218 On Mystery. 



attendant on gradual perception, can ever enjoy. But his de- 

 scendants have shared largely of the emotion ; and who of us, 

 as we too, have gazed the bright earth, and the ample sky. 

 has not found himself insensibly falling into this original feel- 

 ing, and one bewildering sense of the mystery of being and 

 its phenomena engross his soul? But it is not only in these mo- 

 ments of higher and intenser feeling that it arises; life is full 

 of it, and to a thoughtful mind, it is constantly springing up. 



The philosophy of our emotions, consists in a knowledge 

 of the occasions on which they arise ; and as the exertion of 

 great power is essential to the sublime, and slight incongrui- 

 ties to the ridiculous, so there must be somewhat in mysteri- 

 ous facts which render them mysterious. To ascertain what 

 this is, and how far mystery can be solved, will be the objects 

 of the present inquiry. Some remarks will also be made on 

 the nature, extent, and practical bearing of the emotion. 



I shall first speak of the mystery of particular facts, and of 

 the solution which it is ordinarily supposed to admit ; and 

 then of the mystery of general laws. To discover the true 

 foundation of this emotion, it is necessary to distinguish it 

 from ignorance, with which it is often confounded. Mystery 

 does indeed imply ignorance, and in the removal of both, the 

 principle of curiosity is involved ; but there may be ignorance 

 without mystery. In an ignorance of any disconnected fact, 

 or class of facts, as of topography, or chronology, there is, 

 and can be no mystery. One may be ignorant of the year in 

 which the battle of Actium was fought, and unable to ascer- 

 tain it ; but it is simple ignorance, there is no mystery about 

 it ; it may have happened, and no reason can be given why it 

 should not have happened, in one year as well as in another. 

 One may be ignorant whether Actium was in Europe or in 

 Asia, but he has only to consult authorities, and his curiosity 

 is satisfied, but no mystery is solved. 



Further, though there be a connexion between facts, yet, 

 if the rule by which their cause operates be entirely unknown, 

 there can be no mystery. This is the case in the blowing of 

 winds ; and for the most part in human conduct, which last 

 however, is so much governed by known principles, that it 

 may become mysterious when conduct runs greatly counter to 

 its ordinary course. 



I am now prepared to observe, 1st, that those events are 

 mysterious which apparently conflict with a general law pre- 

 viously known, or with a theory, which, as a ground of refer- 



