126 Dr. E. J. Mills on the Atomic Theory. 



in the first creation"*. He also followed Lucretius in asserting 

 that nature would not be lasting were the properties of these 

 particles other than he supposes them to be. It will be observed 

 that Newton allows of indivisibility only so far as ordinary or 

 natural forces are concerned. Elsewhere, in a passage too often 

 overlooked, he limits the indivisibility to his own time. " But 

 whether these parts, distinct and as yet undivided by natural 

 forces, are able to be divided and sundered in their turn is un- 

 certain "f. And again, he allows that " space is divisible in in- 

 finitum "%. It appears, then, that Newton had hardly reached 

 so great a degree of decision upon this subject as is commonly 

 believed. 



Descartes has also been reckoned among the atomists, pro- 

 bably more from the circumstance that he was a strong systema- 

 tizer and formalist than on the basis of any of his extant works. 

 That Descartes himself would not have approved of such an im- 

 putation is clear from the following (translated) passage § : — "It 

 is also very easy to recognize that there can be in it " (sub- 

 stance) "no atoms, that is to say, parts of bodies or matter 

 which are by nature indivisible, as some philosophers have ima- 

 gined ; inasmuch as, however small we may suppose these parts 

 to be, yet, since they must be extended, we see there is not one 

 of them that cannot be further divided into two or more others 

 of smaller size, and hence is divisible." He then goes on to 

 argue that it would be impossible, at any rate, to restrict the 

 power of the Deity in division ; and adds that it is of the nature 

 of even the smallest extended particle in the world to be divisible. 



Leibnitz, moreover, has left on record not a few decided 

 expressions of opinion with regard to this subject. Thus he 

 asserts || that "a material being could not be at the same 

 time material and perfectly indivisible or endowed with real 

 unity" (p. 580). " Material atoms are contrary to reason, be- 

 sides being still composed of parts ; for the invincible attach- 

 ment of one part to another (if we could reasonably conceive or 

 suppose such a thing) would not destroy their diversity" (p. 584). 

 " Limits are viciously assigned to division and subtleness as 

 well as to the richness and beauty of nature, when atoms and a 

 void, or certain prime elements, including the Cartesian, are set 

 up in the place of true units, when the infinite is not recognized 

 in every thing, and the exact expression of the greatest in the 

 least "(p. 599). 



Few among us would deny a hearing to Kant on a question 

 of which philosophy has, from the earliest times, constituted so 



* Horsley's Newton, vol. iv. p. 260 et seq. 



t Principia, vol. iii. p. 358 (1713). % Horsley, p. 263. 



§ Cousin's Ed. (1824) vol. iii. p. 137. II CEuvres (Jacques), vol. i. 



