty receives through its connetlion with 



the 



