J U D 



holers undermine fufticicntly far back ; and yet, in order to 

 fave themfelves trouble, do not make the hole higher than 

 the judge, and thereby cut away and wafte the jud of coal. 

 Thefe procefTes of coal-digging are particularly defcribed in 

 Mr. Farey's Reoort, vol. i. p. 344. 



Judges, or Boot of Judgm, is a canonical book of the Old 

 Tellament, con'aining the hiilory of the Ifraclite judges, 

 of whom we have been fpeaking in a preceding article. 



The author is not known : it is probable the work did 

 not come from any tingle hand, being rather a coUcClion 

 of f veral httle hiiiories, which at firll were fepnrate, but 

 were afterwards colledled by Ezra, or Samuel, into a 

 fingle volume ; and, in all likelihood, were taken from the 

 ancient journals, annals, or memoirs, compofed by the fe- 

 Teral judges. 



The antiquity of this book is itnqueflionable, as it mud 

 have been written before the time of David ; fince the de- 

 fcription (chap. i. v. 21.) was no longer true of Jerufalem, 

 after he had taken pofleffion of it, and liad introduced a 

 third clafs of inhabitants of the tribe of Judah. Eichorn 

 acknowledges, that it doth not bear any marks of fubfe- 

 quent interpolation. Dr. Patrick is of opinion that the five 

 lad chapters are a dilUncl hiilory, in which the author 

 gives an account of feveral memorable tranfaClions, which 

 occurred in or about the time of the judges ; whofe hiftory 

 he would not interrupt by intermixing thefe matters with it, 

 and therefore referved them to be related by themfelves, in 

 the fecond part, or appendix. In thefe he firll gives an 

 account how idolatry crept into the tribe of Ephr?im, then 

 how it was propagated among the Danites ; after which he 

 relates a moll heinous act of adultery, committed in the 

 tribe of Benjamin; which introduces the hiftory, firft, of 

 the almoft. total deftruftion of that tribe for their coun- 

 tenancing that deteftable faft, and then of its reftoration. 

 Eichorn alfo fuppofes that thefe chapters are diftincl frag- 

 ments of a lefs certain date, but pofterior to David (chap, 

 xviii. v. 31.), under whom the houfe of God ceafed to be 

 in Shilih. 



JUDGMENT, or the fecond operation of the mind in 

 the acquifition of knowledge (the firft being perception), 

 is a faculty of the foul, by which it perceives the relation 

 between two, or more, ideas : or the concurrence or coin- 

 cidence of two ideas, or the want of concuiTence or coin- 

 cidence. Two ideas, being compared together, concur, as 

 in the inftance of milk and whitenefs ; and they coincide, 

 as in thofe of Gcd and Creator ; or they do not concur, 

 as vice and ufefulnefs, or they do not coincide, as man and 

 brute. 



Thus, when we judge, that the fun is greater than the 

 moon, the underftanding firft compares the two ideas of 

 the fun and the moon ; and, finding the idea of the fun 

 greater than that of the moon, the will perfectly acqui- 

 efces in that perception, nor put» the mind upon any farther 

 enquiry. 



It is not the underftanding, then, that judges, as is ordina- 

 rily tho\i,ht ; judgments and realonings on the part of the 

 underftanding, are b'.it mere perceptions ; it is the will alone 

 that judges, by acquiefcirg in what is reprefented to it by 

 the underftanding. 



The only difference, then, between pirapUon, judgment, and 

 T;cif'jning, \o far as the underftanding is concerned in them, 

 is this ; tiiat it perceives a thing fimply, without any rela- 

 tion to any otlver thing, in a fimple perception ; that it per- 

 ceives the relations between two or more things in judg- 

 ments ; and, laftly, that it perceives the relations that are 

 between the relations of things in reafonings ; fo that all the 



Vol.. XIX 



J U D 



operations of the underftanding arc in cfTedl no more than 

 pure perceptions. 



Thus, when we perceive, for inllancc, twice 2, or 4, this 

 is no more than a fimple perception ; when we judge, that 

 twice 2 are 4, or that twice 2 are not j, the underftanding 

 does no more than barely perceive the relation of equality 

 that is between twice 2 and 4, or of inequality between 

 twice 2 and J. Farther, reafoning confifts in perceiving 

 the relation, not between two or more things, for that 

 would be a judgment, but of two or more relations of two 

 or more things : thus, when I conclude, that 4 being lefs 

 than 6, twice 2 being 4, are by confequence lefs than fix ; 

 I perceive not only the relation of inequality between 2 and 

 4, and 6 (for this were only a judgment), but alfo the rela- 

 tion of inequality betv.'een the relation of twice 2 and 4, and 

 the relation between 4 and 6 ; which conftitutes a reafoning. 

 The underftanding, therefore, only perceives, and it is the 

 will that judges and reafons, in aftenting voluntarily to what 

 the underftanding reprcfcnts. 



Indeed, when the things which we confidcr appear clear 

 and perfcclly evident, it feems as if it were not voluntarily, 

 that the mind confents to them ; whence we are led to 

 think, thtit it is not properly the will, but the underftanding 

 that judges of them. But to clear this point it muft be 

 obferved, that the things which we confider, never appear 

 entirely evident, till the underftanding has examined them on 

 all fides, and has perceived all the relations ncceftary ta 

 judge of them ; whence it happens, that the will, not being 

 able to will any thing without knowledge, cannot aft on the 

 underftanding ; that is. cannot defire it to reprefent any 

 thing new in its objeft, as having already viewed it on all 

 fides that have any relation to the queftion in hand. It is 

 obliged then to reft in what has been already reprefented, 

 and to ceafe to agitate and difturb it any farther ; in which 

 ceftation it is that judgment confifts. 



This reft or judgment, then, not being free when things 

 are in their laft evidence, we are apt to imagine, that it is not 

 the effeft of the will. So long as there is any thing ob- 

 fcure in the fubjeft that we confider, or that we are not 

 fully fatisfied that we have difcovered every thing neceftary 

 to refolve the queftion, as it happens in moll of thofe things 

 that are difiicult, and that contain various relations ; we re- 

 main at liberty not to acquiefce : the will may command the 

 underftanding to purfue its enquiries farther, and to make 

 new difcoveries, whence it is, that we are more ready to 

 allow the judgments formed on thefe fubjecls to be vo- 

 luntary. 



Moft philofophers, however, maintain, that even the judg- 

 ments which we form on obfcure things are not voluntary ; 

 and will have our confenting to the truth to be an .iftion of 

 the underftanding, which they call njfcnl, to diftinguiih it 

 from our confenting to goodnefs, which they attribute to 

 the will, and call it confent. 



But their error is owing to this, that in our prefent ilatc 

 we frequently fee things to be evidently true, without tise 

 leaft rcafon to doubt of them ; in which cafe the will is not 

 at liberty either to give or rcf.ife her aflent : but it is not fo 

 in matters of goodnefs ; there being nothing, which we do 

 not know fume reafon for forbearing to love. So that we 

 here perceive a manifell indifterence, and are fully convinced, 

 that v.lien we love any thing, evcii God, for inftance, we ufe 

 our liberty, and do it voluntarily. But the ufe we make of 

 our liberty is not fo apparent, wlien we confent to the truth, 

 efpccially when it appears perfeclly evident ; and this leads 

 us to think, that our confent to truth, that is, our ii V.gnient, 

 is not voluntary ; as if an aftion, to be volunt:<ry, muil be 

 indifTcrent ; as if the bleffed above did not love God volun- 

 4 E taiily. 



