K A N T I S M. 



Judgments are divided into two fpccics; analytic and 

 fvnlkitc. An analylic judgment is that in which the attri- 

 bute is the mere developomcnt of the fubjecl, and is found 

 liy the finiple analyfis of the perception,— as, a triangle has 

 three fides. A fynlktical ]nAgmf:nx. is tliat in wliich the at- 

 tribute is connected with the fubjett by a caufe or bafis 

 t.ikcn from the faculty of knowledge, which renders this 

 c >;inedion neceffary, — as, iron is heavy; wood is com- 

 buiHble ; the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to 

 tuo right angles. 



'I'he forms of the underflanding are, in this fyftem, quan- 

 tity, quality, relation, modality. Quantity is dillinguifticd 

 into general, particular, and individual ; quality, into af- 

 firmation, negation, infinite; relation, into categoric, hy- 

 pothetic, and riisjunclive ; and modality, into problematic, 

 certain, and neceflary. M. Kant adds likewife to the pro- 

 perties of the four principal forms of the underilanding a 

 table of categories, or fundamental ideas, " a priori." 



Pure reafon is the faculty of tracing our knowledge " a 

 priori," to fubjeft it to principles, to trace it from its ne- 

 ccfTary conditions, till it be entirely without condition, and 

 in complete unity. The g^reat work of Kant is divided into 

 feveral parts, under the titles, " Of yEllhetic tianfccn- 

 dental j" " Of tranfcendental Loj^ic ;" " Of the pure 

 Ideas of the Underflanding ;" " Of the tranfcendental 

 Judgment; ' " Of the Paralogifm «f pure Reafon," &c. 

 We cannot, from the nature of our work, difcufs all the 

 parts of the fyllem ; but may obferve, th.at the author con- 

 tends that we know objecfs only by the manner in which 

 they afieCl us ; and as the impreilions which they make up- 

 on us are only certain apparitions or phenomena, it is impof- 

 fibie for us to know what an objecl iS in itfelf. Hence the 

 fyllem of Kant has been compared with that of Berkeley, 

 u hch maintains that ienfations are only appearances, and 

 that there is no truth, only in our reafon. But Kant does 

 not go to this length. According to his theory, the under- 

 flanding-, when it confiders the apparitions or phenomena, 

 acknowledges the exiftence of the ob'ieCls thcmfelves, iiaf- 

 much as they ferve for the bafcs of thofe apparitions ; 

 though we know nothing of their reality, and though we 

 can have no certainty but in experience. 



Trurh, according to our author, confifts in the agreement 

 of our notions with the objects, in fuch a manner as that all 

 men are obliged to form the fame judgment : belief confiils 

 in holding a tiling to be true, in confequence of a perfuafion 

 wliich is entirely perfonal, and has not its bafis in an object 

 fubmitted to experience. There is a belief of doctrine ; as, 

 that " there are inhabitants in the planets," which is not 

 the fame as- moral belief; becaufe in moral belief there is 

 fomething neceflary-. The ordinary mode of teaching the 

 e-xiflence of God belongs to the belief ot dottrine ; and it is 

 the fame with regard to the imniortidity of the foul : ncvcr- 

 thelcfs, the author was a firm believer in the exiftence of 

 God, and a future Hate ; becaufe, faid he, " this perfua- 

 fion renders immoveable my moral principles, — principles 

 which I cannot reject, without rendering myielf con- 

 temptible in my own eyes. I widi for happinefs, but I do 

 not with for it without morality ; and as it depends on na- 

 ture, [ cannot uifli it with this condition, except by be- 

 lieving that nature depends on a Being who caufes this con- 

 nect ion between morality and happinefs. This fuppofition 

 is founded on the want or neceflity of my reafon, and not on 

 my duty. We have, however," fays Kant, " no certainty 

 in our knowledge of God ; becaufe certainty cannot exilt, 

 except when it is founded on an object of experience. The 

 p.hilofopher acknowledges that pure reafon is too weak to 

 prove the exiftence of a being beyond thu reach of our fenfcs. 



The neceflity of believing in God-is, thwjforf, only fubjec- 

 tive, although neceflary and general for all thofe beings 

 who conform to their duty. The proofs of natural theo- 

 logy, taken from the order and beauty of the univei-fe, arc- 

 proofs only in appearance. They refolvc thcmfelves into a 

 bias of our reafon to fuppofe an infinite Intelligence, the 

 author of all that is polTiblc ; but from this bias it docs not 

 follow that there really is fuch an author. To fay, that 

 whatever exifls muft have a caufe, is a maxim "' a priori';" 

 but it is a maxim applicable only to experience : for we 

 know not how to fubjoCt to the laws of our perceptions that 

 which is abfolutely independent of them. It' is impoflible 

 to know that God exifls ; but we can comprehend how it is 

 pofllble to aft morally on the fuppofition of the exiftence of 

 an intelligent Creator, — an exiftence which practical reafon 

 forces theoretical reafon to adopt. This proof not only 

 pcrfuadcs, but even acts on the conviftion, in proportion as 

 the motives of our actions are confonnable to the law of mo- 

 rality. Religion ought to be the means of virtue, and not 

 its objcft. Man has not in himfelf the idea of religion, as he 

 has that of virtue. The latter has its principle in the mind : 

 it exitls in itfelf, and not as the means of happinefs ; and it 

 may be taught without the idea of God, for the pure law of 

 morality is " a priuri." He who does good by inclination, 

 does not a<S morally. There are compaflionate minds, which 

 feel an internal pleafnre in communicating ioy around them, 

 and who thus enjoy the fatisfaCtion of others ; but their ac- 

 tions, however jull, however good, have no moral merit, and 

 may be compared to other inclination,-; ; — to that of honour, 

 for example, which, while it meets with that which is jult 

 and ufeful, is worthy of praife and encouragement, but not 

 of any high degree of eileem. According to Kant, we 

 ought not even to do good, either foi the pleafure which we 

 feel in doing it, or in order t» be happy, or to render others 

 happy ; for any one of thefe motives would be empiric, and 

 injure the purity of our moral-'. We ought to aft after the 

 maxims derived " a priori," from the faculty of knowledge, 

 wliich carry with them the idea of neceflity, and arc inde- 

 pendent of all experience ; after the maxims which, it is to 

 be wiflied, could be erected intt) general iaivs for ail beings 

 endowed with reafon. 



SlcIi feem to be the leading-principles of the philofophy 

 of Kant. It is not our bufincis to enter into a critical ex- 

 amination of them ; but the reader will find this very ably 

 done in the firft volume of the Edinburgh Review, faid ta 

 have been written by Mr., now fir, James Mackintolh. 



Kant, there is no doubt, was very fincere in all the 

 opinions which he maintained. He was- a moft decided 

 ciiemy to falfehood of every kind. He never could endure 

 to hear an untruth even in jeft ; and in his own language, be 

 was fcrupulous to avoid every thii g that could convey a 

 falfe idea of himfelf. • Nothing could draw him into a tem- 

 porary renur.ciatimi or qualification of his fcntinrtents ; but 

 wherever a free declaration of his opinions was not found 

 agreeable, he was careful never to appear. He wiibed, in 

 all his aftions, to flicw himfelf to the- world Cmply as lie 

 wa.-, unvarnilficd by any falfe art whatever ; and he even 

 condemned the attempt to conceal one's merit under a for- 

 bidding appearance. He had a high fenfe of his own dig- 

 nity, as an individual in the fcale of exiftence; and he had 

 no Icfs refpeft for every man, as an independent and thinking 

 being, and evinced thefe fcntin;entt by a rcfpcftful deport- 

 ment towards all. For merit uuder every form, and in 

 every perfon, whether of his own or contrary fcntiments, he 

 tcftified the moft unequivocal clieem. 



After the death of Mr. Kant, a beautiful medal wa's exr- 



cuted by M. Abraiufon of Beilin, as a memorial of hi? great 



4 -S 2 taletit«. 



