INSTINCT. 



tio opportunity for being in doubt about his meaning. But, 

 for our part, we cannot help thinking it more pliilofophical 

 to admit any pofiibly conceivable rapidity in our intelleftual 

 operations, tlian to fuppofe, that any aftion performed with 

 fo much corrcftnefs, and with fiich rapidity, as violin and 

 harpfichord playing in fome inftances, can be merely habitual, 

 or automatic ; that is, in every one of its minute fub-divifions 

 altogether unconnctted with the exertions of the will. In 

 habits of art, then, we deem it more corredl to admit the 

 interference of the will ; but in the other clafs, which only, 

 becaufe they give not merely a facility, but alfo a pronenefs 

 to aft, ought to be called principles of aftion, we fee no 

 reafon for admitting its interference in any refpeft. A dif- 

 ferent opinion feems to be maintained in a late elegant trea- 

 tife, for whofe author we have a high refpeft. Upon this 

 we fhall offer a few remarks ; but we have not as yet done 

 with Dr. Rcid. After having attentively examined what 

 he has written on this fubjeft, we do not think that he in- 

 tended to include habits of art in tlie paflages cited above. 

 Surely fo correil an obfcrver of nature could not think, that 

 in habits of arl, fuch as pin-making and violin playing, we 

 acquire, from frequent doing, " not merely v^ facility, but 

 alfo ?Lproner.cfs to do the fame thing on like occafions." In 

 all habits of art we acquire more or lefs of facihty, but 

 furely no pronenefs, as Dr. Reid aflVrts uf the habits he had 

 in view in one of the paflages cited above : for who can aflert 

 with any truth, that a violin-player feels a particular pronenefs, 

 or inward impulfe, to play upon that favourite inftrunient, as 

 often as it is prefented to him ? And yet he has acquired a 

 facility in playing, from having often played before. The 

 truth feems to be, that Dr. Reid, after tiating the diftinftion 

 of habits already mentioned, threw the habits of art into the 

 back groimd altogether. This, indeed, is llrongly con- 

 firmed by the circumltance, that in the effay and chapters to 

 which we allude, he treats only of what can be called ^jv'h- 

 cipks of aaioa, which he defines to be " every thing that in- 

 cites us to aft ;" and particularly when he tells us that habits 

 of arl, fince they give only a facility, cannot with propriety 

 be called principles of aftion. " Habit," he fays, "is com- 

 monly defined a facility of doing a thing, acquired by having 

 done it frequently. This definition is fufficient for habits of 

 art ; but the habits which may, with propriety, be called 

 principles of aftion, mull give more than a facility, tliey 

 muft give an inchnation, or impulfe, to do the aftion ; and 

 that, in many cafes, habits have this force, cannot be 

 doubted." It deferves to be remarked, that in this paffage 

 , j^^ he does not fay, that habits give :s.prouencfs (in his own words, 



^ ' an inclination or impulfe) to aft in fiwy cafe, which he 



fhould have done, if he meant to bring habits of art under 

 the olifervation. He only lays, " that habits give an incli- 

 nation or impulfe in many cafes ;" which feems to prove, that 

 he meant only " thoCe habits, which may, with propriety, 

 be called principles of aftion." This opinion is ftill further 

 ftrengthened by the following e.\traft : " Ariftotle makes 

 vvifdom, prudence, good fcnle, fcicnce and art, as well as 

 the moral virtues and vices, to be habits. If he meant no 

 more, by giving this name to all thofe intelleftual and moral 

 qualities, than that they are all ftrengthened and confirmed 

 by repeated afts, this is undoubtedly true. I take the word 

 ■ in a lefs extenfivc fenfe, when I confider A«toj- <w/>Wnf/^/f^ o/" 

 aRion. I conceive it, &c." (as quoted above.) In this ex- 

 traft he tells us, that he takes the word habit in a confined 

 fenfe, meaning only fuch habits as he calls principles of allion. 

 And lie has already told us, that habits of art do not come 

 under that denomination. If the latter part only of the 

 par.igraph be attended to, it feems to fhew that Dr. Reid 

 held the fame opinion on this point with Hartley ; but if the 



whole be taken together, and interpreted with fairnefs, an4 

 confidered in conneftion with our remarks on the fubjeft, we 

 think it will appear more probable, that Dr. Reid meant 

 only a particular fpecies of habits, thofe wiiich he calls ^c//;- 

 ciphs of adion, and that he did not intend to charaderize fuch 

 habitual aftions as violin and harpfichord-playing, as involmi- 

 tary and mechanical. It muft not be concealed, that pro- 

 feftbr Stewart of Edinburgh feems to think otherwife of 

 Dr. Reid's meaning ; and that he has proved, partly in con- 

 fequence of that opinion, that fome ot our habitual aftions 

 are under the guidance of the will. From the preceding 

 remarks it will appear, that our opinion differs not from the 

 learned profeftbr's, if he means only habits of art : but if he 

 means to bring the other clafs of luibits under the influence 

 of the will, (as it is probable he does, for he talks of habitual 

 aftions in general, and does not even hint at a diftinftion,) 

 we cannot help thinking, as even analogy itfelf affords no 

 fupport to this opinion, that lie «as fvvayed too much by an 

 over-ardent zeal for premature generalization. It deferves 

 to be remarked, as an additional proof of the fairnefs with 

 which we have interpreted Dr. Reid's opinion, that he fays 

 nothing of habits of art in his chapter on habit, except men- 

 tioning one folitary inftance, merely to fhew " the power of 

 habits and their utility ;" whereas he exprefsly mentjons, as 

 bcL*nj'ing to that fpecies which he calls principles of auion, 

 many " awkward habits in addrefs, motion, looks, geflure, 

 and pronunciation, acquired by frequenting bad company ; 

 to forbear which, when fully formed, a general refohition 

 (he fays) is not fufficient." He even affirms, that particular 

 attention is necelTary, on every occafion, to refiit their im- 

 pulfe, until they be undone by the habit of oppofing them : 

 for thcfe habits operate without intention." It is remarked 

 by profefTor Stewart, on the fubjeft of habitual aftions, " that 

 the circumftance of our inability to rccolleft our volitions 

 does not authorize us to difpute their poifibility." To this 

 obfervation we have no objeftion ; but when he further con- 

 tends " that it does not add any force to the objeftion, to 

 urge, that there are inftancesin which we find it difficult, or 

 perhaps impolfible, to check our habitual aftions by a con- 

 trary volition ;" we muft remark, that this very circum- 

 ftance, fince it has not been obviated, renders the objeftion 

 infuperable, and the doftrine againft which it m.ilitates, fo 

 far as that relates to the fpecies of habits which we have 

 called principles of action, altogether inconclufive. I.et any 

 one try, by the moll firm and perfevering efforts, to check 

 for a fliort time the moll common of all habits, that of clofing 

 the eyelids, and he will find, though he may fucceed for a 

 few moments, that he cannot do fo altogether. Nor is it an 

 anfwer to this faft to fay " that the contrary volition does 

 not remain with us fteadily, during the whole operation ; 

 but is merely a general intention, or refohition, which is 

 banifhed from the mind as foon as the occafion prefcnts it- 

 felf, with which the habitual train of our thoughts and voli- 

 tions is affociatcd." For the time requifite for trying this 

 experiment, and being defeated in it, is fo very fliort, that 

 the contrary volition may be eafily kept in view, all the 

 while, without its dwindhng away into " a gener^.l intention 

 or rcfolution ;" and befides, if the perfon who tries the ex- 

 periment, thinks that he is unable to keep up the counter- 

 volition fteadily himfelf, he can eafily have an afTiftant or 

 two, to fit near him, and remind him to keep his thoughts 

 and attention fixed upon the objeft in view. Some may per- 

 haps urge that this motion of the eyelids is iii/lindive ; but 

 by the learned profefTor himfelf it is allowed to be haliilual. 

 \Ve may befides remark, that there is a wide difference 

 between our being unable to recolleft the volitions, which 

 in this theory arc fuppofed to precede all our habitual aftion?, 



and 



