DOCTRINE OF SENSITIVE PERCEPTION. 287 



conscious of the organic affection ; and it is in this immediate know- 

 ledge or consciousness that sensation consists. Sensation may 

 accordingly be defined to be an act of consciousness whereby we 

 apprehend in our body, certain special affections of which, as an 

 aminated organism, it is contingently susceptible. 



In saying that the object of which we are conscious in sensation is 

 an affection of the animated corporeal organism, let it be understood 

 that Hamilton does not altogether negative the commonly received 

 opinion, that the object of sensation is in the mind. A word of 

 explanation is requisite here. The body, as animated, ought not in 

 propriety to be considered external to the mind ; for it exists in a 

 mysterious connection with the indivisible thinking principle, in con- 

 sequence of which, the affections of the living organism are appre- 

 hended as subjective affections. The terms objective and subjective 

 denote, the former what is without the mind, and the latter what is in 

 the mind. Now undoubtedly, the body, as a material organism, with 

 the general relations of extension under which it in that character 

 necessarily exists, is without the mind, and cau only be apprehended 

 objectively ; but as a living organism, it is in union with the mind, 

 and its affections are felt as subjective. The general relations of 

 extension under which our bodies exist as material substances, belong 

 to our bodies alone. They cannot in any sense be predicated of the 

 mind. I, the Ego, do not exist under any relations of extension. 

 But the special affections excited in my body as an animated organism, 

 I claim as mine. I am conscious of them as affections of Self. It is 

 only with this seriously qualifying explanation that Sir "VV. Hamilton 

 would subscribe to the doctrine of Reid, and of philosophers generally, 

 that the object of sensation is in the mind. He would not allow that 

 it is in the mind purely. Strictly, it is a sensorial affection, which 

 we are constrained, however, to view as of the Ego, in consequence 

 of the union subsisting between the Ego and the living organism. 



In the opinion of Reid, the dependence of our sensations upon 

 affections of the bodily organism is altogether arbitrary. A piece of 

 sugar is taken into the mouth ; the organ of taste is affected in some 

 unknown way ; thereupon the sensation of sweetness arises. So 

 says Dr. Reid, and he tells us that no necessary connection exists 

 between the condition determined in the organ, and the sensation to 

 which it is antecedent. It is a connection which has been estab- 

 lished arbitrarily, by the will of the Creator. Had the author of 

 our being so pleased, the sensation of sweetness might have been 

 made to arise, not in connection with the particular condition of the 

 body upon which it is actually consequent, nor in connection with 



