Notices respecting New Boohs. 397 



" metaphysics." Against metaphysics in this sense of the term the 

 author, in common with many other scientific writers, wages un- 

 ceasing war. Admitting the utter futility of the ontological method, 

 it is very questionable whether this has not been overdone, whether 

 this reiteration of abuse against ontology is not mere slaying of the 

 slain. It is far otherwise if, after a man has clearly understood 

 what ontology means and has been convinced of the falsity of its 

 method, he sets himself to see whether these same errors exist in 

 subjects non-metaphysical, and even in the reasoning of those who 

 were loudest with their revilings. This is action, not profession, 

 and indeed noble and useful work in the field of criticism. As 

 Prof. Huxley most truly has said, " It is the business of criticism, 

 not only to keep watch over the vagaries of philosophy, but to do 

 the duty of police in the whole world of thought. Wherever it 

 espies sophistry or superstition they are to be bidden to stand, nay, 

 they are to be followed to their very dens and there apprehended and 

 exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, ' else she'll betray 

 more men.' " This in truth is the task which Mr. Stallo has un- 

 dertaken in the present volume, having chosen the field of science 

 for his beat. 



Besides having critical value, it is stated that the work is " in- 

 tended as a contribution to the theory of cognition." Now this 

 term, which is a translation of the German " Erkenntniss-Theorie," 

 is but seldom used in this country in precisely the same sense which 

 is here, in common with modern G-erman usage, adopted. In the 

 present work it is used in a sense very similar, if not identical, 

 with what I have called the "New Metaphysic" (Phil. Mag. xiv. 

 p. 75) — that is to say, in regard to method. The author, as we have 

 seen, entirely rejects the " old metaphysic," or ontological method 

 of inquiry — " all cognition being founded upon a recognition of 

 relations ;" and his theory of cognition seeks to discover these rela- 

 tions. The " thing per se" the " Ding an sich" or thing-in-itself of 

 Kant, and "the absolute," as well as the assumption of other fic- 

 titious entities as the "fountain and origin of all phenomenal 

 existence," is distinctly repudiated ; and hence these conceptions 

 form no part of his theory of cognition. Prom this standpoint the 

 author proceeds to examine the validity of the reasoning upon 

 which the mechanical theory and other scientific theories rest. It 

 may fairly be asked, what are the qualifications of the author for 

 this by no means easy undertaking? The title-page of the book 

 affords no information on this point. It will therefore be probably 

 unknown to most readers of the book in this country that the 

 author is an American judge of no small reputation, who (I believe 

 myself to be correct in saying) was formerly a professor of physical 

 science. 



The book itself bears witness to the author's wide acquaintance 

 with philosophical and scientific writings. The volume may be 

 divided into two parts. The first, consisting of eight chapters, is 

 devoted to a rigid examination of the atomic theory, the kinetic theory 

 of gases, and the doctrine of the conservation of energy. "While ad- 

 mitting the value of the atomic theory as a " working hypothesis," the 



