462 



The Court of Aj>peals hold in direct terms that the city 

 acquired an absolute estate in all lands taken for the park 

 under the act of 1861, which act it will be remembered provides 

 for the establishment of this park. That the estate thus 

 acquired was not a mere use or easement in the land, but an 

 absolute fee, entirely free from any reversionary right of the 

 original owners. That in the exercise of the right of eminent 

 domain, the Legislature is the sole judge to what extent the 

 public use requires the extinguishment of the owner's title, and 

 that its power in this respect' is not limited by any constitu- 

 tional restriction. That the idea of establishing a public park 

 carries with it more than the mere use of an extensive area of 

 land to be passed over, or but temporarily occupied by the 

 public, and over which any private owner may still exercise 

 acts of ownership, since the alteration of surface, and the expen- 

 sive processes of drainage and of planting, through which the 

 land must pass before it can become a complete park, neces- 

 sarily requires permanency and exclusiveness of public control, 

 and that, therefore, the power to take land for such purposes 

 must carry with it the right to acquire the largest title in the 

 land taken. 



Upon referring to the act of 1861, the court found it to be 

 expressly declared that after legal proceedings to acquire the 

 land and to ascertain the amount of compensation which 

 should be paid to the owners therefor, had been taken and 

 were confirmed by the court having the matter in charge, the 

 land itself should be the absolute property of the city ; and that 

 it could not have been intended that the owner should receive 

 the full value of his property and yet have left to him a rever- 

 sionary interest in it. And with respect to that provision of 

 the act which declares that the city took the title for public 

 use as a park, the court held that so long as the title remained 

 in the city, it was, of course, held in trust for that purpose, but 

 that it was within the power of the Legislature to relieve the 

 city from the trust, and to authorize it to sell and convey, "when 

 the land was no longer required for public use, and that it did 

 this in direct terms when, by the subsequent act of 1870, it 

 directed a sale of the land to be made by the Park Commis- 

 sioners. 



The opinion of the court, delivered by that admirable jurist, 



