208 EETIEWS — DOCTRINE OE SENSITIVE PERCEPTION. 



of the leading points in his system, and must bring our exposition to 

 a close. 



It "will be remembered that sensitive perception (taking the ex- 

 pression in its widest sense) apprehends three things— first, (in sen- 

 sation) the affections of cur animated organism — secondly, (in the 

 perception of our organism as material) the relations of mutual 

 outness which these bear to one another — and thirdly, (in the per- 

 ception of extra-organic objects, not revealed to consciousness as 

 material) resistance offered to the movement of our organism in 

 space. "We have here the basis of Sir "W. Hamilton's division of 

 the qualities of bodies. Sensation reveals to us the secondaries. 

 The perception of the organism as material, discovers to us the 

 primaries. And the perception of extraorganic resistance makes us 

 acquainted with the secundo-priinaries. To begin with the primaries. 

 In being conscious of the relations of our organism to itself in space, 

 we apprehend it as an object not indivisible and unextended like the 

 ego, but such that affections exist in it, mutually external to one 

 another : an object which is also finite, and which may hence be 

 defined as " occupying space and contained in space." This is the 

 definition of matter or body ; and whatever properties can be 

 evolved out of this definition, are primary qualities of matter. 

 Thus, figure is a primary quality, because whatever occupies, space 

 and is contained in space, must possess figure. It is apparent 

 that the primaries are only in an improper sense termed qualities 

 (or suchnesses) ; for a body is not, by possessing them, con- 

 stituted such a body. They do not discriminate one body 

 from another, but belong to all bodies alike. Turn next to the 

 secondaries. In being conscious of organic affections, we apprehend 

 them as differing in kind or quality strictly so called. For example, 

 one affection of the animated organism, apprehended by conscious- 

 ness, gives the sensation of redness ; another, the sensation of acidity 

 — two sensations of a different kind or quality altogether. Now 

 organic affections may be stimulated by causes either within or with- 

 out the organism. To causes of the former description our atten- 

 tion is seldom powerfully called ; but it is necessary on many accounts 

 that the latter sort should be discriminated among themselves, and 

 should receive distinctive names. Accordingly, when we have been 

 led by experience to attribute a particular affection to the stimulating 

 influence of some external body, we ascribe to that body a quality 

 commonly denoted by the same name with the sensation produced in 

 us. Such qualities, collected into a class, form the secondary quali- 



