292 REVIEWS — SIR TO, HAMILTON'S 



bad it so pleased (rod, external objects migbt bave been perceived 

 by us, independent of sensation altogether. Tbe dependence of tbe 

 knowledge of a relation upon tbe knowledge of tbe things correlated 

 is so far from being arbitrary, that even Divine power could not work 

 an impossibility of giving us tbe former save on condition of tbe 

 latter. 



It cannot have escaped tbe notice of our readers, that perception 

 must, on the doctrine expounded, have for its condition, not only 

 sensation, but a plurality of sensations, because tbe perception of 

 our organism (which enters into all perceptive consciousness, even 

 into that of the extra-organic world,) is the consciousness which we 

 have of the mutual outness of organic affections locally external to 

 one another, and therefore plural. These affections do not indeed 

 constitute sensation, but sensation consists in the recognition of 

 them ; so that perception can take place only where sensation is 

 recognising a plurality of objects. Sir "W. Hamilton not only holds 

 this, but maintains that sensation itself supposes plurality in the 

 object or objects of its apprehension. Let us quote his own words : 

 ' The second," (that is, the second condition of sensitive perception, 

 in either of its forms ; attention having been named as the first,) " is 

 ' plurality ', alteration, difference, on the part of tbe perceived object 

 ' or objects, and a recognition thereof on the part of the perceiving 

 • subject." However technical a sound these words may have in 

 uninitiated ears, (Sir William is partial to esoteric phraseology,) tbe 

 thing meant may, without much difficulty, be understood. AYere 

 tbe organism of our body without affections capable of being discri- 

 minated as plural, it would in fact be devoid of affections altogether ; 

 for what are affections except alterations or differences ? If, there- 

 fore, sensation be the recognition of affections in the organism, it 

 follows that where there is no alteration or plurality, there can be no 

 sensation : as Hobbes has pointedly expressed it, " sentire semper 

 "idem, etnon sentire, ad idem recidunt." But indeed it is not in 

 sensitive perception alone, that alteration is held to be an indis- 

 pensable condition, but in every other exercise of consciousness like- 

 wise ; and this, it may be remarked, is a grand fundamental principle 

 on which Sir "W.Hamilton relies, in seeking to refute those theorists 

 in the highest region of thought, who claim for man a knowledge of 

 the Unconditioned. The Unconditioned, including the Infinite and 

 the Absolute, does not exist under characters of plurality or difference, 

 and therefore, (Sir William argues) cannot be apprehended by human 

 consciousness. "Without, however, attempting to soar to such sub- 

 lime speculations at present, but keeping to the terra firma of our 



