VIRTUE. 



ftniAure of our natures, which have no otlier' meafure or 

 ftandard befides every one's private ftrufture of mind and 

 fenfations ; that it imphes, that a creature vnth. intelligence, 

 reafon, and liberty, could not have performed one good ac- 

 tion, without that inftinftive affeftion to which Dr. Hutche- 

 fon afcribes every good aftion ; that it makes brutes capa- 

 ble of virtue, becaufe they are capable of aifeftions ; that 

 it eftimates the excellency of charafters by the ftrength of 

 paflions, by no means in our power ; and that, upon the 

 whole, it gives us a much lefs honourable idea of virtue than 

 other fyftems, which make it to confift in the agreement of 

 the aftions of an intelligent being, with the nature, circum- 

 ftances, and relations of things, and of which reafon is the 

 judge. 



We fhall only add, that the opinion of thofe who maintain 

 our ideas of morality to be derived from fenfe, is far from 

 being entirely modern. There were, among the ancients, 

 philofophers, particularly Protagoras and his followers, who 

 entertained a hke opinion, but extended it much farther, that 

 is, to all fcience, denying all abfolute and immutable truth, 

 and afferting every thing to be relative to perception. 



According to others, who afcribe the principle of appro- 

 bation to fentiment, there is no occafion for fuppofing any 

 new power of perception ; nature afting in this, as in all 

 other cafes, with the ftrifteft economy, and producing a mul- 

 titude of effefts from one and the fame caufe ; and there- 

 fore, fympathy, they fay, a power which has always been 

 taken notice of, and with which the mind is manifeftly en- 

 dowed, is fufficient to account for all the effefts afcribed to 

 this peculiai- faculty. Of this number is Dr. Adam Smith. 

 ( See Symp.athy. ) See alfo Smith's Theory of Moral Sen- 

 timents, pafGm ; and particularly part i. feft. i, 2, 3. 



The term obligation of virtue, or moral obLgation, fre- 

 quently occurs among moral writers ; and it is very difiFer- 

 ently defined and explained. Mr. Balguy defines obligation 

 to be a ftate of the mind into which it is brought by per- 

 ceiving a reafon for aftion ; but an excellent writer obferves, 

 that this is the effeft of obligation perceived, rather than 

 obhgation itfelf. 



Other writers, with Dr. Cumberland, have defined obliga- 

 tion the necefiity of doing a thing in order to be happy : but 

 if this be the only fenfe of obhgation, what is meant when 

 we fay, a man is obliged to ftudy his own happinefs ? In this 

 cafe we can only mean, that it is right to ftudy our own 

 happinefs, and wrong to negleft it. 



Dr. Warburton maintains, that moral obligation always 

 denotes fome objeft of will or law, or implies fome obliger ; 

 and accordingly, the word obligation Cgnifies only the par- 

 ticular fitnefs of obeying the divine will, and cannot pro- 

 perly be applied to any other fitnefs, which is reftraining the 

 fenfe of the word in a manner unwarranted by the common 

 ufe of it. 



Moral obligation, fays Dr. Paley, is like all other obliga- 

 tions ; and all obligation is nothing more than an inducement 

 of fufficient ftrength, and refulting, in fome way, from the 

 command of another. As the will of God is our rule, to 

 inquire what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in 

 any 'inftance, is, in effeft, to inquire, what is the will of 

 God in that inftance ? This n to be determined either by his 

 exprefs declarations, which muft be fought for in fcripture, 

 or by the light of nature, i. e. what we can difcover of his 

 defigns and difpofition from his works ; and therefore it is 

 abfurd to feparate natural and revealed rehgion from one 

 another. 



Mr. Hume, in his fourth Appendix to his Principles of 

 Morals, has been pleafed to complain of the modern fcheme 

 of uniting ethics with the Chriftian theology. They who 



find themfelves difpofed to join in this complaint will do 

 well to obferve v/hat Mr. Hume himfelf has been able to 

 make of morahty ^-nthout this union. And for that pur- 

 pofe, let them read the fecond part of the ninth feftion of 

 the above effay ; which part contains the praftical applica- 

 tion of the whole treatife, — a treatife, which Mr. Hume 

 declares to be " incomparably the beft he ever wrote." 

 V/hen they have read it over, let them confider, whether 

 any motives there propofed are likely to be found fufficient 

 to withhold men from the gratification of luft, revenge, 

 envy, ambition, avarice, or to prevent the exiftence of thefe 

 paffions. Unlefs tliey rife up from this celebrated effay, 

 fays archdeacon Paley, with ftronger impreffions upon their 

 minds, than it ever left upon mine, they will acknowledge 

 the neceffity of additional fanftions. But the neceffity of 

 thefe fanftions is not now the queftion. If they be in fall 

 ejlalli/hed, if the rewards and punilliments held forth in the 

 gofpel will aftually come to pafs, they mujl be confidered. 

 Such as rejeft the Chriftian rehgion are to make the beft 

 (liift they can to build up a fyftem, and lay the founda- 

 tions of morality without it. But it appears to be a great 

 inconfiftency in thofe who receive Chriftianity, and expeft 

 fomething to come of it, to endeavour to keep all fuch ex- 

 peftations out of fight in their reafonings concerning human 

 duty. 



Dr. Hutchefon fays, a perfon is obhged to an aftion, 

 when every fpedlator, or he himfelf, upon refleftion, muft 

 approve his aftion, and difapprove omitting it. Obhgation 

 to aft, however, and reflex approbation or dilapprobation, do, 

 in one fenfe, always accompany and imply one another ; yet 

 they feem as different as an aft and an objeft of the mind, or 

 as perception and the truth perceived. After all it may be 

 obferved, that however varioufly and loofely this word may 

 be ufed, its primary and original fignification coincides with 

 reftitude : right imphes duty in its idea, fo that to perceive 

 an aftion to be right, is to fee a reafon for the doing it in 

 the aftion itfelf, abftrafted from all other confiderations 

 whatever ; and this perception, this acknowledged reftitude 

 in the aftion, is the very effence of this obligation, or that 

 which commands the approbation and choice, or binds the 

 confcience of every rational being. See Price's Review of 

 the Principal Queftions, &c. in Morals, chap. vt. ; Adams's 

 Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue ; and Paley's 

 Principles of Moral and Pohtical Philofophy, vol. i. 



Morahfts ufually diftinguifti four principal, or, as they are 

 vulgarly called, cardinal virtues ; "jiz . prudence, juJlice,forlitudt, 

 and temperance : the reafon of which divifion is founded in 

 this : that, for a man to live virtuoufly and honeftly, it is 

 nccefTary he know what is fit to be done ; which is the bufi- 

 nefs of prudence. That he have a conftant and firm will to 

 do what he judges beft ; which wiU perfeft the man, either 

 as it reftrains too violent perturbations, the office of temper- 

 i!n:<: : or as it fpurs and urges on thofe that are too flow 

 and languid, which is the bufinefs of fortitude : or, laftly, 

 comparatively, and mth regard to human fociety ; which 

 is the objeft of jujlice. 



To thefe four all the other wrtues are referred, either as 

 parts, or as concomitants. 



Some ethical writers divide virtue into betuvolence, pru- 

 dence, fortitude, and temperance; by others it is diflinguifhed 

 into two branches only, prudence and benevolence ; the former 

 attentive to our own intereft, and the latter to that of our 

 fellow-creatures, both direfled to the increafe of happinefs, 

 and taking equal concern in the future as in the prefent : but 

 the divifion that is now moft common, is into duties towards 

 God, as piety, reverence, refignation, gratituJe, &c. ; to- 

 wards other men (relative duties), as juftice, ch;u-ity, fidelity, 



leyalty, 



7 



