UNIVERSALE. 



UNIVERSAL, fomething that is common to many 

 things ; or, it is one thing belonging to many, or all things. 



The word, according to fome, is compounded of unum 

 ver/tis alia. 



There are univerfal inftruments, for meafuring all kinds 

 of diftances, as heights, lengths, &c. called alfo pantometers 

 and bolometers. 



An univerfal dial is that by which the hour may be found 

 by the fun all over the earth ; or under any elevation of 

 the pole. See Univerfal T)i\l. 



Several learned authors have had it in view to eftablifh 

 an univerfal charafter ; by which the different nations 

 might underftand each other's writings, without learning 

 their language. See Univerfal Character. 



The Romanics are divided among themfelves about the 

 title of univerfal b'ifhop, which fome of the popes have arro- 

 gated to themfelves ; though others of them have declined 

 it. Baronius holds the appellation to belong to the pope 

 jure divino ; and yet St. Gregory, oppofing the fame qua- 

 lity given by a council in 586 to John, patriarch of Con- 

 ftantinople, afferted exprefsly, that it did not belong to any 

 bilhop ; and that the bifhops of Rome neither could, nor 

 ought to take it. Accordingly, St. Leo refufed to accept 

 it, when offered him by the council of Chalcedon ; for fear, 

 lell, giving fomething particular to one bifhop, they fhould 

 take from all the rell ; fmce there could not be an uni- 

 verfal bifhop, but the authority of the refl muft be 

 diminifhed. 



Universal, Univerfale, in Logic, is either complex or in- 

 complex. A complex univerfal, is either an univerfal proportion, 

 as, " Every whole is greater than its parts ;" or whatever 

 raifes a manifold conception in the mind ; as the definition 

 of a reafonable animal. 



An incomplex univerfal, is what produces one only con- 

 ception in the mind, and is a fimple thing, refpefting many ; 

 as human nature, which relates to every individual in which 

 it is found. 



Now in an univerfal, two things are diflinguifhed ; the 

 matter, called the material univerfal, univerfale materiale, 

 which is the one nature multiphable into many ; as hu- 

 manity in Peter, Paul, &c. ; and the/orm, called the formal 

 univerfal, which is the unity of that nature. 



Wherefore, to conftitute an univerfal, it is requifite the 

 nature be one, yet multipliable ; but what fuch a nature is 

 has proved matter of great controverfy, both among the 

 ancient and modern philolophers. 



The Platonifls will have univerfals to be nothing but di- 

 vine ideas. By idea, they mean the pattern or form which 

 the artificer has in view when he makes any thing ; but as 

 this is twofold ; internal, which is a fort of image of the 

 thing to be done, which the artificer frames in himfelf ; and 

 external, which is fometlung out of himfelf, wliich the arti- 

 ficer imitates ; the philofophers have been infinitely per- 

 plexed to find which of the two Plato meant. The Peripa- 

 tetics infill he meant the external ; but the Platonills, and 

 moll of the Chriflian divines, were advocates for the 

 internal. 



The Peripatetic fyflem of fpecies and phantafms, as well 

 as the Platonic fyflem of ideas, is grounded, fays Dr. Reid, 

 in his reafoning againll the ideal theory (fee Idea), upon 

 this principle, that in' every kind of thought, there mufl be 

 fome objeft that really exifts ; in every operation of the will, 

 fomething to work upon. Whether this immediate objeft 

 be called an idea with Plato, or a phantafm or fpecies with 

 Ariflotle ; whether it be eternal and uncreated, or pro- 

 duced by the imprefiions of external objects, 13, as he thinks, 

 of 110 confequence in the prefent argument. 

 9 



The Stoics and Nominalitls maintain this in common with 

 the Platonifls, that univerfals are not in the things them- 

 felves, but out of them. The Stoics particularly, for uni- 

 verfals, put a kind of formal conceptions, or afts of know- 

 ing ; by reafon they reprefent many things at the fame 

 time ; e. g. knowledge, reprefenting all men, is, according 

 to the Stoics, an univerfal. 



The Nominalifls make words univerfals ; becaufe the 

 fame word reprefents many things, as the word man repre- 

 fents all men ; but both Stoics and Nominalifls make uni- 

 verfals to be fomething extrinfic to things themfelves ; al- 

 leging that whatever exiils, or is produced, is fingular ; fo 

 that there is no univerfal really in things. See Nominals 

 and Realists. 



The Peripatetics, however, contend, that there are uni- 

 verfal and common natures in tilings themfelves ; or that 

 things and natures like each other form a material univerfal. 

 But as to the manner in which they are univerfal, or whence 

 they derive their univerfality, that is, their unity and apti- 

 tude of being in many, whether from nature, or from our 

 underflanding, is great matter of difpute among them. If 

 they derive that unity in which their univerfal form is 

 placed from nature, then there is an univerfal a parte ret ; 

 which is the opinion of the Scotifts. 



If they do not derive it from nature, but only from our 

 minds or underftandings, then the doftrine of the Thoraills 

 is allowed, who contend, that a formal univerfal has no other 

 exittence, but by an aft of the intelleft. 



"As in all the ancient metaphyfical fyflems," fays the inge- 

 nious profefTor Dugald Stewart, " it was taken for granted, 

 tliat every exertion of thought implies the exiflence of an 

 object diilinft from the tliinking being ; it naturally oc- 

 curred, as a curious queflion, What is the immediate objeft 

 of our attention, when we are engaged in any general fpecu- 

 lation ? or, in other words, what is the nature of the idea 

 correfponding to a general term ?" — " In anfwer to this 

 queflion," fays the profefTor, "tlie Platonills, and, at an 

 earlier period, the Pythagoreans, taught, that although 

 thefe univerfal ideas are not copied from any objefts per- 

 ceivable by fenfe, yet that they have an exiflence independ- 

 ent of the human mind, and are no more to be confounded 

 with the underflanding, of which they are the proper ob- 

 jefts, than material things are to be confounded with our 

 powers of external perception : that as all the individuals 

 which compofe a genus, mufl pofTefs fomething in common ; 

 and as it is in confequence of this, that they belong to that 

 genus, and are diflinguifhed by that name, the common 

 thing forms the effence of each ; and is the objeft of the un- 

 derflanding, when we reafon concerning the genus. They 

 maintained alfo, that this common effence, notwithflanding 

 its infeparable union with a multitude of different indi- 

 viduals, is in itfelf one and indivifible." Our author fubfli- 

 tutes the term ejence for idea, as more inteUigible to the 

 modern reader, and more fuited to convey the true import 

 of Plato's exprefTions. ( See Essence. ) On mo ft of thefe 

 points, the philofophy of Ariflotle very nearly agreed with 

 that of Plato ; though they ufed different language in 

 developing their refpeftive opinions. Plato, fond of the 

 marvellous and myflerious, maintained the incomprehenfible 

 union of the fame idea or effence, with a number of indi- 

 viduals, without multiplication or divifion. Ariflotle, aim- 

 ing at greater perfpicuity, contented himfelf with faying, 

 that all individuals are compofed of matter and form ; and 

 that in confequence of pofleffing a common form, different 

 individuals belong to the fame genus. " But they both 

 agreed, th.it, as the matter, or the individual natures of ob- 

 jefts were perceived by fenfe ; fo the general idea, or effence, 



or 



