410 



follows, that the Legislature may authorize a sale, or any other dis- 

 position of the lands, as the public welfare or convenience may demand. 

 They certainly have as complete a dominion over property belonging 

 to the State as any private owner has over property owned by him- 

 self. The right of alienation is an inseparable incident of every 

 ownership. 



There is no ground for saying that the case shows an attempt to 

 transfer private property from one man to another. When the prop- 

 erty was taken, it was acquired in good faith for a legitimate public 

 use. The Legislature had the unquestioned right to create a large or 

 a small Park, and to take as much land as they deemed necessary. 

 Their right to diminish the size of the Park, and to sell land no longer 

 needed, whenever the public interest will, in their judgment, be pro- 

 moted by it, is also unquestionable. The case shows such a public 

 exigency, and we have no doubt of the power of the Legislature to 

 meet it by authorizing a sale of any part of the land originally taken. 



Indeed, the question of the power of the Legislature to acquire an 

 absolute estate in land, and to sell the same when no longer needed 

 for public use, can not now be considered an open one in this State. 

 (Hey ward v. The Mayor, 3 Seld., 143. Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 

 R., 314.) 



It only remains to notice one other objection taken by the defend- 

 ant, which relates to the effect of a pledge said to be contained in the 

 Act of 1861, of the lands authorized to be taken, for the payment of 

 the bonds issued for the purchase of said lands. It is claimed on 

 behalf of the defendant that it creates a contract between the public 

 and the bondholder, the obligation of which the Act of 1870 seeks to 

 impair, and, that, therefore, the latter act is void by reason of that 

 provision of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits any 

 State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 

 The answer to this is that no contract was created. The Act of 1861 

 is merely restrictive of the corporate power of the City of Brooklyn 

 in respect to the lands so taken and other property, and in no sense 

 affects the power of the Legislature over them. 



Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled 

 to judgment. 



