438 Mr. TV. R- Browne on Action at a Distance. 



material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my 

 readers." 



Now, in speaking of this passage, it is usual to quote the 

 first of those sentences only, and omit the second ; and yet 

 it is obvious that the second is intended to explain and define 

 the sense of the first. Read by the light of the second, it 

 seems perfectly clear that all which is denied in the first is the 

 possibility of gravity being an inherent property of matter, in 

 the sense in which hardness, inertia, &c. may be considered as 

 properties. What Newton might seem to have had in his mind 

 was the coarse materialism of Democritus and Lucretius, which 

 held that all the phenomena of the universe were due to the 

 mere motions and clashings of its ponderable atoms. This at 

 least, he would hold, was disproved by his discoveries, because 

 to defend it by assuming an occult property of matter, which 

 could extend to a distance, was absurd. All, however, which 

 he really says is that one body cannot, uncaused, act on another 

 at a distance. In the second sentence he expressly uses, not 

 indeed the word Cause, but the much stronger word Agent • 

 and he distinctly contemplates the possibility of this agent 

 being, not material, but immaterial. It seems clear, therefore, 

 that he is thinking of nothing less than of denying that action 

 at a distance may, as a matter of fact, exist. Indeed, when 

 we consider that this passage occurs, not in a mathematical 

 work, but in a letter expressly treating of the relation between, 

 the discoveries of science and the doctrines of theology, and 

 when we remember the strong theological views which he is 

 known to have held, it seems impossible to doubt that he 

 would have been perfectly contented to acquiesce in the im- 

 material nature of the agent of gravity ; though, no doubt, he 

 would have been perfectly open to consider any reasonable 

 hypothesis of a material agent which might have been placed 

 before him. 



Having thus attempted to restore the true sense of this 

 famous passage, the writer will go on to consider, in the second 

 place, how far the conception of Action at a distance actually 

 merits the condemnation it has received. It seems desirable 

 to commence with a definition, and to lay down the conse- 

 quences which flow from it in general, before proceeding to 

 consider particular cases. 



Definition. — " By the term ' Action at a distance ' is meant 

 that direct action takes place between two bodies, separated 

 from each other by a finite distance, without the intervention 

 of any other body whatever." 



Now if action at a distance does not exist, then the only 

 direct way in which one body (A) can act upon another (B) 

 is by coming into absolute contact with it ; and the only indi- 



