INSTINCT. 



BS to mamtajn that tl>e word inftinft is unpliilofophical ; 

 fince all that has been referred to this principle, whether in 

 nan or in the brutes, may be the refult of experience, or of 

 imitation. 



Some writers confound the actions that have been gene- 

 rally deemed /H//;Hi'//i>c with thofe that fpring from reafon ; 

 fonie with tlio(e tliat fpring from mechan'ifm ; and others with 

 fiich as fpring from hah'it and ajfociatlon. But it is eafy, we 

 think, to diltinguilh them from each and all of thefe, by 

 pointing out actions wliich differ from fuch as are called ra- 

 tior.iil, habhuid, or m.xhanlcal. An action is called lallonal 

 when it is performed under the influence of a molh'^; that 

 h, zi-ilh a -vh-'M to confcqtKnccs : Tluis, to worfhip the Deity 

 for having created us, for his goodnefs towards us, and that 

 he may reward us hereafter, is a rational afflon. Some are of 

 opinion that the ntolivs, or the end we have in view in our 

 rational aUions, is the cjufe of thefe aflions ; but for our 

 part, as we think that the human mind can aft not only in 

 oppofition to the ftrongeft external motive, but againft all ex- 

 ternal motives whatever, properly fo called, we caimot help 

 thinking it mere corre-Tt to ciU them fimply inducements, and 

 to confider the mind itfelf fulely and properly as the caufc. 

 Mechanical &tWo\\i alfo have a caufe as well as thofe that are 

 rational; namely, mechanifm or organization. But this caufe 

 is not an end propofed, or a motive ; neither is it an inward 

 feeling, difpofition, or fonfation : Thus a clock goes through 

 its courfe of hours, minutes, and fecouds, without a view to 

 confequences, without fpoataneity, and even without being 

 able to check its own action. To tliis clafs belong tlie ac- 

 tions of the heart and arteries, the vermicular action of the 

 inteftines, and thofe of fecretion and refpiration in animals. 

 IrJIindive actions may be traced to a caufe as well as both the 

 preceding j but this cannot be referred to the clafs of mo- 

 tives., as they are not performed with a view to confequences ; 

 neither can the caufe be faid to he mechanifm, as they are accom- 

 panied with Jponlarieiiy . The proper caufe, however, is the 

 internal feeling, fenfation, or difpofition, that leads to the per- 

 formance of them, w-ithout delign or intelligence, on the 

 part of the animal. Thus an infant, in a few minutes after 

 birth, feeks the bread without any knowledge whatever of 

 its neceflity for his prefervation ; and a pair of young birds, 

 without teaching or experience, build th-jir firfl neft with as 

 much ilvill and esactnefs as the oldeft of their tribe could 

 do ; and that, too, of the cuftomary materials of their fpe- 

 ciesi and in the fituations bsft calculated for depofiting and 

 hatching their eggs. Injlinci and mechanifm have been oftener 

 confounded with each other, particularly of late, than any 

 other of thofe principles of aftion which we are confider- 

 ing; and yet we cannot help thinking that the difthiclion 

 between habit and inJlinawvX not appear as palpable as tliofe 

 we have already made, particularly as fome habits are formed 

 at fo early an age that it is very difficult to afcertain whether 

 the actions that fpring from them are from habit or from na- 

 ture. But fuppofmg fuch a principle as inllindt, fuch as we 

 have defcribed it, the actions that fpring from it muft differ 

 from fuch as are habitual in this, " that the former mull be 

 from nature, and the latter acquired." Habit has been de- 

 fined to be a facihty of doing, and not only a facility, but 

 alfo a pronenefs to do certiiin things from having done 

 tliem frequently before. This definition, however, is 

 manifellly not applicable to habits of art, but only to 

 fuch as can be properly called principles of a^ion. (Sec 

 Hadit.) Inftinctive aclions agree v.ith habitual ones of the 

 latter kind in this, that they are both performed without in- 

 telligence will, or delign ; and this has accordingly induced 

 Dr. Reid to confound them, and to clafs tljcm, very im- 

 properly we think, under the head of mechanical aftions. 



Their agreeing in a few particulars cotild not warrant him in 

 reducing them to the fame clafs, particularly when he tells 

 us himfelf, that " the origin of one is natural, of the other 

 acquired." 5ut, befides this, the habitual aftions of man 

 feemto want altogether t]at fpoiilaneity which we obferve in 

 the inftinftivc actions of the other animals ; fuch as neft- 

 building, for intlance, and the operations of bees, dercribcd 

 in a fubfeqvient part of this article, or the migrations of 

 birds of palfage " through the pathlefs air without cliart or 

 compafs." One inllance of an action confeffedly habitual 

 will illuftrate this more fully. Let us take that motion of 

 the eye-lids which occurs almoft every inftant. This aftion 

 cannot be the neceffary refult of mechanifm, as we fee that 

 children do not, for fome days after birth, clofe their eye-Hds 

 on the approach of external objects. But as foon as fomC 

 object (fuppofe too much light)' has made them feel inconve- 

 nience or pain, and thus produced a voluntary or mechanical 

 motion of the eye-lids, this effect becomes gradually fo in- 

 timately affociatcd with its caufe, that even the appearance 

 of the candle will produce the effedl. And, finally, habit 

 gives us fo great a pronenefs to this aftion, that we perform 

 it conllantly, amidll all our occupations, without confciouf- 

 ncis, will, or fpontaneity ; and even without perceiving that, 

 in every waking minute of our lives, we are feveral moments 

 totally in the dark. And fo far is this motion from being a 

 voluntary act, that it requires a ftrong exertion of will and 

 attention to check it, even for a {hort time ; but do what we 

 will, we can never check it altogether. To avoid being mif- 

 underftood, it will be neceffary to illuftrate more fully tlie 

 dillindtion between habits o^' art, in which we acquire a faci- 

 lity only from frequent practice, fuch as playing expertly on 

 the violin or harpfieliurd, and thofe habits, which, belides a 

 facility, induce alfo s. pronenefs to act; for inftance, in that 

 motion of the eye-lids juft defcribed, and many other awk- 

 ward motions and habits learned from bad example and bad 

 company. This is the more neceffary, as it has not been 

 illuitrated fufficiently by any author with whom we are ac- 

 quainted ; and forcibly calls to our recollection the words of 

 a French writer, who remarks: " Tout fe tient dans un cer- 

 tain ordre de fpcculations : Voulez vous developer une ve- 

 ritc ? II faut en cclaircir vingt autres, qui I'avoifinent, et 

 dont Inlumiere vient, pour ainfi dire, I'cclairerpar reflexion. ' 

 Habits of the latter kind may be properly called principles 

 ofaftion; habits of art ca.nnot. Thefe require thought, at- 

 tention, and will in the performance of their operations ; 

 « hilit the others require no fmall exertion of thought, atten- 

 tion, and will to check them. Nor can they, even thus, be 

 completely overcome, until, by repeated exertions, a counter 

 habit is cilabhfhed, which is the beft way to obviate their 

 effects. It was this that made Dr. Reid lay, " I conceive it 

 to be a part of our conllitution, that what we have betn ac- 

 cullomed to do we acquire not only a facility, but a pronenefs 

 to do on hke occafions ; fo that it requires a particular will 

 or effort to forbear it, but to do it require.^;, very often, no 

 will at all. We are carried by habit, as by a flrea'm in fwim- 

 ming, if we make no relidance." Dr. Reid diftiugi. idles, 

 thefe two fpccies of habits as we do; but in fome paffages 

 he fcems to confound them, for he claffes them and inllinct 

 under the head of mechanical principles. Thus, he fays, 

 " Habit differs from inllindt, not in its nature but in its 

 origin ; the latter being natural, the former acquired. Botk 

 operate without will or intention, without thought, and 

 therefore may be ca'led mechanical principles.'' (See- 

 H.\BIT.) From both thefe paff.iges it would feem that le 

 meant habit in general ; for the ali'ertions are not qualified in 

 any fliape. If fuch was his opinion, his doclriiie agrees 

 exadly with that of Dr, HnrtW, wht>ftt lan)^iage ailord* 



