Insanity and Grime. 135 



upon the most trifling cause, assaulted his adversaries with 

 fury, and would instantly kill any animal that offended him. 

 When he came of age he was found competent to manage his 

 estate, and was in some instances benevolent, but continually in- 

 volved himself in ferocious strife, and finally killed a woman 

 who used offensive language to him, by throwing her down a 

 well. Similar cases, though milder in degree, often occur; 

 and it would seem most consonant with reason to hold them as 

 exhibitions of highly cultivated depravity, unless they can be 

 accounted for by very plain and positive proof of disease. 

 The paroxysms of rage exhibited by such persons differ widely 

 from such instances as that of a lady who, up to the age of forty- 

 three, was never known to manifest a passionate disposition, 

 but, after the birth of her last child, was subject to over- 

 powering fits of rage, excited by the most trifling causes.* 



If good ground appears for believing that cerebral disease 

 exists, it would seem proper that it should be held as very 

 likely to have destroyed responsibility to a greater or less 

 extent, even though its only traceable results were not obviously 

 connected with the crime. Thus, if the disease was only known 

 to have led to the delusion that an individual was made of glass, 

 and his offence was forgery, it would be difficult to avoid the 

 belief that the offender's self-control might have been lessened 

 by the disorder, although we could not exactly tell how. In 

 such cases, justice would object to an irreversible sentence like 

 the death penalty formerly enacted for forgery in this country, 

 or to a cruel punishment ; but it would not necessarily object 

 to a penal discipline directed towards the amendment of the 

 patient, and accompanied by what medical treatment his case 

 required. 



The question will be asked, Would you then punish men 

 who are not sane ? The reply is necessarily a little complex. 

 In the first place, no man, however sane, ought to be punished 

 brutally, and if we omit the consideration of capital punish- 

 ment, it will be universally conceded that no man ought to be 

 compelled to undergo a secondary punishment that is not cal- 

 culated, directly or indirectly, to promote his reformation. 



No scientific man would deny Dr. Bucknill\s statement 

 concerning degrees of responsibility, and few would demur to 

 the doctrine of a quotation which he makes from the fifth report 

 of the Inspectors of Lunatic Asylums in Ireland, in which, after 

 protesting against a morbid disposition to render lunacy tin' 

 protector of crime, they say, "If there are extenuating cir- 

 cumstances connected with the psychological condition of the 

 accused, they are legitimate subjects to be considered in meting 

 out the after punishment, but certainly not in the first instance, 



* Obscure Diseases of Mind and Brain, first edit., p. 179. 



