to confequences, certain aftions necelTary for the preferva- 

 tion of the individual and the continuation of the kind. 



"Tnftincl in brutes bears fome analogy to reufon in men. 

 There have been many fyllems adopted to explain the prin- 

 ciples which produce and direcl the fpontaneous aftions-of 

 brute animals. 



Many of the ancient philofophers afcribcd to brutes an 

 underllanding differing only in degree from that of man, 

 and attributed their inferiority to the want of proper and 

 fufficient bodily organs. This fyfteni has been very llre- 

 nuoudy fupported by M. Hc-lvetius, de I'Efprit, torn. i. 

 p. 2. &c. Among the moderns the learned Cudwortli en- 

 deavoured to explain the inftindt of animals, by means of a 

 certain plallic nature. Des Cartes thought that all the 

 atlions of brute animals might be explained by the fimple 

 laws of mechanifm, and con'.iders them as machines totally 

 devoid of life and fcntiment, but fo curioufly conilrucltd 

 by the Creator, that the mere imprefrions of light, found, 

 and other external agents, on their orgai.s, produced a fcries 

 of motions in them, and caufed them to execute thofe 



INSTINCT. 



fent to the 



mind by the powers of imagination, or of n •- 

 mory, in a lax fenfe of the word. Thefe are common t,i 

 men and other animals, excepting that brutes poflefs oiily 

 the faculty of imagination in common with us, and not that 

 of memory, in the llrifl; and proper fenfe of the word. In- 

 deed this author endeavours to prove, tliat the knowledge 

 of brutes docs not merely differ in degree from that of n.: :, 

 but that it is of a kind entirely different from it ; and t! ..' 

 they are incapable both of memoi-y and reafoi.ing : the .'. 

 culty of imagination f^-rving to give thein a confufed lu 

 of events that are part, by the view, or other impreflioiv. i 

 objocfs that are prefent." The third and principal claf- 

 inliinfls is that which comprehends all thofe which ivl. Reir 

 calls [prMtaneous. This fpecies of inftind is not atter. 

 with any power of refleftion, determining the animal to ^. 

 cide freely between two different modes of aiTtion prelent 

 to his imagination ; nor is it merely corporeal or mechanical. 

 It is put into atlion by the natural and primitive principle 

 of felf-love, implanted in ail animated beings ; or by a love 

 of pleafure and averlion to pain, producing a voluntary 



operations, which had before been afcribed to an in- clination to perform certain actions v.hich tend to their 



ternal principle of life and fpontaneity. But the actions 

 and manners of animals, which are totally incompatible witli 

 the mere principles and laws of mechanifm, evince the ab- 

 furdity of this opinion. The dogma of Des Cartes is faid 

 to have been firll introduced by Pherecydes, the mailer of 

 Pythagoras ; and though Des Cartes had the merit of 

 developing and applying this hypothelis, the doftrine 

 was before publiilied by the Spaniard Pereira. M. Buffon 

 adopts the opinion of Des Cartes in part.but grants brule ani 

 mals life, and the faculty of dillinguiihing between pleafure 

 and^pain, together with a ilrong inclination to the former and 

 averlion from the latter. By thefe inclinations and aver- 

 iions he undertakes to account for all, even the moll ftriking 

 operations of animals ; affirming, that, in confequence of 

 impreflions made on the brain, by means of the fenfitive 

 organs, and by the re-aclion of the brain and nerves on the 

 mufcles, thefe machines acquire a motion conformable to the 

 nature of the animal, and of the impreflions of the different 

 objects which a<St upon their organs, and excite defu-e or 

 averfion. See Bi;l"tes. 



The pre-eftabhflicd harmony of Leibnitz Las alfo been 

 applied to explain the actions of brute animals. Others 

 have confidered the aiflions of animals as produced by the 

 conftant snd immediate influence of the divine energy, di- 

 recting all their inclinations and motions : fuch appears to 

 liave been the opinion of Mr. Addifon, in the fecond vohmie 

 of the Soeftator. The late i.ngenious HermaEn ^Samuel 

 ■Reimar, profeffor of philofophy at Hamburgh, lias enu- 

 merated and expofed thefe and other opinions, with regard 

 to the inllincl of animals, in his Obfervations Phyfiques, 

 &c. publiihed in two vol?. i2mo. at Amllerdam and Paris, 



ill-being and prefervation. To the performance of thefe 

 atlions they are particularly prompted by their prefent 

 fenfations, by imagination fupplying- the place of memory, 

 and by other caufes. The wonderful effefls produced by 

 thefe inllinclive appetites, are farther to be attributed to 

 the exquilite mechanifm in their bodily conformation, par- 

 ticularly in the ilrudlure of the various organs with which 

 they execute their operations, and to the fuperior perfec- 

 tion and acutenefs of their external fenfes, by which they 

 are quickly and dillinflly informed of thofe qualities of 

 objedls which mofl materially concern them. In order to 

 account for the more curious and furpriling operations of 

 brute animals, M. Reimar adds two other principles, v'lz. 

 ill, an internal diftinft perception of the precife power and 

 proper ufe of their various bodily organ?, together with 

 an innate knowledge of the qualities of thofe objecls around 

 them in which they are interefted ; and, 2dly, certain in- 

 nate and determinate powers and inclinations, impreffed by 

 the Author of nature, a priori, on the foul itfelf; by 

 which they are arbitrarily, and without their own know- 

 ledge or confcioufnefs, direiiled and irrefillibly impelled to 

 the performance of thefe various operations which they 

 execute with fuch unremitting indiiilry and art. Thele 

 determinate forces, whicli conlliiute the principal part of 

 M. Reimar's fylleni, are no where fo vifible and diftinguifli- 

 able as in that numerous fet of inilinds which he claffes 

 under the title of the IrJuJlrious jnllintls of animals. For 

 a farther account of this fyi'lem we mull refer to the work 

 itfelf, or to an abilradl of it, with feveral of the author's 

 ilhillrations, in the Monthly Review, vol. xlv. p. 533, S:c. 

 The majority of philofophers, even in Des Cartes s time. 



J 770: and, defining inllincl, in the moll comprehenfive fenfe maintained, that the aftions of the brutes were mollly m- 



-of the word, to be every natuml inclination, accompanied Jl'mBlvc, and not mechanical. This prevailing fcntiment was 



with a power, in animals, to perform certain adions, di- altered a little by a wrung application of the principles of 



vides initinfts into three heads. The firll, which he calk J.ocke. But the balance was foon afterwards reltored to its 



jnechattkal inJl'wSs, belong to the body confidered as an or- former preponderance in behalf of injllnarce principles, by 



ganizcd fubllance, and arc exercil'ed blindly and inde- the writings of lord Shaftefcury and Dr. Hutchefon ; and 



pendently of the will of the animaL Such are thofe which llill more particularly by thofe of Dr. Reid. Some authors, • 



produce the motion of the heart and lungs, the contraflion who, with Locke, rejeCl innate notions and innate principles, 



and dilatation of the pupil, digedion, &c. This clals of both fpecnhitive and praftical, allow that the mind acls fome- 



iiillin.is it. pofieffed ij) common both by men and brutes, umei injlinclively ; others, v.ho reje£l Locke's ideal theory 



and in fome meafure even by vegetable?. The fecond clafs altogoiher, detail a great number of inllinclive principles of 



comprehends thofe which he terms reprefentative inllinfts, mind ; wlulll a third clafs of writers will have the actions, 



whicli confift partly in the power of perceiving external that have been generally denominated iiijlincl'ivi;, to be either 



objects by their prefent impreliion on the fenfes, and partly hal)itual, allociated, or mechanical. Nor does the matter reft 



iu the faculty of rendering the ideas of thefe objecls pre- here : for fome authors of a very modern date go fo far even 



