V 1 R 



V 1 R 



Willd. in Sp. PI. V. 4. 872, have retl-rred it to Myrlfiicii, 

 by the fpecific name oi febifera, v/here, notwithtlanding our 

 learned friend Mr. Brown's doubts, we ftiould think it ought 

 to remain. 



VIROSIDUM, in Ancient Geography, a town of Great 

 Britain, thouo-ht by Camden to be Warwick, in Cumber- 

 land. 



VIROVESSA, a town of Hifpania Citerior, S.E. of 

 Julio- Brigduna, one of the ten cities of the AutrigoneS, ac- 

 cording to Pliny. In the Itin. Anton, it is marked on the 

 ronte from the Gauls to the place named Ad Legionem 

 Geminum, between Segafamundum and Segefamona. Pto- 

 lemy calls it Vireufta, and it is now named Briviefca. 



VIROVIACUM, a place marked in the Itin. Anton, 

 between Caftellum and Turnacum, or Caffel and Tournai, 

 at the fame diftance from both places. 



VIROUR, in Geography, a town of Hindooftan, in 

 Tinevelly ; 57 miles N.N.E. of Neermul. 



VIRPRINACH, a town of Iftria; 9 miles E.N.E. of 



Pedena. 



VIRREIES, three fmall ifla.^ds among tlie Pliilippines. 

 N. lat. \f 18'. E. long. 121° 48'. 



VIRSBO, a town of Sweden, in Weilmanland ; 24 

 miles N. of Stroem(holm. 



VIRTON, a town of France, in the department of the 

 Foreils; 10 miles S.W. of Arlon. 



VIRTSUNGIANUS Ductus, ox Duaui Virifungii, fo 

 called from the inventor, Virtfungius, a profeffor at Padua, 

 in Anatomy, a canal, more niMzAy ciM&i du8us pancreatictis. 

 See Pancreas and Pancreatic Juice. 



VIRTU% Ital. force, talents. 



VIRTUAL, Potential, fometliing that has a power, 

 or virtue, of afting, or doing. 



The term is chiefly underftood of fcmething that afts by 

 a fecret invifible caafe, in oppofition to aflual :md Jinfib/e. 



ViuTUAL Focus, in Optics. See Focus. 



VIRTUALIT Y, Virtualitas, in the Schools, denotes 

 fome mode or analogy in an objeft, which, in reality, is the 

 fame with fome other mode, but, out of regard to contra- 

 diftory predicates, is confidered as if di.linft from it. 



And hence arife what we call virtual diJ}in8ions, by which 

 one virtuality is diftinguifhed fro.ii another, not one thing 

 from another. 



Thus it is, the divine nature is diflinguifhed from the di- 

 vine perfon ; and the divine underftanding from the divine 

 will. 



VIRTUALLY, Virtualitek, is applied to a mode 

 of exiftence. A thing is faid to be virtually any where, 

 when it is deemed to be there by fome virtue, influence, or 

 other eifeft, produced by it. Thus the fun is virtually on 

 earth, i. f. by his light, heat, &c. 



A thing is alfo faid to be virtually prefent, when the vir- 

 tues, or properties, belonging to it, and iffuing from it, fe- 

 main. In which fenfe, the forms of the elements are held to 

 be virtually in mixed bodies. 



A thing is alfo faid to be a caufe virtually, or a virtual 

 caufe, and that two ways : the firtt, when there is no real 

 diftinftion between it and the effe£t attributed to it j and 

 yet it is conceived by us as if it were really the caufe of it. 

 Thus, immutability in God is the caufe of eternity. 



Secondly, when any effect, is not of the fame kind with 

 the caufe, and yet the caufe has the power or virtue of pro • 

 ducing the effeft ; thus the fun is not formally, but vir- 

 tually^ hot ; and fire is not contamed formally, but vir- 

 tually, in heat. 



VIRTUE, Virtus, a term ufed in various fignifica- 

 tions. In the general, it denotes power, or perfcSion, of 



any thing, whether natural or fupematural, animate cr 

 inanimate, eflential or acceflary. Hence the virtues, 

 that is, the powers of God, angels, men, plants, ele- 

 ments, &c. < 



Virtue, in its more proper and reftrained fenfe, is ufed 

 by fome writers to fignify an habit, which improves and 

 perfefts the poffeflbr and his aftions. Accordingly, in this 

 fenfe of the term, firtue is a principle of afting or doing 

 well and readily ; and as there are two faculties or powers in 

 man from which all his aftions proceed, inz.. the under- 

 itanding and the will, fo the virtue (as thefe authors fay), 

 by which he is perfe^ed, or by which he is difpofed to do 

 all things rightly, and to live happily, muil be two-fold ; 

 the one of the underftanding, the other of the will. That 

 which improves the underftanding, is called intelkaual, or 

 dianoetic ; and that, the will, moral, or ethical. For, fince there 

 are two things required in order to live aright, viz. to know 

 what ftiould be done, and, when known, readily to perform 

 it ; and fince man is apt to err various ways in each refpeft, 

 unlefs regulated by difciphne, &c. he alone can deport him- 

 felf rightly in his whole courfe of hfe, whofe underftanding 

 and will have attained their utmoft perfetlion. 



Virtue, Jntelkffual, then, according to Ariftotle, is an 

 habit of the reafonable foul, by which it conceives or fpcaks 

 the truth, either in affirming or denying. 



The virtues which come under this clafs are divided into 

 fpetulative, which are thofe converfant about neceflary 

 things, that can only be known or contemplated ; and prac- 

 tical, which are converfant about contingent things, that 

 may likewife be praftifed. 



Ariftotle has another divifion of intelleftual virtue, derived 

 from the fubjeft ; as fome of them are feated in the 

 tTir>i//i;»»x'5, or contemplative part ; viz. thofe converfant about 

 neceflary things, as fcience, tvi/dom, intelligence ; and others in 

 the Xoyis-ixn, or praiiical part, fuch as thofe converfant about 

 contingent things, zs prudence, art, Sic.^ 



Virtue, Moral, is defined by Ariftotle to be an eleftive 

 habit, placed in a mediocrity, determined by reafon, and as 

 a prudent man would determine. See the fequel of this 

 article. 



We ftiall here fubjoin as concife an account as poflible of 

 the principal fyftems of morality or ethics that have been 

 propofed by different writers, both ancient and modern, 

 who have treated of this fubjeift ; from which the reader 

 v/ill be able to difcover the opinions that have chiefly pre- 

 vailed with regard to the nature, foundation, and obligation 

 of virtue, referring for a more extended and elaborate ac- 

 count of the fubjeft to the article Moral Philosophy. 



It may be proper to premife, that virtue has been diftini- 

 guilhed into abjlra8 or abfolute, and relative or pradical 

 virtue. AhJIrad virtue is, moft properly, a quality of the 

 external aftion or event ; and denotes what an aftion is, 

 confidered independently of the fenfe of the agent ; or 

 what, in itfelf and abfolutely, it is right fuch an agent, in 

 fuch circumftances, {hould do, and what, if he judged truly, 

 he would judge he ought to do. PraSical virtue, on the 

 contrary, has a neceflary relation to, and dependence upon, 

 the fenfe and opinion of the agent concerning his aftions : 

 or it fignifies what he ought to do, upon fuppofition of his 

 having fuch and fuch fentiments of things. Agreeably to 

 this diftinftion, good aftions have been by fome divided into 

 fuch as are materially good, and fuch as are formally fo. 

 The enquiry concerning the foundation of virtue refers to 

 abfolute virtue : and if it be aflted what the foundation of 

 virtue i9, we may mean cither, what is the true account or 

 reafon that fuch and fuch aftions are right, or apprehended 

 as fuch by us ; or, what are the primary principles and 



heads 



