DISTRICTING 69 



industrial district; the presumption being in favor of the legality of the 

 action of the legislative body. That small parcels, consisting of only one 

 city lot, were excepted by the city council from the " residence district " of 

 a city as fixed by ordinance, within which district certain occupations could 

 not be followed, and added to the industrial district, when such parcels 

 were surrounded on' all sides by parts of the " residence district," did not 

 of itself show unjust discrimination in excepting territory from the resi- 

 dence district. 



The court held that lawful occupations, such as laundry business, might 

 be confined to certain limits in the city wherever such restrictions might 

 reasonably be found necessary to protect the public health, morals and 

 comfort. An ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of public laundries 

 and wash houses in those parts of the city designated as the " residential 

 district " could not be said to be unreasonable and invalid, though large 

 parts of such districts might be sparsely built up, in the absence of the 

 facts showing unjust discrimination. Whether restrictions upon the opera- 

 tion of a business in certain portions of a city are reasonably necessary 

 for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare, the court con- 

 strued as being primarily for the determination of the city council. Such 

 action by the city council, the court held, would not be disturbed by the 

 court, unless the regulations had no relation to the public health, safety or 

 welfare, or unless they clearly invaded personal or property rights under the 

 guise of police regulations. 



In Ex Parte Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. 1070, the Supreme 

 Court rendered a decision that was almost identical with that in Ex Parte 

 Quong Wo, this time ejecting a lumber yard from the residential district. 



In Ex Parte Hadacheck, 132 Pac. 589, decided May 15, 1913, the 

 Supreme Court again sustained the constitutionality of the Industrial and 

 residential districts. In this case, the petitioner owned a brick yard in the 

 residential district. He had acquired the land for this brick yard in 1902, 

 before the territory to which the ordinance was directed had been annexed 

 to Los Angeles. The land contained valuable deposits of clay suitable for 

 the manufacture of brick, and was more valuable for brickmaking than 

 for any other purpose. The petitioner had during the entire period of his 

 ownership used the land for brickmaking and had erected on it the kilns, 

 machinery and buildings necessary for such manufacture. 



In upholding the constitutionality and ejecting the brick yard from the 

 residential district, the court held that the police power is not restricted to 

 the suppression of nuisances, but extends to the regulation of the conduct 

 of business and to the use of property to the end that public health or 

 morals may not be impaired or endangered. 



The court also held that the right of the legislature, in exercising the 

 police power to regulate or in proper cases to prohibit the conduct of a 

 given business, is not limited by the fact that the value of investments 

 made in the business prior to any legislative action will be greatly dimin- 



