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XXIV. On tie Recent Theories of Electricity. By Louis 

 T. More, Ph.D., Professor of Physics, University of 

 Cincinnati *. 



THE theories of matter and electricity which have been 

 recently advanced have aroused the interest of the 

 thinking public generally, and rather startling accounts 

 have appeared concerning a scientific revolution. In a 

 series of essays t I attempted to give a more or less philo- 

 sophical discussion o£ these theories ; their effect on thought ; 

 and their relation to the older atomic theories. During the 

 writino- of these essays, I became convinced that the new 

 ideas were sufficiently crystallized to permit of a more 

 technical and critical discussion of their merits and defects. 

 And in spite of an apparent advantage they may have over 

 the older conceptions, it is quite possible that this gain is 

 not permanent, and that the present movement is on the 

 whole harmful to correct scientific procedure because it 

 tends to obliterate the boundary between science and meta- 

 physics. But I should have hesitate;! to raise any protest if 

 I had not believed that a simple modification in the definition 

 of electricity would reconcile many of the discrepancies 

 between the new and older theories, and make unnecessary 

 the substitution of electricity for matter and electrodynamics 

 for mechanics. 



While it is not possible to draw a definite boundary line 

 between the regions of physics and metaphysics, still we may 

 do so in a general way by saying that the domain of physics 

 concerns the discovery of phenomena and the formulation of 

 natural laws based on postulates which are determined by 

 experience and generally accepted as true ; the causes of 

 phenomena and the discussion of the postulates of science 

 are the province of the metaphysician. This differentiation 

 in methods of thought cannot be rigidly adhered to since 

 this boundary line is more or less obscure, and is liable to 

 considerable displacement as a science advances ; but the 

 acceptance of this principle would prevent much of the con- 

 fusion which has been introduced into the science of physics 

 by writers who have not recognized this to be a general rule. 

 For example, the principle of relativity is not strictly a 

 physical law but the expression, in mathematical symbols, of 

 the general philosophical law of the finite nature of the 

 human mind which has been accepted for centuries. Again, 

 the discussion of the shape of the atom or electron is not 



* Communicated bv the Author. 



t L. T. More, Hibbert Journal, July 1909 and July 1910. 



