VIRTUE. 



things, fn regulating our conduft according to the fitnefs 

 or incongruity which there may be in tlie apphcation of 

 certain aftions to certain things, or to certain relations ; 

 tliat of Mr. Grove and others, who explain virtue by 

 faying, that it is the conformity of our aftions to rea- 

 fon or wifdom ; that of many others, who reprefent it as 

 originating in a regard to the will of God ; that of Mr. 

 Wollafton, which places it in afting according to the truth 

 of things, aitlons as well as words having a language, fo 

 that when this aftion is agreeable to the nature of things, 

 the aftion is virtuous, and when it implies a falfe alfertion, 

 vicious : that of lord Shaftefbury, which places it in main- 

 taining a proper balance of the affeftions, and allowing no 

 pjJTion to go beyond its proper fphere, or in a certain juft 

 difpofition of a rational creature towards the moral objedls 

 of right and wrong : are all of them reducible to the fame 

 fundamental idea of propriety, as it has been explained. 



The moft ancient of thofe fyftems, which make virtue 

 confift in prudence, is that of Epicurus, who maintained that 

 bodily pleafure and pain were the fole ultimate objefts of 

 natural defire and averfion, and were the fources of thofe of 

 the mind ; and who placed the moft perfeft happinefs which 

 man was capable of enjoying in eafe of body, and in traji- 

 quillity of mind. According to him, virtue did not deferve 

 to be purfued for its own fake, nor was itfelf one of the 

 ultimate objefts of natural appetite, but was eligible on 

 account of its tendency to prevent pain, and to procure 

 eafe and pleafure. Among our modern writer;, on the fub- 

 jeft of morahty, there have been fome who have placed all 

 virtue in a %vife regard to our own intereft : this feems to 

 have been the opinion of Dr. Waterland, Dr. Rutherford, 

 &c. 



The fyftem which makes virtue confift in benevolence, 

 feems to have been the doftrine of moft of thofe philofo- 

 phers who, about and after the age of Auguftus, called 

 themfelves Ecleftics, who pretended to follow chiefly the 

 opinions of Plato and Pythagoras, and who are commonly 

 known by the name of the later Platonifts. In the divine 

 riatui-e, according to them, benevolence was the fole princi- 

 ple of aftion, and directed the exertion of all the other at- 

 tributes. The wifdom of the Deity was employed in finding 

 out the means for bringing about thofe ends which his good- 

 nefs fuggefted, as his infinite power was exerted to execute 

 them. Benevolence, however, was a fupreme and governing 

 attribute, to which the others were fubfervieiit, and from 

 which the whole excellency of the divine operations was 

 ultimately derived. The whole perfeftion and virtue of the 

 lium?n mind confifted in fome refemblance and participation 

 of the divine perfeftions, and, confequently, in being filled 

 with the fame principle of benevolence, which influenced 

 all the aftions of the Deity. This fyft«m, as it was much 

 efteemed by many of the ancient fathers of the church, was, 

 after the Reformation, adopted by feveral divines of the moft 

 eminent piety and learning, and of the moft amiable manners ; 

 particularly by Dr. Ralph Cudworth, Dr. Henry More, 

 and Mr. John Smith, of Cambridge. Mr. Bayes has alfo 

 more lately confidered benevolence as the fpring of the 

 divine aftions ; whilft Mr. Balguy referred them all to rec- 

 titude, and Mr. Grove to wifdom. The fubjeft was ably 

 canvafTed by thefe writers, and feveral excellent pamphlets 

 publiftied on the occafion. But of all the patrons of the 

 fyftem of benevolence^ the late Dr. Hutchefon purfued it to 

 the greateft extent, and with diftinguifhed acutenefs and ac- 

 curacy. Accordingly, he defines moral goodnefs to be a 

 quality apprehended in fome aftions, which produces appro- 

 bation and love towards the after, from thofe who receive 

 BO benefit from the aftion ; and he obferves, that the mix- 



ture of any felfifti motive diminifhes or altogether deftfoyj 

 the merit which would otherwife have belonged to any ac- 

 tion, and, therefore, that virtue mull confift in pure and dif- 

 interefted benevolence aloije. Others, and particularly Dr- 

 Cumberland, in his Law of Nature, have placed the whole 

 of virtue in the love of God and our fellow-creatures : to 

 this purpofe he obferves (De Legat. Nat. cap. i. feft. 4.), 

 the foundation of all natural law is this, that the greateft. 

 benevolence of every rational agent towards all forms the 

 happieft ftate of every and of all the benevolent, as far as is in 

 their power, t.ad is neceffarily requifite to the happieft ftate 

 which they can attain ; and, therefore, the common good i« 

 the fupreme law. Archdeacon Paley, defervedly efteemed 

 as one of our moft popular modern writers, defines virtue to 

 be " the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of 

 God, and for th? ake of everlafting happinefs." Accord- 

 ing to this definitivvn, in our judgment partly juft and partly 

 erroneous ( fee Moral Philosophv ), but comprehending the 

 fentiments of thofe who refer virtue to benevolence, to the 

 will of God, and to a regard to their own happinefs, the 

 good of mankind is the fubjeft, the will of God the rule, 

 and everlafting happinefs the motive of human virtue. 



The three fyftems above recited comprehend the principal. 

 accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue. To 

 one or other of tiiefe, all the other definitions or defcriptions. 

 of virtue, how different foever they may appear, are eafily, 

 reducible. That fyftem which places virtue in obedience 

 to the will of the Deity, may be counted among thofe 

 which makes it confift in prudence, or among thofe which, 

 make it confift in propriety. When it is afked, why wt 

 ought to obey the will of the Deity, the queftion can admit 

 but of two different anfwers. It muft either be faid, that 

 we ought to obey the will of the Deity becaufe he is a beings 

 of infinite power, who will recompence or punifti : or it 

 muft be faid, that, independent of any regard to our own. 

 happinefs, or to rewards and punifhments of any kind, there 

 is a congruity and fitnefs that a creature fhould obey ita 

 Creator, and a hmited imperfeft being fubmit to one of in- 

 finite perfeftion. In the firft cafe, virtue confifts in pru- 

 denc J or in the proper purfuit of our own final and fu- 

 preme intereft ; fince it is upon this account that we are 

 obliged to obey the will of the Deity : and in the latter cafe» 

 virtue muft confift in propriety ; fince the ground of our 

 obligation to obedience is the fuitablenefs or congruity of the 

 fentiments of humility and fubmifllon to the fuperiority o£ 

 the objeft which excites them. That fyftem which places 

 virtue in utility, coincides too with that which makes it con- 

 fift in propriety. 



All the fyftems above recited fuppofe, that there is a real 

 and effential diftinftion between virtue and vice, whatever 

 thefe qualities may confift in. There is a real and effential 

 difference between the propriety and impropriety of any 

 affeftion ; between benevolence and any other principle of 

 aftion ; between real prudence and fhort-Cghted folly or 

 precipitate raftinefs. And the general tendency of all thefe 

 fyftems is to encourage the beft and moft laudable difpo- 

 fitions and habits. 



There are, however, fome other fyftems, which feem alto- 

 gether t« annihilate the diftinftion between vice and virtue, 

 and the tendency of which is, therefore, wholly pernicious : 

 fuch are the fyftems of Rochefoucault, and Mandeville, who 

 afcribes aftions commonly accounted virtuous to the fri- 

 volous motive of vanity : treating every thing as vanity that 

 has any reference to what are, or ought to be the fentiments 

 of others ; and by means of fuch fophiftry he eftabhfties his 

 favourite conclufion, that private vices are public benefits. 

 After tlie enquiry concerning the nature of virtue, the. 



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