JUSTICE. 



c. 7, 8.), " Ju(liti« conjundla eft beneficientia :" Beneficence 

 is connefted with juftice. And again, " Injuftitise duo 

 genera," &c. There ai-e two kinds of injulHce, one of 

 thofe who do an injury to others ; another with which they 

 are chargeable, who negledt to vindicate and defend the 

 injured, when it is in their power. To the fame purpofe 

 Antoninus fays (rsj. S!j/,m«, 1. ix. c. j.), " A man may be 

 unjuft not only by doing, but negkcling to do fomething." 

 Thefe philofophical writers feem evidently to have thought, 

 that the duties of humanity are parts of juftice properly fo 

 cal ed. Simple juftice we have already defined, agreeable to 

 the accurate definition of it in the civil law. " Juftitia eii 

 conilans et perpetua voluntas jus fuum cuique tribuendi :" 

 i. e. J:tftice is a conftant and prevailing will, or difpofition, 

 to render to every one iiis due. 



Ju'^ice doth not derive its being from fear, as is affirmed 

 by Mr. Hobbes, who fuppofes mankind in their natural 

 ilate to have a licence iincircumfcribed by any other 

 bounds, befides their owti natural force. This licence 

 iliey are induced to exchange for a more limited right 

 in fociety, to prevent that war of every one with every 

 one, which would be the confequence of every one's in- 

 fifting upon his natural rights. " According to this hy- 

 pothefis," as Dr. Cudworth well obferves (Intellett. 

 Syftemj, "juftice and civil government are plainly things 

 not good in tliemfelves, nor defirable (being a hindrance 

 of liberty, and nothing but fliackles and fetters), but 

 by accident only, as neceflary evils. They are lefler evils 

 fubmitted to purely for the fake of avoiding a greater. 

 Hence it inevitably follows, that all men muft be ay.cir^i 

 hy.-j.:-A, iinwilhngly juft, or not with a full and perfcft, but 

 mix-d will only." The true principles of juftice are fuch 

 as thefe : It is reafonable that his will, who is the common 

 father of mankind, fliould be the meafure of their behaviour 

 one towards another. It can never be thought a thing 

 pleafing to God, who has originally the fame affeftion for 

 one as for another, that one man, by fraud or violence, ftiould 

 ufurp dominion over another, or any way moleft or hinder 

 him. Befides, this would introduce confufion into his works, 

 the glory of which is their order and harmony. " If it be 

 the difpofition of mankind," fays Cicero (De Offic, 1. iii. 

 J 5.), that every one for his own advantage ftiould opprcfs 

 and rob his neighbour, it is neceflary that fociety, which is 

 the moft natural ftate of mankind, be entirely diffolved. 

 Juft as in the human body, the whole muft be weakened 

 and deftroyed, if every member coidd have this perfuafion, 

 and aCl upon it ; that it ftiould flourifti by drawing to itfelf 

 the ftrength and nouriftiment of the member neareft to it.'' 

 Thus from that original and univerfal fociety to which a'l 

 mankind belong, neceffarily flow obligations to mutual 

 juftice ; and Mr. Hobbes's ftate of vi-ar appears to contra- 

 difr the very firft view of human nature. But befides this 

 general focioty, particular civil focieties have, by the direction 

 of nature, been erected in feveral parts of the world. The 

 Ai.thor of nature has formed his rational creatures with a 

 ftrong bent and inclination to combine into bodies pohtic. 

 It is iiiclination, therefore, which makes men feek fociety, not 

 the bare profpeft of benefiting themfelves by it ; to fatisfy 

 nature more than to defend themfelves from violence. 

 When focieties are formed, though juftice be ncceftary to 

 make them flourifh, and hence we infer the will of the great 

 . governor of the world ; yet in the nature of things, the 

 obligation to juftice is antecedent to any fociety whatfoever. 

 From the inclination to fociety with which God hath made 

 man, we infer his will to be, that juftice ftiould be cultivated, 

 which is necefiary to the fupport of fociety ; but civil 

 fociety is not the original of juilice. Aiiother prin- 



ciple of juftice is, that the good of the whole is to be 

 preferred before the good of any one part. Is it good, 

 pleafing to a moft benevolent creator, and confequently de- 

 ferving the approbation and concurrence of every rational 

 agent, that this or that man ftiould be happy ? It is much 

 better that a greater number, and beft of all that all ftiould 

 be fo. But how can all men be made happy, witliout a 

 conftant regard to tlie rules of juftice. Biftiop Cumberland 

 (DeLegibus Natura, cap. i- § 23.) not only refolves juftice, 

 with the feveral duties annexed to it, into this principle, but 

 even the riglit of felf-prcfervation. Farther, it is altogether 

 reafonable, that we ftiould, or ftiould not do to another, 

 what we would, or would not that he fliould do unto us. 

 Every man is agreed to think every other man unjuft, who 

 deprives him of any good thing which he lawfully enjoys. 

 We fliould therefore confidcr, that others may reafonably 

 expect of us, whatever we may reafonably demand from 

 them. Moreover, ail men have their rights and properties. 

 He tliat is born to leaft, is born with a riglit to life, 

 liberty, and fafety. If there be right, there muft be juf- 

 tice : thefe mutually fuppofe one another. Again, what- 

 ever is enjoyed or poffeffed by a moral agent, independently 

 of another, may be ufed, enjoyed, and encouraged, with- 

 out being fubjctt to the controul of that other ; provided 

 that the poffelTor has not alienated or forfeited his right ; 

 and that he ufes it not to the prejudice of any other perfon. 

 Upon this principle is founded the natural equahty of man- 

 ki-'.d, that is, an equality of right. This equality fubfifts in 

 all the effentials of being and happinefs, under ail tbe 

 changes of condition to which every man is liable. Let a 

 man's condition be wliat it will, high or lov»-, rich or poor, 

 a prince or a fubjeft, as he has an equal ri^ht to what he 

 lawfully pofteftes, with that which any other man can have ; 

 fo there are certain pofieflion?, the right of which he cannot 

 transfer to another ; of which number are hfe, limbs, and 

 liberty, both civil and rehgious: in all which refpefts, there- 

 fore, the meaneft perfon, while innocent, is equal to the 

 greateft among men. Mr. Hobbes indeed (De Cive, 1. i. 

 c. I. $ 3.) proves the equahty of mankind from the equal 

 power they have of doing mifchief. M. Barbeyrac ob- 

 ferves, that this equality may be called an equality purely 

 phyfical ; whereas it is a moral equahty, or an equality of 

 right, that muft be laid as the foundation of juftice. Puf- 

 fendorf deduces this equality of mankind from the famenefs 

 of nature ; which feems to make it, as well as that of Mr. 

 Hobbes, a phyfical equahty. Of Mr. Godwin's fentiments 

 concerning the fubjedt under prefent difcufiion, we ftiall 

 probably have occafion to give fome account under the arti- 

 cles Politics, Society, and Virtue. 



Having briefly ftated the great principles of juftice, we 

 fliall now proceed to the divifion of it. According to 

 Ariftotle, juftice is univerfal ov particular. Univcrfa! ]\i^\ce 

 confifts in the obfervance of the laws, which extend to all 

 the adtions of mankind capable of good or evil, and thus 

 comprehends all the virtues. Hence arofe the common fay- 

 ing, " Ev oE uky-xios-j-.n (TvWrfilvi va.:' Afsin sri," that if, all 

 virtue is included in righteoufnefs. Particular ]u^\cQ refpe£ts 

 the rights of other men, and confifts in the obfervance of 

 eq'jality, or in challenging no more than our own ; and in 

 giving to others what is theirs. Particular, or fimple juftice 

 is either di/lribiiti've or commutative. D iflriliulivs juiticc is con- 

 cerned in the diftribution of honour, money, or whatever 

 elfe is to be divided among the members of a fociety, for 

 in all thefe there is room for equality or inequality ; and 

 therefore to diftribute as we ought is a part of juftice. In 

 other words, it is concerned in matters of government, ani 

 of bcr.eficencc ; and is either remuncratory, or punitive : it 



obferves 



