the Fundamental Problem of Nature. 7 



an act, we account for it by means of a something which requires 

 itself to be accounted for in a similar manner. To make the 

 matter still more plain, suppose that an effort or exertion A of 

 force has been produced. It has not only been produced, but it 

 has been produced at a particular time and in a particular place, 

 and in reference to some particular thing ; that is to say, the 

 effort not only got existence, but a particular determined exist- 

 ence. There are, therefore, two things which require to be ac- 

 counted for : — (1) the mere exertion of the force — its simple pro- 

 duction ; and (2) why this particular effort A was made instead 

 of B, or C, or any other possible effort, and why it happened at 

 this particular time and place rather than at some other. That 

 is, we have to account (1) for its production, (2) for its determi- 

 nation. Now what we are inquiring after at present, is not what 

 produced this effort or exertion of power A, but what determined 

 it ; that is, what caused this particular effort A to happen rather 

 than B, or C, or any other, or to happen rather than not to hap- 

 pen, or to happen in the particular manner in which it did happen 

 rather than in some other manner. It must be evident that 

 whatever this cause may have been, it was not an exertion of force. 

 For let us suppose that the effort A was determined as to the 

 manner of its happening by an effort B, then this effort B itself 

 requires to be accounted for in a similar manner ; for if the effort 

 B happened, it must have happened after a particular determined 

 manner ; and if so, we must ask what determined the effort B — 

 what caused it to happen in that particular manner ? And if we 

 say it was by an effort C, we involve ourselves in a similar manner, 

 and so ad infinitum. 



But even supposing we were to maintain that the determina- 

 tion of the effort A was caused by effort beyond effort ad infini- 

 tum, it would not help the matter the least ; for on looking at 

 the question more closely, we find that it is not the determining 

 act or effort B which determines the effort A, but the determina^ 

 tion of the determining effort B. We find that if this determining 

 effort or exertion of force B had not been itself particularly de- 

 termined as to the manner of its happening, the effort A deter- 

 mined by it would not have happened as it did; so its happening 

 in the manner in which it did happen depended upon the effort 

 C which determined the determining effort B. And again, on 

 looking more closely we find that it did not depend upon this 

 effort C either, but upon the determination of this effort C. 

 And even supposing we were in this manner to go back to infi- 

 nity, still it would not be the antecedent act which determined 

 the consequent act, but the determination of the antecedent act 

 which determined it ; so that, after all, by no possible means 

 can we conceive determination to be the result of an act, or ex- 



