SCIENCE. 



313 



celestial and terrestial physics, chemistry, physiology 

 and social physics. In its general outlines, it is a 

 near approach to the proper order ; but, in its special 

 application and interpretation, it is a statement of 

 the philosophy contained in his celebrated work just 

 referred to. In that he gives his theory in the fol- 

 lowing statements : " Our study of nature is restricted to 

 the analysis of phenomena, in order to discover their 

 laws, and can have nothing to do with their nature, or 

 cause, or the mode of their production." The question 

 is suggested, What is the province of philosophy, if not 

 to explain such nature, cause, and mode of production ? 

 He opposes "all inquisition into the essence of things ;" 

 rejects all hypotheses of " electric fluids and luminous 

 ethers which are to account for the phenomena of heat, 

 light, electricity, and magnetism." He denies that there 

 can be any such thing as internal observation of the 

 mind, or any knowledge of the causes of phenomena. 

 What does he mean by mind ? and how does he know 

 that there are other minds than his own, or what is so 

 called, to study his Positive Philosophy ! He defines 

 law to be " a constant relation of succession or simil'- 

 tude," and ignores all causes operating in matter, and o 

 course there are no such entities as force, life or mind, 

 human or divine. 



In his subdivisions and groups, many incongruities are 

 found, the statement of which must here be omitted. 

 The subject matter of concrete mathematics, which is 

 composed of plane geometry and rational mechanics, he 

 has stated to consist of space, time, motion, and force, 

 whose nature, indeed, may not be inquired into. He un- 

 dertakes to classify the science in the order of historic 

 development, or progress, which cannot be substantiated. 

 Thus, historically, geometry had advanced to a consider- 

 able degree of perfection before the invention of algebra ; 

 and chemistry had made considerable progress before 

 geology and mineralogy had become strictly sciences ; 

 while many of the facts of zoology had been arranged in 

 systematic order more than two thousand years before 

 the laws or methods of the stratification of the rocks, in- 

 cluding immeasurable periods of time, had come to be 

 accepted, as against the almost universally received doc- 

 trine of a miraculous creation of " the heavens and the 

 earth," in six literal days about six thousand years ago. 



The method of Herbert Spencer, while ostensibly based 

 upon the distinction between the abstract and the con- 

 crete sciences, really precedes in development upon the 

 hypothesis of Materialistic Evolution. He classifies the 

 sciences under three tables : 1. Abstract Science, which 

 includes mathematics and logic. 2. Abstract-Concrete 

 Science, which includes mechanics, meteorology, chemis- 

 try, heat, light, electricity, and magnetism. 3. Concrete 

 Science, which includes astronomy, astrology and geo- 

 gony. Evolved from the latter are those subjects which 

 are contained in the two following branches ; 1. Minera- 

 logy, meteorology, and geology; 2. Biology, out of which 

 evolves morphology, physiology, psychology, and socio- 

 logy. It will be seen that the distinction between the ab- 

 stract and the concrete sciences has involved inconsisten- 

 cies and confusion. While mathematics is appropriately 

 placed first in the order, inasmuch as its piinciples apply 

 to the measure of content, which belongs to all things 

 susceptible of measurement, especially to the physical, 

 mechanical and chemical departments of science; and 

 also, as numerical mathematics applies to organic being, 

 social statistics, etc., logic pertains to the rational nature 

 and cannot with propriety be placed below both inorganic 

 and organic nature without involving the necessity of 

 separating subjects which are necessarily affiliated, as 

 empirical psychology and rational psychology are. 

 Further, both mathematics and logic are both 

 abstract and concrete, being founded in principles 

 which are applied practically both to forms and things. 

 The term abstract, which means to draw from, or sepa- 

 rate, or that which is considered part from its related 



subjects, is more appropriately applied to some other 

 sciences than those assumed ; thus Kinematics is an 

 abstract science, inasmuch as it is "motion considered 

 apart from its causes." 



In the second table, the sciences of the laws relative to 

 bodies are given before the recognition of such bodies, as 

 if anticipating them ; yet these are given under a two- 

 fold term "abstract concrete," instead of being given as 

 abstract. Thus, in giving the mechanical laws of solids 

 and fluids before the supposed existence of these, is pre- 

 sumption, and we may well ask, how can there be laws 

 of entities which as yet do not exist ? for it should be 

 observed, these material entities are expressed in the 

 third table, and as being evolved from terrestrial ele- 

 ments, and included under the term theology. The 

 scheme betrays the design of the classification. It seems 

 evidently devised to exhibit, under the term " concrete," 

 the evolution from matter and motion, of all the "totali- 

 ties " included in this branch. According to this, matter 

 and motion, in their redistribution, evolve the phenomena 

 of force, life, and mind, while these entities, held as real 

 by a true dualism, are regarded by Mr. Spencer as having 

 no substantive existence, but only modes of motion mani- 

 fested by matter, the only real existence, according to his 

 philosophy. The author of this scheme proceeds upon 

 the postulate that " The second and third groups supply 

 the subject matter to the first, and the third supplies 

 the subject matter to the second." Why not, then, begin 

 with the subject matter, not simply including material 

 phenomena, but the inherent force, and the laws of mani- 

 festing phenomena ? He abhors a " serial " order, upon 

 whatever scheme of philosophy, and combats M. Compte 

 on this ground, yet has conveniently adopted it for his 

 main purpose, as betrayed in his third table. 



An extended criticism of his system of philosophy, and 

 his classification of the sciences, is not intended in this 

 paper. Such has been given by M. Lettre, Prof. Bain, 

 and others. 



Only one other scheme of classification by other per- 

 sons than the writer of this, will here be given ; it is that 

 of Prof. Laurens P. Hickok. D. D., LL. D., who is 

 the author of several profound philosophical works. He 

 gives what he designates a " Rational Method of the 

 Classification of all Science." His method includes two 

 general brarches or divisions: 1. Empirical or Induc- 

 tive Science ; 2. Rational or Transcendental Science. 

 These fundamental divisions are clearly defined. Tne 

 first is limited to facts or phenomena ; the second to laws 

 and principles. The first embraces " what is given in 

 experience," using the terms empirical and inductive to 

 include observation and experiment. It is divided into 

 two parts : 1. Qualities given in Perception ; 2. Things 

 given in Reflection ; the former grouping external phe- 

 nomena, as optics, acoustics, etc., the latter grouping 

 things in space and time, including mensuration, sub- 

 stance, cause, counter-cause, chemistry, magnetism, 

 mechanism. The second or rational branch is divided 

 into, 1. Intuitive (all mathematics); 2. Discursive (all 

 philosophy). " Mathematics deals only in forms ; phil- 

 osophy deals only in existences." Discursive science is 

 divided into two parts. 1. Ontology, which includes 

 cosmology, psychology, and theology. 2. Deontology, 

 defined to be the rule of speculation, includes the canons 

 of taste, (esthetics), politics, ethics, and religion. Cos- 

 mology is treated as including not only material nature, 

 but physiology, now classified under biology. Accord- 

 ing to this scheme, therefore, man's physical nature be- 

 longs to cosmology, the term anthropolgy not being 

 given as it is common with systems of philosophy. 



The subdivisions of Dr. Hickok do not appear to be 

 systematically arranged. His special field of thought 

 does not embrace the sciences pertaining to inorganic 

 matter, nor indeed to biology, but lies in the profound 

 depths of transcendental philosophy held to be consistent 

 with christian theism. 



