K A N T I S M. 



the feet of the German Gamahcl. Tnith was the objeiJl of 

 his fearch, and liberality was the refulc. He wiihed to 

 eftablifh all human knowledge on the firm bafis of reafon ; 

 and j-ejecled all principles as vifionary, which did not admit 

 of a fiindamental explication. He conceived, however, of 

 religion as an inherent quality of the foul, which panted 

 after fome higher objeA than this tranfitory exiftcnce. It 

 demanded no proof from without : it flowed of itfelf from 

 within ourfelves. Hence he was accufed by fome of myf- 

 ticifm, and by others of infidelity : but it fecms certain from 

 the tcilimony of his bed friends, and from the whole tenor 

 of his works, that, he was a firm believer in the exiitence of 

 a great Firll Caufe, in a future Hate of rewards and puniih- 

 ments, and in Chriilianity. In his political opinions, he 

 held that all men were originally born free ; but, though a 

 citizen of the world, he was, at the fame time, a friend to 

 peace and good order, and deprecated every violent effort 

 which was made to acquire that freedom to which all men 

 are by nature entitled ; and in his own pnvatj conduct, he 

 always teilified due refpeft and fubmiffion to cltablillied 

 authorities. By one of his biographers, M. Charles Villers, 

 Kant is reprefented as hiving never withdrawn, in a life of 

 eighty years, from his native city ; contenting himfelf, in 

 the true fimplicity of a fagc, with the occupr-.tions of fludy, 

 and the fociety of a few favoured friends. It is not merely 

 as a metaphyfician that he claims to be confidired ; for 

 there is fcar_ely a fcience which he has not endeavoured to 

 jlluftrate. He is a mathematician, an aftronomer, a chemilt ; 

 in natural hillory, in phyfies, in phyfiology, in hiftory, in 

 languages, and literature, and the arts ; in all the details of 

 geography, as they relate to the exaft fituation of the parts 

 of the globe, their inhabitants, and produftions, every thing 

 is famihar to him. The prominent feature in Kant's in 

 telleftual charatter was the accuracy with which he analyfed 

 the moft complex ideas. Nothing efcaped the fcrutiny of 

 his intelledual eye. Whatever was barely perceivable to 

 others in the moral and phylical world, became manifeft to 

 him. He difcovered, therefore, very eafily the congruities 

 of other men's fentiraents, and traced with perfect precilion 

 their errors to theii- true fource. He had likewife the fa- 

 culty of unfolding the moil abflrufe principles, and digelling 

 fingle and individual fentiments into a fyllematic order. 

 Herein confifted the originality of his mind. He vie-.vcd 

 the world through the medium of his own happy temper, 

 and found every thing around him agreeable and alluring. 

 He is faid to have united in the happieil degree two qualities 

 fo rarely combined in one perfon, - the greated acutenefs of 

 reafoniug, with the polifh of a gentleman. He poiTeflcd the 

 enviable - talent of making every thing intereding upon 

 ■which he fpoke, and of ben^g able to fpeak upon every fub- 

 jeft. Such was profeffor Kant. We (hall now touch upon 

 his theory as a metaphyfician. 



Befides employing a vaft number of words of his own in- 

 vention, chiefly derived from the Greek language, Kant 

 ufes exprefTions, which have long been familiar to metaphy- 

 fjcians, in a fenfe diff'ercnt from that in which they are gene- 

 rally received : and hence a large portion of time is requifite 

 to enable the moft fagacious mind to afcertain with prccifion 

 the import of his phrafeology. He divides a'l our know- 

 ledge into that which is " a priori," and that which is " a 

 pollerinri." Knowledge " a priori" is conferred upon us 

 by our nature; and knowledge "a pofteriori" is derived 

 from our fenfations, or from experience ; and it is, in this 

 fydem, denominated " tmpyric." Kant does not, as this 

 divifion would fccm to imply, intend to revive the dodlsiae 

 ■of innate ideas. He coniiders all knowledge as acquired : 

 ^.Qiaiatains that experience ia theproduAricc of all know- 



ledge, and that without it we could not have had a fingle 

 idea. Our ideas " a priori," he fays, are produced 'u.'itb 

 experience, bat not ty it, or do not proceed from it. Tliey 

 exift in, and are forms of the mind. They are didingui(hej 

 from other ideas by two marks, which are eafily difccrned : 

 they are univcrfal and neceffary ; they admit of no excep- 

 tion, and their converfe is impoffible. Ideas which we de- 

 rive from experience have no fuch charafters. We can ima- 

 gine that what we have feen, or felt, or heard once, we may 

 fee, or feel, or hear again ; but we do not perceive any im- 

 pofTibility in its being otherwife. Thus, if I fee a building 

 on fire, I am certain of this individual faft ; but it affords 

 no general knowledge. But if I take twice two fniall balls, 

 and learn to call twice two four, I fliall immediately be con- 

 vinced that any two bodies whatever, when added to any 

 other two bodies, will conftantly make the fum of bodies 

 four. Experience affords the opportunity of acquiring this 

 kno«'ledge ; but it has not given it : fur how could experi- 

 ence prove that this truth ftiould never vary ? Experience 

 mull be limited, and cannot teach what is univerfal and ne- 

 ceffary. It is not experience which difcovers to us, that v.e 

 (hall always have the furface of a whole pyramid, by multi- 

 plying its bafe by the third part of its height ; or, that two 

 parallel lines extended " in infinitum" flia'l never meet. 



All mathematical truths, according to Kant, are " a 

 priori :" thus, that a ftraight hne is the diortell of all pof- 

 fible lines between two given points; that the three angle? 

 in any plane triangle are always equal to two right angles, 

 are propofitions which are true " a priori." Pure know- 

 ledge " a priori," is that which is without any mixture of 

 experience. Two and two make four, is a truth of which 

 the knowledge is " a priori ;" but it is not pure know- 

 ledge, becaufe the truth is particular. The ideas of fub- 

 llance, and of caufe and effedl, are " a priori ;" and when 

 they are feparated from the objefts to which they refer, they 

 form, according to this fydem, " void ideas." It is our 

 knowledge " a priori," that is, the knowledge which pre- 

 cedes experience, as to its origin, which renders experience 

 poflible. Our faculty of knowledge has an efl"t;ft on our 

 ideas of fenfatiou, analogous to tliat of a veffel which gives 

 its own form to the liquor with which it is filled. Thus, in 

 all knowledge " a poileriori," there is fomething " a 

 priori," derived from our faculty of knowledge. All the 

 operations of our minds, all the imprelTions which our fenfes 

 receive and retain, are brought into cfFeft by the conditions', 

 the forms, which exid in us by the pure ideas " a priori," 

 which alone render all our other knowledge certain. Time 

 and fpace are the two effential forms of the mind : the firft, 

 for impreffious received by the internal fenfe ; the fecond, for 

 thofe received by our external fenfes. It is by means of the 

 form fpJCf, that we are enabled, " a priori," to attribute 

 to external obicfts impenetrability, divifibility, &c. ; and it 

 is by means of the form time, that we attribute to any thing 

 duration, fucceflio;), ike. Arithmetic is derived from the 

 inttrnal fenfe, and geometry from that of our external. 

 Our underdanding collefts the ideas received by the impref- 

 fions made on our organs of fenfe, confers on thofe ideas 

 unity by a particular energy " a priori," and thereby forms 

 the reprefeutation of each cbjeCl. Thus a perfon is fuccef- 

 fively flruck witli the impreflions of all the parts which form 

 a particular garden. His underdanding unites thefe impref- 

 fious, or the ideas refulting from them ; and in the unity 

 produced by the aft, it acquires the idea of tlx; whole gar- 

 den. If the objefts which produce the impreffions, aflord 

 alfo the matter of the ideas, then the ideas are " empyric ;" 

 but if the objcfts only unfold the forms of the tliought, the 

 ideas are "a priori." 



i Judgment 



