the Fundamental Problem of Nature, 19 



groups of molecular movements. We go on in like manner till 

 we reach a unity which comprehends under it all the groups of 

 molecular movements occurring in the vegetable or in the animal 

 kingdom. The unity which pervades the endless diversity of 

 molecular movements must be as perfect as the unity which we 

 find to pervade the endless diversity of organic forms. In fact 

 the two are inseparable^ because the unity which exists amongst 

 organic forms is the effect of the unity which exists amongst mo- 

 lecular movements. It is because these molecular movements 

 are determined according to a unity of plan, that their effects 

 (viz. organic objects) have a unity of form. It is the particular 

 determinations of the movements of the molecules that give the 

 particular form to the tree. 



It may, however, be noticed that a thing may be the result of 

 the determination of molecular motion, although it may not be so 

 directly. For example, that which determines the arrangement of 

 the buds on a twig may be something in the tissue or in the 

 texture of the twig itself; but if we carry our inquiry backwards, 

 we shall find that the particular form of the texture results from 

 the particular way in which the molecules are determined during 

 the formation of the texture. Again, on the other hand, that 

 which determines that some particular bud rather than some 

 other should be developed into a branch may, as Mr. Chauncey 

 Wright suggests, be the simple accident which leads to that 

 bud being better supplied with nutriment, light, air, and other 

 favourable conditions. But such an accident can lead to the 

 development of the bud into the branch only through the 

 determination of molecular motion. The selection of that par- 

 ticular bud to be the future branch may be due to these acci- 

 dental circumstances. But this mode of accidental selection 

 does not explain the special arrangements of the branches. It 

 does not account for the objective idea in that arrangement, 

 unless we suppose that these accidents occur according to a 

 plan and not according to chance. Natural selection never can 

 explain the objective idea in nature unless we suppose the selec- 

 tion to be made according to a design or plan. Mr. Darwin 

 has developed a new and most important idea; but his theory 

 can never, from its very nature, explain the mystery of the 

 organic world. There must be a determ^ining cause in the back- 

 ground of all natural selection working out the objective idea. 

 This I trust will be rendered more evident when we come to con- 

 sider determination of motion in relation to Final Causes. 



But there is not merely a unity of plan to be accounted for, but 

 also a unity of purpose. Things in nature are not only related 

 to one another in form, but they stand related as means to ends. 

 And this relationship is as all-pervading as that of form. There 



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