JUDGMENT. 



f arily, becaufe they cannot be diverted from it by any other 

 thing ; nor we conlVnt freely to this evident propofition, that 

 twice 2 are 4, becaufe we have no appearance of reafon to 

 difTiiade us fiom it. 



Mr. Locke (b. iv. c. 14 ) ditlinguiflies between know- 

 ledge and judgment ; the former being that faculty of the 

 mind, by which it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly 

 fatisfied of the agreement or difagreement of any ideas ; the 

 latter, or judgment, is the putting of ideas togetlier, or the 

 feparating of diem from one another in the mind, when their 

 certain agreement or difagreement is not perceived, but pre- 

 fnmed to be fo ; which is, as the word imports, taken to be 

 fo before it certainly appears; and if it fo unites or feparates 

 them, as in reality things are, it is right judgment. A judg- 

 ment, called by Mr. Locke a mental proportion, is that 

 union or feparation of the ideas which is the refult of the 

 aft of judging; and this inay exill witliout any connection 

 with words ; tho'igh, as men are very much ufed to connect 

 ideas with words, it is very difficult to treat of judgments as 

 dilHnguiHied from verbal propofitious. (See Piioi'OSITIos. ) 

 I'lie iburces of jiidgm.eut are confcio'.ifneis, fenfe, intuition, 

 and teltimony. See each of thefe articles relpeftively. The 

 definition commonly given of judgment, by the more an- 

 cient writers in logic, was, th.it it is an act of the mind, by 

 which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Dr. Reid 

 thinks this to be as good a definition as can be given, and 

 prefers it to fome others ; but it is evidently liable to ob- 

 jections, which he has (lated. Judgment is a fohtary a£i of 

 the mind, and tiie expreffion of it by alKrmation or denial 

 is not at all efTcntial to it ; and therefore the definition muft 

 be rellri<fted to mental affirmation or denial, which, as he 

 fays, is only another name for judgment. Befides, affirma- 

 tion or denial is very often the expreffion of teftimony, 

 which is a different aft of the mind, and ought to be diltin- 

 guifhcd from judgment. Judgment, as Dr. Reid proceeds 

 to obferve, is an aft of the mind fpccifically different from 

 fimple apprehenfioii, or the bare conception of a thing ; for 

 although there can be no judgment without a conception of 

 the things about which we judge, yet conception may be 

 without any judgment. Judgment can be cxprefTed by a 

 propofition onlv, and a propofition is a complete fentence ; 

 but fimple apprehenfion may be exprefied by a word or words, 

 which make no complete fentence. It is felf-evident, that 

 every judgment muft be either true or falfe ; but fimple ap- 

 prehenfion or conception can neither be true nor falfe. 

 Again, one judgment may be contradiftory to another ; and 

 it is impoflible for a man to have two judgments at the fame 

 time, which he perceives to be contradiftory. But contra- 

 diftory propofitious may be conceived at the fame time with- 

 out anydifiiculty. Dr. Reid obferves, that there are fome 

 notions or ideas that ought to be referred to the facuhy of 

 judgment as their fource ; becaufe if we had not that fa- 

 culty, they would not enter into our minds ; e.g. we could 

 not have the idea of any relation without fome exercife of 

 judgment, and yet the relations of things coniHtute one 

 great clafs of our notions or ideas. It is further reinarked, 

 that in perfons come to years of underllanding, judgment 

 neceffarily accompanies all fenfations, perception by the 

 fenfes, confcioufnefs and memory, Ijut not conception. 

 The man who feels pain, judges and believes that lie is really 

 pained ; a perfon who perceives an objeft beUeves tiiat it 

 exifts, and is what he diilinftly perceives it to be ; nor is it 

 in his power to avoid fuch judgment; and the fame may be 

 faid of memory and confcioufnefs. All operations of this 

 kind arc accompanied with a determinaticm that fumcthing is 

 true or falfe, and a confoquent behef. If this determination 

 be not judgment, it is an ojieration without a aame j for it is 



not fimple apprehenfion, neither is it reafoniiig ; it is a 

 mental affirmation or negation ; it may be expreil'ed by a 

 propofition affirmative or negative, aiid it is accompanied 

 with the firmeil belief. " Thefc," fays Dr. Reid, " are 

 the charafteiillics of judgment, and I mull call it judgment, 

 till I can find another name for it." The judgments we form 

 are either of things neceflary, or of things contingent. Our 

 affcnt to neceflary propofitions is not grounded upon any 

 operation of fenfe, of memory, or confcioufnefs, nor does 

 it require their concurrence ; it is unaccompanied by any 

 other operation but that of conception, which mull accom- 

 pany all judgment ; and therefore this judg.ment of things ne- 

 ceflary may be called pure judgment. Our judgment of 

 things contingent muft always reft upon fome other operation 

 of the mind, fuch as fenfe or memory, or confcioufnefs, or 

 credit in teftimonv. 



In common language, there are many forms of fpeech 

 which fhew that the fenfes, memory, and confcioufnefs, 

 are confidered as judging faculties. Evidence is the 

 ground of judgment, and when evidence is perceived, it is 

 impoiTible not to judge. Dr. Reid, adverting to the notion 

 of judgment, which, he thinks, is peculiar to iVIr. Locke, and 

 which we have already ftated, expreffes his opinion, that 

 there can be no knowledge without judgment, though there 

 may be judgment without that certainty which we commonly 

 call knowledge. In order to avoid difputes about the mean- 

 ing of words, this author wilhes to be u;.derllood as giving 

 the name of judgment to every determination of the mind 

 concerning what is true or what is falfe. This, he thinks, is 

 what logicians, from the days of Arillotle, have called 

 judgment. " Whether it be called one faculty," he fays, 

 " as I think it always has been, or whether a philofopher 

 chufcs to fplit it into two, feems not very material. And if 

 it be granted, that by our fenfes, our memory and con- 

 fcioufnefs, we not only have ideas or fimple apprehenfions, 

 but form determinations concerning what is true and what is 

 falfe ; whether thefe determinations ought to be called hwj)- 

 lal^e ox jmh^mcnt, is of fmall moment." — " Philofophers," 

 fays the fame writer, " have never been able to give any 

 definition of judgment which does not apply to the determi- 

 nation of our fenfes, our memory, and confcioufnefs, nor 

 any definition of fimple apprehenfion which can comprehend 

 thofe determinations." Judgments of this kind may, in the 

 ftrifteft fenfe, be called " judgments of nature," nor do 

 they admit of improvement by culture. 



Dr. Reid further obferves, that fome exercife of judgment 

 is neceflary in the formation of all abllraft and general con- 

 ceptions, whether they be more fimple or more complex ; in 

 dividing, in defining, and, in general, in forming all clear and 

 dillinft conceptions of things, which are the only fit materials 

 of reafoning. He adds, that all our notions of relations may 

 more properly be afcribed to judgment as their fource and 

 origin, than to any other power of the mind. The notions 

 of unity and number are fo abftraft, that it is impoffible 

 they fliould enter into the mind until it has fome degree of 

 judgment. Judgment is alfo an ingredient in all matters of 

 talk- ; in all moral determinations ; and in many of our paf- 

 fions and afi'cftions. So that this operation, after we come 

 to have any exercife of judgment, mixes with moll of the 

 operations of our minds, and, in analyfing them, cannot be 

 overlooked without confulion and error. Reid's EfTays, 

 eff. vi. chap. 1. 



Jlik;.ment, in ?i Legal Scnfi, is a fentence or decifioii 

 pronounced by authority of a king, or other power, either 

 by their own mouth, or by that of their judges, and offiocrs, 

 whom they appoint to adminifter juftice in their Head. 



Judgments are the fentence of the law, pronounced by 



