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 IX. Intelligence and Miscellaneous Articles. 



SCIENCE AND METAPHYSIC. 

 To the Editors of the Philosophical Magazine and Journal. 



GeJTXLEMEjST, 



VUILL you allow me space to say a few words upon some points 

 ' " which are raised and discussed in your review of Prof. Max 

 Midler's translation of Kant's ' Critique of Pure Reason.' The first 

 question of importance, namely that of the meaning of metaphysic 

 and its relation to science, is an extremely interesting one, and, as 

 it seems to me, well worthy of discussion from a scientific stand- 

 point. One side of the question is put forward in your review ; 

 and it is the other side which I wish briefly to state here, with the 

 object of eliciting discussion. 



Metaphysic, as now understood, and Science are not words which 

 are opposed as regards meaning. The subject-matter of science 

 and of metaphysic are distinct : they run in different, yet closely 

 connected channels. And perhaps here, at the outset, I may be 

 permitted to remark that, in any sense in which the word meta- 

 physic is or has been held, it is inadmissible to instance Auguste 

 Comte as a metaphysician, even if his own reiterated state- 

 ments upon the question did not forbid. Any one who has 

 read the Philosophie Positive will know how Comte never lets an 

 opportunity pass without ridiculing both metaphysic and metaphy- 

 sician, in the old sense of the words. He regarded the metaphy- 

 sical method of looking at things as a stage through which the 

 human mind has to pass before it reaches the final stage, which he 

 called the positive or scientific. In fact, one of the main objects of 

 his great work was to free science from metaphysic as be under- 

 stood it. When Comte censured as useless the study of the fixed 

 stars with the object of discovering their chemical composition, he 

 was arguing upon grounds that were of the most commonplace and 

 superficial kind, and could not by any means be shown to be even 

 remotely connected with metaphysic. I am unable to agree, except 

 in a very limited sense, with Prof. Max Miiller in thinking that there 

 is any connexion between the philosophical systems of Kant and 

 Comte. Metaphysic, until quite recent times, has been mainly an 

 attempt to discover the supposed hidden causes of phenomena ; a 

 mode of inquiry which had its systematic origin in Aristotle, and was 

 extended and formulated by the Schoolmen. In science the same 

 tendency was manifest. Abstract entities were assumed as origina- 

 ting causes ; and it is only recently that science has given up the 

 search for these causes as futile, and sought to show how phenomena 

 take place instead of why they take place. Here was a change of 

 method in science ; and what I wish to emphasize is that a similar 

 change has occurred in metaphysic. Metaphysic has adopted 

 the new method. While formerly the metaphysician endeavoured 

 to discover what the facts of nature were in their hidden essence, 

 he now seeks to find out what these facts are known as or appear 



