UNIVERSALS. 



or ioim, was perceived by the iiitelleft ; and that, as the 

 attention of the vulgar was chiefly engrofled with the 

 former, fo the latter furnifhed to the philofopher the mate- 

 riala of his fpeculations. 



" The chief difference between the opinions of Plato and 

 Ariftotle on the fubjeift of ideas, related to the mode of 

 their exiftence. That the matter of which ;ill thint^s are 

 made, exifted from eternity, was a principle which both ad- 

 mitted ; but Plato farther taught, that, of every fpccies of 

 things, there is an idea or form which alfo exilled from 

 eternity ; and that this idea is the exemplar or model ac- 

 cording to which the individuals of the ipecies were made ; 

 whereas Ariftotle held, that, although matter may exill 

 without form, yet that forms could not exid without 

 matter. 



" The doftrine of the Stoics concerning univerfals, differed 

 widely from thofc both of Plato and Ariftotle, and feems to 

 have approached to a fpeculation which is commonly fup- 

 pofed to be of a more recent origin, and which an eminent 

 philofopher of the prefent age has ranked among the dif- 

 coveries which do the greateft honour to modern genius." 

 See Hume's Treatife of Human Nature, book i. part i. 

 fedt. 7. 



Our author's preceding ftatement of Ariftotle's doc- 

 trine, as far as it is commonly fuppofed to differ from 

 that of Plato, is founded on the authority of Bruckcr, 

 whom we have cited under the appropriate titles ; though 

 Harris, in his " Hermes," and the author of the " Origin 

 and Progrefs of Language," give a different account of the 

 difference fubfifting between them. 



The opinion which generally prevailed among the Scho- 

 laflics in the dark ages was, " that univerfals do not exill 

 before things, nor ajtcr things, but in things ; that is, uni- 

 verfal ideas have not (as Plato thought) an exiftence fepa- 

 rable from individual objefts ; and, therefore, they could 

 not have exifted prior to them in the order of time ; nor 

 yet, (according to the doftrine of the Stoics,) are they 

 mere conceptions of the mind, formed in confcquence of an 

 examination and comparifon of particulars ; but thefe ideas 

 or forms are from eternity united infeparably with that 

 matter of which things confdl ; or, as the Ariftotelians 

 fometimes exprefs themfelves, the forms of things are from 

 eternity immerfed in matter." 



This opinion concerning the nature of univerfals was ge- 

 nerally maintained till the eleventh century, when a new 

 doftrine, borrowed from the fchool of Zcno, waspropofed by 

 Rofcchnus, and propagated by Abelard. According to 

 thefe philofopliL'rs, there are no exillences in nature corre- 

 fpondmg to general terms, and the objcfts of our attention 

 in all our general (peculations, are not idea?, but words. 

 The SchoIafticB from this time formed themfelves into two 

 lefts, ixz. the Nominalifts and Realills : the former attach- 

 ing itfelf to the opinions of Rofcclinus and Abelard, and the 

 latter to the principles of Ariftotle. See No.minai.s and 



RkA LISTS. 



Our author's opinion coincides with that of the Nomi- 

 nalifts ; and from his elaborate ftatement of the proccfs of 

 the mind, in purfuing general fpeculations, he nifcrs, "that 

 idea, which the ancient philofophers confidered as the cffence 

 of an individnal, is nothing more than the particular quality 

 or qualities in which it refembles other individuals of the 

 fame clafs ; and in conlequence of which, a generic name is 

 applied to it. It is the poffefRon of this quality, that cn- 

 iitles the individual to the generic appellation ; and which, 

 therefore, may be faid to be elfential to its clalfification with 

 -that particular genus ; but as all clalTifications are to a cer- 

 tain dcrjrcc arbitrary, it docs not ncccffarily follow, that it 



is more eilential to its exiftence as an individual, than various 

 other qualities which we are accuftomcd to regard as acci- 

 dental. In other words (if I may borrow- the language of 

 modern philofophy), this quality forms its nominal, but 

 not its real cft'ence." See Classification, Abstraction, 

 and Genkkalization. 



After the death of Abelard, the Rcalifts began to revive ; 

 the left of the Nominalifts declined, and in the fourteenth 

 century was almoft completely extinft. Their doftrine was 

 equally reprobated by the two great parties which then 

 divided the fchools ; the followers of Duns Scotus and of 

 Thomas Aquinas. (See Scotists and Tiiomists. ) At 

 length, William Occam vindicated the long-abandoned phi- 

 lofophy of Rofcelinus. See Nominals. 



Although the names of the contending parties no longer 

 exift, the lubjeft of controverfy between them has at a very 

 late period intereftcd the attention of philofophers. The 

 moft diftinguifhed advocates for the doftrine of the Nomi- 

 nalifts, fince the reviv.il of letters, are Hobbes, Berkeley, 

 and Hume. 



" The univerfahty of one name to many things," fays 

 Hobbes (Tripos, chap. v. ^ 6.) " hath been tlie caufe that 

 men think the things themfelves are univerfal ; and fo fe- 

 rioufly contend, that betides Peter and John, and all the reft 

 of the men that are, have been, or fliall be, in the world, 

 there is yet fomething elfe that we call man, tn'z. man in 

 general ; deceiving themfelves, by taking the univerfal, or 

 general appellation, for the thing it fignifieth : for if one 

 fliould dcfire the painter to make him the pifture of a man, 

 which is as much as to fay, of a man in general ; he meaneth 

 no more, but that the painter ftiould chufe what man he 

 pleafeth to draw, which muft needs be fome of them that are, 

 or have been, or may be ; none of which are univerfal. But 

 when he would have him to draw the pifture of the king, or 

 any particular perfon, he limiteth the painter to that one 

 perfon he chufes. It is plain, therefore, that there is 

 nothing univerfal but names ; which are therefore called 

 indefinite, becaufe we limit them not ourfeives, but leave 

 them to be applied by the hearer : whereas a Angular name 

 is limited and reftrained to one of the many things it fig- 

 nifieth ; as when wc fay, this man, pointing to him, or giving 

 him his proper name, or by fome fuch other way." 



Berkeley and Hume do not materially differ from one 

 another. " A very natural queflion," fays the latter, ( Trea- 

 tife of Human Nature, book i. jiart i. ^ 7.1, "has been 

 flarted concerning abitraft or general ideas ; Whether they 

 be general or particular in the mind's conception of them ? 

 A great philofopher has difputed the received opinion in 

 this particular ; and has afferted, that all general ideas are 

 nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, 

 which gives them a more extcnfive fignilication, and makes 

 them recall, upon occafion, other individuals, which are 

 limilar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the 

 greateft and moft valuable difcoveries that have been made 

 of late years in the republic of letters, I (hall here en- 

 deavour to confirm it by fome arguments, which, 1 hope, 

 will put it beyond all doubt and controverfy." 



Leibnitz, has alfo declared himfclf a partifan of this feft, 

 in a difVcrtation entitled " De Stilo Philofophico Marii 

 Nizolii." Dr. Campbell, in his " Philofophy of Rhetoric," 

 has founded an interefting fpeculation on the principles of 

 Berkeley and Hume. S.'e Absthaction. 



Attempts have been made, fays our author, for reviving 

 the fyftem of the Realifts ; and he reckons among the 

 ableft of thefe that of the excellent Dr. Price, to whom he 

 pays a tribute of merited refpeft. This approved writer 

 employed, he fays, his ingenuity in fupport of fome of the 



old 



