TASTE. 



tlie unJoidanding : the former of tliefe qualities is more the 

 gift of nature ; tlie latter more the produft of culture and art. 

 Among the ancient critics, Longinus poficficd mod deh- 

 cacy ; Arillotle moft corrcftnefs. Among the moderns, 

 Mr. Addifon is a higli example of delicate talk ; and dean 

 Swift, if he had written on the fubjedl of criticifm, would 

 perhaps have afforded the example of a corrcft one. In 

 determining the ftandard of taflc, thofe wiio fay that nature 

 is tliis llandard, lay down a principle very true ar.d juft, as 

 far ai it can he apphed : neverlhelefs, conformity to nature 

 is an exprefiion very often ufed, without any dillinft or 

 determinate meaning : in a more clear and precife fenfe, 

 nothing can be conlidered as the ftandard of tafte, but the 

 talle, as far as it can be known, of human nature. That 

 which men concur the mod in admiriiig, mud be held to be 

 beautiful. His tafte muft be efteemed juft and true, which 

 coincides with the general fentimcntsof men. In this ftand- 

 ard we muft reft. To the fenfe of mankind the ultimate ap- 

 peal muft ever lie, in all works of tafte. But this fenfe is 

 founded on thofe principles of reafon and found judgment, 

 which arc applicable to matters of tafte : and yet the ulti- 

 mate conclufions to which our reafonings lead, refer at laft 

 to fenfe and perception. Accordingly it is obferved, that 

 the difference between the authors who found the ftandard 

 of tafte upon the common feehngs of human nature, afcer- 

 taincd bv general approbation, and thofe who found it upon 

 eftabhftied principles, which can be afcertained by reafon, is 

 more an apparent than a real difference. For they who lay 

 tiie greateft ftrefs on fentiment and feeUng, mak» no fcruple 

 of applying argument and reafon to matters of tafte ; they 

 appeal to cftabliftied principles, and plainly ftiew that the 

 general approbation to which they ultimately recur, is an 

 approbation refulting from difcuffion as well as from fenti- 

 ment. And they, on the other hand, who, in order to vin- 

 dicate tafte from any fufpicion of being arbitrary, maintain 

 that it is afcertainable by the ftandard of reafon, admit, 

 neverthelcfs, that what pleafes univerfally, muft on that ac- 

 count be held to be truly beautiful : and that no rules or 

 conclufions concerning objedls of tafte, can have any juft 

 authority, if they be found to contradift the general fenti- 

 ments of men. 



However, it is not pretended, that there is any ftandard of 

 tafte, to which, in every particular inftance, we can refort 

 for clear and immediate determination. But it is fufficient 

 to conclude, that tafte is far from being an arbitrary prin- 

 ciple, which is fubjeft to the fancy of every individual, and 

 which admits of no criterion for determining whether it be 

 falfe or true. Its foundation is the fame in all human minds. 

 It is built upon fentiments and perceptions, which belong to 

 our nature ; and which, in general, operate with the fame 

 uniformity as our other intelleftual principles. When they 

 are perverted by ignorance or prejudice, they are capable of 

 being rectified by reafon. Their found and natural ftate is 

 ultimately determined by comparing them with the general 

 tafte of mankind. 



The ingenious writer to whom we are indebted for the 

 preceding obfervations, has diftinguiftied between tafte and 

 genius. See Genius. 



Mr. Alifon has treated the fubjeft of this article with fo 

 much ingenuity and elegance, in his " Effay on the Nature 

 and Principles of Tafte," that it would be ahnoft fufficient, 

 without further enlargement, to refer to his exeellent per- 

 formance. 



According to this much approved writer, the perception of 

 the qualities that are denominated beautiful and Jubl'me in the 

 works of nature and art, is attended with an emotion of 

 ^leafure, very diftinguiftiable from every other pleafurc of 



our nature, and to which is appropriated tlie name of the 

 " emotion of t.ifte." Accordingly, the diftinftion of the 

 objefts of tafte into x\\c fullime and beautiful, has produced a 

 limilar divifion of this emotion into the " emotion of fub- 

 limity" and the " emotion of beauty." The qualities that 

 produce thefe emotions occur amid every variety of extertml 

 fancry, and among many diverfities of difpofition and affec- 

 tion in the mind of man. The moft pleafmg arts of human 

 invention are altogether direfted to their pnrfuit, and even 

 the neceffary arts are exalted into dignity by the genius that 

 can unite beauty with ufe. 



Our author, in his profecution of this fubjeft, firft invefti- 

 gates the nature of thofe qualities that produce the emotions 

 of tafte, and then the nature of the faculty by which thefe 

 emotions are received. He obferves, that the theories which 

 have been formed in relation to this fubjeft have uniformly- 

 taken for granted thejimp/icity of this emotion, and have re- 

 ferred it to fonie one principle or law of the human mind ; 

 and have therefore concluded, that the difcovery of that one 

 principle was the effential key by which all the pleafures of 

 tafte were to be refolved. Thefe theories are arranged, 

 in confequence of the alTumption of this fundamental prin- 

 ciple, into two clafTes of fuppofition : one, which reduces the 

 " emotion of tafte" dlre&ly into an original law of our 

 nature, which fuppofet a fcnie, or fenfes, by which the qua- 

 hties of beauty and fublimity are perceived and felt, as their 

 appropriate objefts ; and hence concludes, that the genuine 

 objeft of the arts of tafte is to difcover and to imitate thofe 

 qualities in every fubjeft, which the prefcription of nature has 

 thus made elTentially either beautiful or fublime. To this 

 firft clafs of hypothefes belong almoft all the theories of 

 mufic, architefture, and fculpture, the theory of Mr. 

 Hogarth, of the abbe Winkelman, and, perhaps, in its 

 laft refort, alfo the theory of fir Joftiua Reynolds ; and 

 of all thofe who attend more to the caufcs of thefe emo- 

 tions, than to tiieir nature. The fecond clafs of hypothefes 

 refifts the idea of any new or peculiar fenfe, diftindl from 

 the common principles of our nature ; which fuppofes fome 

 one known and acknowledged principle or affedion of mind 

 to be the foundation of all the emotions we receive from 

 the objeAs of tafte ; and, therefore, refolves all the va- 

 rious phenomena into fome more general law of our intel- 

 leftual or moral conftitution. Of this kind are the hvpo- 

 thefes of M. Diderot, who attributes all our emotions of 

 this kind to the perception of relation ; of Mr. Hume, who 

 refolves them into our fenfe of utility ; of the venerable St. 

 Auftin, who, with nobler views, one thoufand years ago, 

 refolved them into the pleafure which belongs to the per- 

 ception of order and defign, &c. This hypothefis has been, 

 adopted by rational and philofophic minds : by thofe who 

 have been led by their habits to attend more to the nature of 

 the emotions they felt than to the caufes which produced 

 them. Mr. Alifon, purfuing an analyfis of the effeft which 

 is produced upon the mind, when the emotions of beauty or 

 fubhmity are felt, concludes that it is very different from the 

 determination of a " fenfe ;" that it is not a fimple but a 

 complex emotion ; that it involves, in all cafes, the produc- 

 tion of fome fimple emotion, or the exercife of fome moral 

 affeftion, and the confequent excitement of a peculiar 

 exercife of the imagination ; that thefe concomitant effefts 

 are diftinguiftiable, and very often diftinguiilied in our expe- 

 rience ; and that tlie peculiar pleafure of the beautiful ar.d 

 fublime is only felt when thefe two effcfts are conjoined, and 

 the complex emotion produced. 



Our author having inveftigated the caufes which produce 

 this effeft, or, in other words, "the fqurccs of the beautiful and 

 fublime in nature and art, and having ftiewn that there is 



no 



