DOCTRINE OF SENSITIVE PERCEPTION. 285 



not to be confined exclusively to Lower Canada. Incidents of early 

 Canadian history are also introduced in a pleasing style, and 

 addressed as these are in the Journal de IS Instruction Publique to 

 those of French origin,they are presented in a form calculated to give 

 piquancy and interest to us, who, when considering them at all, are- 

 apt to overlook some of the minuter points best calculated to awaken 

 an interest in our historic past. Altogether Ave gladly welcome these 

 Education Journals as most useful and acceptable additions to the 

 periodical literature of the Province. 



D. W. 



Reid"s Works, {Essays on the Human Mind, Sfc, ;) with selections 

 from his unpublished letters ; with a Preface, Notes, and Supple- 

 mentary Dissertations, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edin- 

 burgh : 1854. 



The following article is not a criticism, but simply an exposition of 

 the late Sir "William Hamilton's doctrine of Sensitive Perception ; 

 and it is designed to supply what has hitherto been felt by many, 

 and especially by those entering on the study of philosophy, to be a 

 great desideratum : an accurate, and yet not very technical statement 

 of the only consistent and plausible system of natural realism which 

 is before the world. It is necessary to explain that the writer of the 

 article considers Sir William's doctrine to be in several important 

 respects erroneous. But without bringing forward the grounds of 

 this opinion, he has limited himself at present to the task of exposi- 

 tion. The only exceptions to this, are, the foot note on the subject 

 of the extension of body, and the reference made in the note at 

 page 295, to a former article in this journal, on Sir William Hamil- 

 ton's doctrine of consciousness. 



Under the general title of Sensitive Perception, Sir Wm. Hamil- 

 ton includes sensation proper and perception proper ; or more simply, 

 without the addition of the epithet proper, sensation and perception. 

 Each of these forms of sensitive perception is held to be an act of 

 the mind in which an object is known. Sensation is allowed indeed 

 to be a lower exercise of intelligence than perception ; because, as 

 will afterwards appear, it is merely the knowledge of a fact, while 

 perception is moreover the knowledge of a relation : but still both 

 are acts of intelligence. The mind in sensation, as well as in percep- 

 tion, is cognizing an object. This is not the universally received 



