The Key to the Pacific 



297 



And that commerce, which will continue 

 to grow as the years pass, is not alone 

 with progressive Japan and teeming 

 China, but with our own fertile islands on 

 the Asiatic coast and with the great 

 English-speaking colonies of Great 

 Britain in New Zealand and Australia. 

 In 1893 our greatest authority on the sea 

 power and naval strategy, Captain A. T. 

 Mahan, wrote with reference to the pro- 

 posed annexation of Hawaii : 



"To any one viewing a map that shows 

 the full extent of the Pacific . . . 

 two circumstances will be strikingly and 

 immediately apparent. He will see at a 

 glance that the Sandwich Islands stand 

 by themselves in a state of comparative 

 isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea ; 

 and, again, that they form the center of a 

 large circle whose radius is approxi- 

 mately the distance from Honolulu to 

 San Francisco . . . this is substan- 

 tially the same distance as from Honolulu 

 to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, and So- 

 ciety Islands, all under European control 

 except Samoa, in which we have a part 

 influence. 



"To have a central position such as 

 this, and to be alone, having no rival 

 ... . are conditions that at once fix 

 the attention of the strategist . 

 But to this striking combination is to be 

 added the remarkable relations borne 

 to the great commercial routes 

 traversing this vast expanse. 



"Too much stress cannot be laid upon 

 the immense disadvantages to us of any 

 maritime enemy having a coaling station 

 well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of 

 every point of our coast line from Puget 

 Sound to Mexico. Were there many 

 others available we might find it difficult 

 to exclude them all. There is, however, 

 but the one. Shut out from the Sand- 

 wich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is 

 thrown back for supplies of fuel to dis- 

 tances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles — or be- 

 tween 7,000 and 8,000 going and com- 

 ing — an impediment to sustained mari- 

 time operations well nigh prohibitive 

 . . . It is rarely that so important a 

 factor in the attack or defense of a coast 

 line — of a sea frontier — is concentrated 



in a single position, and the circumstance 

 renders doubly imperative upon us to 

 secure it if we righteously can." 



Hawaii is on the track of probably all 

 the trade which the Pacific Coast states 

 have with the rest of the world, and 

 therefore, as a strategic point, it is of 

 supreme importance that it be joined to 

 us "by hooks of steel" which it would 

 take the navies of the world to break. 



The relation of a strategic point like 

 Hawaii to the safety of the nation is illus- 

 trated by the relation of Gibraltar and 

 Malta to the safety of Great Britain. The 

 control of the Mediterranean is essential 

 to England, as thereby she dominates the 

 coasts of all the adjacent countries and 

 controls hostile movements. "If," writes 

 Lord Brassey, "we are resolved to re- 

 tain our hold on the Mediterranean, it is 

 imperatively necessary that our two naval 

 bases at Malta and Gibraltar should be 

 made secure from attack and efficient for 

 the repair and protection of the fleet. In 

 Malta and Gibraltar we hold strategical 

 positions of the utmost importance." 

 They are of utmost importance because 

 they control the trade route through the 

 Suez Canal, dominate the coasts of 

 what may at some time be hostile na- 

 tions, and render unnecessary the con- 

 stant presence in the Mediterranean of a 

 fleet of overwhelming strength. That 

 strength may be safely confided to the 

 channel and home fleets, which, with 

 bases in that sea, can at any time secure 

 control of it. 



"If we abandon the Mediterranean," 

 says Lord Brassey, "we cease to be a 

 first-class power in Europe. . . . 

 Upon a consideration of all the circum- 

 stances, it is clear that the dignity, the 

 wealth, and the influence of England for 

 peace depend on the retention of a para- 

 mount position as a naval power in the 

 Mediterranean. We have that position 

 now, and the recent manifestations of 

 popular sentiment have shown that we 

 are resolved to keep it." In that last 

 sentence substitute for the words "Eng- 

 land" and "Mediterranean" the words 

 "United States" and "Pacific" and see if 

 it will not apply with peculiar aptness to 



