﻿186 Prof. J. Bayma on the Fundamental 



supreme test of scientific hypotheses : and if our men of science 

 were less afraid of speculative knowledge than they appear to 

 be, we should be less familiar with the sight of " bubbles shining 

 with an evanescent splendour, and suddenly bursting at the touch 

 of a hard fact/' or, let me add, of a still harder principle. 

 Professor Norton thus continues : 



" Our author is another instance of a learned philosopher, who 

 has faith in such unsubstantialities, and thinks to substitute them, 

 as a proper basis for a theory of molecular mechanics, in place of the 

 general conceptions, to which the progress of science leads, and by 

 which alone its highest inductions find any explanation — regards the 

 latter as arbitrary assumptions, and his own mental convictions of 

 what matter must be and how it must act as the only reliable foun- 

 dation upon which to build." 



This passage is made up of assertions which may easily be 

 retorted against my critic. But to answer directly. The pro- 

 gress of science leads without doubt to general conceptions, 

 which are sometimes very good, and at other times very ques- 

 tionable, according as those who deal with the matter are more 

 or less conversant with the principles of speculation and the 

 highly important art of reasoning. But the question lies not 

 in this : it lies in the truth or falsehood of the assertion that I 

 t( substituted " unsubstantialities for those general conceptions. 

 Now, I think that everyone who has read my ' Elements of 

 Molecular Mechanics' can bear witness to the gratuitousness of 

 the assertion. What Professor Norton calls ll unsubstantialities" 

 (probably because he cannot touch them with his finger) are 

 considerations which have not been substituted in the place of 

 the general conceptions to which the progress of science leads, 

 but have been added, for the greater satisfaction of a class of 

 readers, under the form of scholia, to the theorems by which 

 those general conceptions are shown to be legitimate results of 

 the progress of science : and have been appended not to prove 

 those theorems (which had no need of a second demonstration) 

 but to meet the " unsubstantialities " of some metaphysicians, 

 who are yet to be reconciled with modern science in certain 

 matters : and, lastly, they have been printed in a smaller type, 

 lest the reader should mistake them for the substance of the work, 

 and engage unawares in the awful mysteries of philosophical spe- 

 culation (Introd. p. G). Let Professor Norton read again the 

 first pages of my work : I do not doubt but that he will discover 

 his mistake. 



He states likewise that I regard those general conceptions (to 

 which the progress of science leads) as arbitrary assumptions, 

 and my own mental convictions as the only reliable foundation 

 upon which to build. Surely, Professor Norton himself relies 



