404 Notices respecting New Books. 



to Molyneux, the visual idea of roundness (or protuberance) is 

 quite different from the tactual idea of roundness (or protuberance), 

 and no one could, without experiment, ever connect these two 

 essentially different ideas with one another. 



The strange part of this discussion is, however, Locke's own 

 answer to the problem of Molyneux. He says he agrees with his 

 friend, but he expresses his opinion in somewhat different words : 

 he says " that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able, wdth 

 certainty, to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he 

 only saw them ; though he could unerringly name them by his 

 touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their 

 figure felt." 



The difference between Locke's solution and that of Molyneux 

 lies in Locke's reservations " at first sight " and " w 7 ith certainty." 



It is not easy to determine the precise meaning of these reserva- 

 tions ; they may be merely surplusage. They do not necessarily 

 imply that the blind man made to see could at the second glance, 

 or by any number of glances, distinguish with certainty the cube 

 from the globe. But they may mean this. Dr. Loewy discusses at 

 considerable length and with great acuteness the meaning of these 

 reservations, and comes to the conclusion that while they somewhat 

 conceal, they do not remove the essential contradiction between the 

 notion of common sensibles and Molyneux's solution of his problem. 



There is, however, a possible meaning of these reservations not 

 alluded fc by Dr. Loew T y. Locke may have meant that the variety 

 of new sensations suddenly presented to the previously blind man 

 would prevent his at first sight concentrating his attention on those 

 sensations which corresponded to the common sensibles of figure 

 and extension in the two bodies presented to his view, but that 

 when he became accustomed to them he would be able with cer- 

 tainty to distinguish them. Just as we might say that, if two of 

 our friends blackened their faces, we would not be able at the first 

 glance with certainty to distinguish them, but by attentive study 

 of their features we could by and by make out, notwithstanding 

 the confusing blackness, the familiar forms. But while our author 

 does not expressly mention this possible meaning of Locke's reser- 

 vation, he clearly shows that if Locke meant that by any number 

 of glances or any amount of looking the previously blind man could 

 come to know with certainty the cube from the sphere without touch- 

 ing them, then Locke did not agree with Molyneux. Locke there- 

 fore either did not really agree with his friend, or his opinion in this 

 matter was inconsistent with his own principle of common sensibles. 



Dr. Loewy concludes this part of his essay by a short discussion 

 of how far Locke's views were modified in works published by him 

 later ; and gives indications which show that, while he still held to 

 the doctrine of common sensibles, he avoided its application to 

 ideas connected with extension and figure. 



The question, however, remains, Was Molyneux right ? Are the 

 observations of sight so essentially different from those of touch 

 that there can be no ideas common to them both ? 



