WIT. 



the lead difference, thereby to avoid being mifled by fimili- 

 tude, and, by affinity, to take one thing for another : and 

 hence he accounts for the reafon of that common obferva- 

 tion, that men who have much wit and prompt memories, 

 have not always the cleared judgment, or deeped reafon. 



It is the metaphor and allufion wherein, for the mod 

 part, confid the entertainment and pleafantry of wit ; which 

 ftrikes in fo lively a manner on the fancy, and is therefore 

 fo acceptable to all people, becaufe its beauty appears at 

 firft fight, and there is required no labour of thought, to 

 examine what truth or reafon there is in it. The mind, 

 without looking any farther, reds fatisfied with the agree- 

 ablenefs of the pifture, and the gaiety of the imagination ; 

 and it is a kind of affront to go alsout to examine it by the 

 fevere rules of truth, or reafon. Whence it diould feem, 

 that wit confids in fomething that is not perfeftly conform- 

 able to them. Effay on Human Underd. b. ii. c. xi. f. 2. 



Profeffor Diigald Stewart (Elem. of the Philofophy of 

 the Human Mind, p. 302.) adds to Locke's definition of 

 wit, that it implies a power of calling up at pleafure the 

 ideas which it combines ; and he inclines to believe, that the 

 entertainment which it gives to the hearer is founded, in a 

 confiderable degree, on his furprife, at the command which 

 the man of wit has acquired over apart of the conditution, 

 which is fo little fubjeft to the will. Hence it is, that we 

 are more pleafed with a bon mot which occurs in converfa- 

 tion than with one in print ; and that we never fail to receive 

 difgud from wit, when we fufpeft it to be premeditated. 

 The pleafure, too, which we receive from wit, is heightened, 

 when the original idea is darted by one perfon, and the 

 related idea by another. Accordingly Dr. Campbell has 

 remarked, that a witty repartee is infinitely more pleafing 

 than a witty attack ; and that an allufion will appear excel- 

 lent when thrown out extempore in converfation, which 

 would be deemed execrable in print. 



To the fame purpofe another ingenious writer has ob- 

 ferved upon Mr. Locke's defcription of wit, that every 

 refemblance of ideas is not that which we call wit, unlefs it 

 be fuch an one that gives delight and furprife. Thefe two 

 properties, he fays, feem eflential to wit, more particularly 

 the latter of them. In order, therefore, that the refem- 

 blance in the ideas be wit, it is necefiary they diould not lie 

 too near one another in the nature of things ; for where the 

 likenefs is obvious, it gives no furprife. Speftator, vol. i. 

 N°62. 



From this account of the nature of wit, it is eafy to per- 

 ceive what good reafon Cicero had for faying (De Orat. 

 lib. ii. cap. 54.) Wit is a thing not to be learned: it is the off- 

 fpring of nature, and proper effeA of a bright and lively 

 fancy. Cicero reduces wit to two kinds, •vi-z,. cavillatio, 

 which, in our language, may be called continued luit, or h\i- 

 mour, and JiifrtcrtdJ, which may be termed concife viit, orjeding. 

 The ingenious profeifor above cited fuggeds the follow, 

 ing difference between invention in the arts and fciences and 

 wit. The former depends, in mod indances, on a com- 

 bination of thofe ideas which are conneAed by the lefs ob- 

 vious principles of affociation ; and it may be called forth in 

 ahnod any mind by the preffure of external circumdances. 

 The ideas which mud be combined in order to produce the 

 latter are chiefly fuch as are affociatcd by thofe flighter con- 

 neftions which take place when the mind is carelefs and dif- 

 engaged. " If you have real wit," fays lord Chederfield, 

 " it will flow fpontaneoufly, and you need not aim at it ; for 

 in that cafe, the rule of the gofpel is reverfed ; and it will 

 pMve, Seek and you fhall not find." Accordingly wit is 

 promoted by a certain degree of intoxication, which pre- 

 vents the exercife of that attention which is neceffary for in- 

 vention iu matters of fcience. 



For the nature of wit in general, the different kinds of 

 it, its ufe to an orator, and the manner in which it ought to 

 be condufted, fee Ward's Orat. vol. ii. p. 195, Sec. 



Wit is alfo an appellation given to perlons poffeffed of 

 the faculty called luit, efprit. 



A French author, who, in 1695, pubhdied a " Treatife 

 of Wit, du Bel Efprit," lays down four charafters of it. 



1. A man, who, with an open air and eafy motions, 

 affefls thofe he converfes with agreeably ; and on any 

 fubjeft that prefents itfelf, advances new thoughts, and 

 adorns them with a fprightly turn ; is, all the world over, 

 a wit. 



2. Another, who, lefs folicitous about the choice and de- 

 licacy of his fentiments, knows how to make himfelf valued 

 by I know not what elevation of difcourfe ; who draws 

 much attention, and ihews great vivacity in his fpeaking, and 

 readinefs in his anfwers ; is hkewife acknowledged a wit. 



3. A third, who takes lefs care about thinking than 

 about fpeaking well : who aftefts fine words, though per- 

 haps low and poor in matter ; who pleafes by an eafy pro- 

 nunciation, and a certain tone of voice, is placed in the 

 fame rank. 



4. Another, whofe chief aim is not to make himfelf 

 edeemed, fo much as to raife mirth and laughter ; who 

 jokes pertinently, rallies pleafantly, and finds fomething 

 to amufe himfelf with in every petty fubjeft ; is likewife 

 allowed a wit. 



Yet, it may be obferved, that in all thefe cafes, there is 

 nothing of real wit, as above defined ; but the whole is 

 imagination, or memory at mod : nay the whole is no more 

 than what temperament may give. 



A true wit mud have a jud faculty of difcernment ; mud 

 have, at the fame time, both great energy, and peculiar de- 

 licacy, in his fentiments ; his imagination mud be noble, 

 and at the fame time happy and agreeable ; his expreffions 

 polite and well turned ; without any thing of parade or 

 vanity in his difcourfe, or his carriage. It is not at all ef- 

 fential to a wit, to be ever hunting after the brilliant ; dill 

 dudying fine thoughts, and affefting to fay nothing but 

 what may itrike and furprife. 



This is a fault very frequent in dramatic perfons : the 

 duke of Buckingham rallies it very judly. 



" What is that thing which we flieer wit do call ? 

 'Tis when the wit of fome great writer fhall 

 So overflow, that is, be none at all, 

 That ev'n his fools fpeak fenfe ." 



From the account we have given in the preceding article 

 of the difference between invention and wit, it appears, that 

 thofe who have the reputation of wits are commonly more 

 confident in their own powers, who allow the train of their 

 ideas to follow, in a great meafure, its natural courfe, and 

 hazard in company every thing, good or bad, which occurs 

 to them. Men of modedy and tade feldom attempt wit in 

 a promifcuous fociety ; or if they are forced to make fuch 

 an exertion, they are feldom fuccefsful. Such men, however, 

 in the circle of their friends, to whom they can unbofora 

 themfelves without referve, are frequently the mod amufing 

 and the mod intereitiiig of companions ; as the vivacity of their 

 wit is tempered by a correft judgment and refined manners: 

 and as its effedl is heightened by that fenfibihty and delicacy, 

 with which we fo rarely find it accompanied in the common 

 intercourfe of life. When a man of wit makes an exertion 

 to didinguith himfelf, his fallies are commonly too far-fetched 

 to pleafe. He brings his mind into a ilate approaching that ' 

 of the inventor, and becomes rather ingenious than witty. 



Genuine wit, fays lord Chederfield, never made any man 

 laugh fince the creation of the world : upon which profef. 



for 



1 



