60 REPORT OF THE 



"The Constitution provides that no county, city, town or 

 village shall be allowed to incur any indebtedness except for 

 county, city, town or village purposes (Constitution, Article VIII., 

 Section 10). 



" If the establishment of a county park is not a county pur- 

 pose, the statute which the plaintiff attacks is violative of this 

 prohibition. The argument in his behalf, on this branch of the 

 case, is based on the proposition that counties exist solely for 

 political or govermental purposes, and that a county has none of 

 the capacities of a quasi private corporation, such as a city exer- 

 cises in supplying its inhabitants with water and light and public 

 recreation grounds. 



" The Constitution itself contains no definition of the term 

 'county purposes,' and we must look elsewhere to ascertain its 

 meaning. The revised statutes declared that each county had 

 power to purchase and hold land within its own limits and for 

 the use of its inhabitants (R. S., Part I., Chap. XII., Title i, Article 

 First). 



" Literally this provision was broad enough to include the 

 acquisition of park lands within the boundaries of the county. It 

 was repealed in 1892 by the county law, which defines a county 

 and states the purpose of its formation in these words : 'A county 

 is a municipal corporation, comprising the inhabitants within its 

 boundaries, and formed for the purpose of exercising the powers 

 and discharging the duties of local government and the adminis- 

 tration of public affairs, conferred upon it by law (Laws of 1892, 

 page 1744). 



" The last clause is a more comprehensive statement of the 

 powers of counties than was to be found in the Revised Statutes. 

 It seems to me sufficient to embrace the establishment of a series 

 of public pleasure grounds, even though some portion thereof be 

 outside the county limits, whenever the Legislature chooses to 

 confer upon the county the right to acquire and control the 

 same. 



" That a city might take park lands in another county than that 

 in which it was situated was decided in the case of the new parks 

 in New York. ( In the Matter of the Application of the Mayor 

 of the City of New York, 99 N. Y., 569.) If a county may take 

 park lands at all I see no reason why it may not also be allowed 

 to go into another county. 



" The strict limitation of county purposes insisted on by the 

 plaintiff ignores the demands of the public welfare growing out of 

 the peculiar conditions which prevail in populous country dis- 

 tricts where the needs or wishes of the people in the way of recre- 

 ation often closely resemble the conditions that exist in cities. 



