WILLIAM B. DW1GIIT. 51 



cording of facts and their relations, including effects and 

 causes where they can be discovered. 



Secondly, where causes are not known, forming reason- 

 able suppositions as to the causes which may produce 

 certain systems of known effects. Such suppositions 

 are called "hypotheses." They are intended, by no 

 means, as specimens of ingenious conjecture, to lie upon 

 the shelf of record. They are, rather, to be used as the 

 basis of judicious and systematic experimentation, by 

 which the full truth may be finally reached and proved. 



Thirdly, where the proper relations between known 

 causes and known effects are not certain, a supposition is 

 again mad^ as to the proper adjustment of these causes 

 and effects. This is called " theory," and is quite similar 

 in its use to the hypothesis. 



Lastly, the scientist, either directly, by the orderly 

 grouping of facts, or if this be not possible, indirectly, 

 by experi mentation under hypotheses or theories, arrives 

 at a law. This is a key which will forever unlock cer- 

 tain doors in natural research ; and, once obtained, it 

 will stand for all time. 



These four steps are the methods of research univer- 

 sally recognized and practiced by scientists. But two 

 of these, which are quite similar in most respects, — that 

 is tk theory' 1 and "hypothesis" — are very commonly 

 spoken of as of little use, or even as a matter of re- 

 proach, for science. 



Even those well educated in other liberal professions 

 not infrequently belittle scientific research as being 

 largely a mere following of will-o'-the-wisp hypotheses 

 or vague guesses at the truth. And when one hypothe- 

 sis, followed for awdrile, is supplanted by another, it 

 seems plain to such persons that science is aimlessly 

 wandering. Nothing can be more untrue ; nothing can 

 be more unjust. 



Theories and hypotheses in natural science are not idle 



35 



