VIRTUE. 



Leads of »irtue, /. e. the conli^erations inferring obligation 

 in particular cafes, and rendering particular aftions right 

 and fit to be done ; or, moreover, what are the motives, 

 caufes, and reafons, which engage or attach us to it, and 

 fupport the praftice of it in the world. In this lail fenfe 

 the term mad be ufed by thofe who reorefent the will of 

 God, felf-intereft, the reafons of things, and the moral 

 fer.fe, as all diftinA and coincident foundations of virtue. 



An ingenious writer, in forming his arrangement of the 

 different fyftems of moral philofophy, of which we (hall 

 here avail ourfelves, oblerves, that in treating of tlie princi- 

 ples of morals, there are two queftions to be confidered : 

 firft, wherein does virtue confift, or what, in temper and 

 corduft, conftitutes the excellent and laudable charafter ? 

 and fecondly, by what power of the mind is this charafter, 

 v/hatever it be, recommended to us ? The firft quettion is 

 examined when we confider whether virtue confills in bene- 

 volence, as Dr. Hutchefon imagines ; or in afting fuitably 

 to the different relations of perfons and things, as Dr. 

 Clarke fuppofes ; or in a conformity to the will of God ; 

 or in the prudent purfiiit of our own true happinefs, as 

 others have maintained. In reference to the fecond queftion 

 vre confider, whether the virtuous charafter, whatever it 

 confuls in, be recommended to ub by felf-love, which makes 

 us perceive that this charafter, both in ourfelves and others, 

 tends raoft to promote our own private intereft ; or by 

 reafonj which points out to us the difference between one 

 charafter and another, in the fame manner as it does tiiat 

 between truth and falfehood ; or by a peculiar power of 

 perception, called a moral fenfe, which this virtuous ciia- 

 rafter gratifies and pleafes, as the contrary difgufts and dif- 

 pleafes it ; or laftly, by fome other principle in human 

 nature, fuch as the modification of fympathy, or the like. 



The different accounts which have been given of the 

 nature of virtue, may be reduced to three different clafTes. 

 According to fome, virtue, or the virtuous temper of 

 mind, does not confift in any one fpecies of affeftions, but 

 in the proper government and direftion of all our affeftions, 

 which may be either virtuous or vicious, according to the 

 objefta which they purfue, the principles and motives that 

 direft the purfuit of them, and the degree of vehemence 

 with which they purfue them. According to thefe authors, 

 therefore, virtue confifts in propriety. 



According to others, virtue confifts in the judicious pur- 

 fuit of our own private intereft and happinefs, or in the 

 proper government and direftion of thofe felfifh affeftions 

 which aim folely at this end. In the opinion of thefe 

 authors, virtue confifts in prudence. 



Others again make virtue confift in thofe affeftions only 

 which aim at the happinefs of others, not in thofe which 

 aim at our own. According to them, therefore, difin- 

 terefted benevolence is the only motive which can ftamp 

 upon any aftion the charafter of virtue. 



According to Plato, Ariftotle, and Zeno, virtue confifts 

 in propriety of conduft, or in the fuitablenefs of the af- 

 feftion from which we aft to the objeft which excites it. 

 In the fyftem of Plato, reafon is the judging and ruling 

 faculty ; and virtue, according to him, confifts in that ftate 

 of mind in which every faculty confines itfelf within its 

 proper fphere, without encroaching on that of any other, 

 and performs its proper office with that precife degree of 

 vigour which belongs to it : or, in other words, virtue con- 

 fifts in propriety of conduft. 



Virtue, according to .\riftotle, (as we have already 

 ftatcd,) confifts in the habit of mediocrity, according to 

 right reafon ; every particular virtue lying in a kind of 

 medium between two oppofitc vices ; and ttius, by making 



virtue to confift in praftical habits, he probably had in view 

 to oppofe the doftrinf of Plato, who feems to have thought 

 that juft fentiments concerning what was fit to be done or 

 avoided were of themfelves fufficient to conftitute the moft 

 perfeft virtue. Ariftotle, on the contrary, was of opinion, 

 that no conviftion of the underftanding was capable- of 

 getting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals 

 arofe not from knowledge but from aftion. 



Others dilallow the Peripatetic notion of virtue, as 

 placed in a habit : for a habit, or habihty, fay they, in- 

 cludes two things ; a cuftom, and facility ; the firft: as a 

 caufe, and the fecond as an effeft : fo that a habit is 

 nothing but a facility acquired by cuftom. They, there- 

 fore, who make virtue a habit of doing well, muft, of ne- 

 oeffity, afcribe it to a frequent exercife of good aftions. 

 But this cannot be ; for the virtue muft be before the 

 good aftions ; and the habit, after them. Indeed, whence 

 (hould the aftions proceed, but from virtue ? Virtue, 

 therefore, is before the good aftions, and, certainly, before 

 a habit, refulting from a frequency of good aftions. Hence, 

 they define virtue to be a firm purpofe, or refolution, of 

 doing whatever right reafon demands to be done. For, 

 though a cuftom of doing well be required to make a 

 perfon efteemed good among men ; yet it does not follow 

 that that cuftom, or habit, is the formal caufe of that de- 

 nomination, or the goodnefs itfelf. 



Befides, from the definition of Ariftotle, none can know 

 what virtue is ; for what mediocrity is, or what an extreme, 

 in which he fuppofes vice to confift, can never be deter- 

 mined, till we know what is agreeable to the nature of 

 things ; and, moreover, the definition is faulty, becaufe 

 there are fome branches of virtue which cannot be carried 

 to an extreme. 



In thisconneftion we may obferve, that as on various oc- 

 cafions mankind aft more from habit tlian refleftion, and 

 that they are in a great degree paflive under their habits, 

 the exercife of virtue, the guilt of vice, or the ufe of moral 

 and rehgious knowledge, confift in forming and contraftin^ 

 thefe habits. Hence it appears, that it is in many cafes a 

 very important and ufeful principle of virtue (fee Habit) ; 

 and we ftiall thus be able to explain the nature of halitual 

 virtue. Whatever definition of virtue we may adopt, a 

 man may, in faft, perform many afts that juftly merit the 

 denomination of virtuous, without thinking at the time of 

 the principle from which he afts ; whether it be reftitnde, 

 benevolence, a regard to the will of God, or a view to his 

 own happinefs. 



According to Zeno and the Stoics, virtue confifted in 

 choofing and rejefting all different objefts and circum- 

 ftances according as they were by nature rendered more or 

 lefs the objefts of choice or rejeftion ; in felefting thofe 

 which were moft to be chofen, when all could not be ob- 

 tained ; and in felefting thofe which were Icaft to be 

 avoided, when all could not be avoided. This conftituted 

 the effunce of virtue, and was what the Stoics called to live 

 confiftently, to live according to nature, and to obey thofe 

 laws which nature, or the Author of nature, prefcribcd for 

 our conduft : and in this courfe, they required the nofl 

 perfeft apathy, and confidered every emotion which might 

 in the fmallgft degree difturb the tranquillity of the mind, as 

 the effeft of levity and folly. 



Befides thefe ancient there are fome modern fyftems, ac- 

 cording to which virtue confifts in propriety ; or in the 

 fuitablenefs of the affcftion from which we aft, to the 

 caufe or objeft v^hich excites it. The fyftem of Dr. 

 Clarke, Mr. Balguy, and other writern, which placrs 

 virtue in afting according to tht relations of perform and 

 I i : tlinigfl, 



