﻿350 Prof. J. Bayma on the Fundamental 



ever this may be, he wishes us to know that he, irrespectively of 

 what I may have said to the contrary, conceives continuous 

 matter as easily as the space coextensive with it. Now, nothing 

 that is impossible is conceivable, and therefore continuous matter 

 is not impossible. 



The argument, if unexceptionable, would fairly meet my ob- 

 jection. But I may be allowed to express my conviction that 

 the fact is not exactly what Professor Norton imagines. The 

 difference between matter and space, with regard to continuity, 

 is such as to allow of no assimilation between them. Dimen- 

 sions in mere space are mathematical relations only, whilst in 

 matter they would of necessity be physical : moreover space is 

 not a compound made up of a formal infinite multitude of ma- 

 terial parts, whilst continuous matter would be such, as it would 

 imply so many distinct parts of matter as can be marked out by 

 endless division : space is vacuity, continuous matter would be 

 fulness : space is only virtually continuous, inasmuch as it 

 allows and makes possible continuous motion, whilst matter 

 would be materially and formally continuous, as is evident. It 

 is useless to enlarge on other such marks of perfect opposition : 

 those mentioned suffice to show the impossibility of intellectually 

 conceiving matter and space as possessing any common pro- 

 perty. The learned Professor, reconsidering the subject, will, I 

 hope, acknowledge that it is infinitely more difficult " to con- 

 ceive of an atom of continuous matter, than of the space coex- 

 tensive with it." Any one who has a true and philosophical no- 

 tion of space must own that, whatever may be the phantasma- 

 gory of our imaginations, it is simply impossible for the intellect 

 to conceive continuous matter as an imitation of continuous 

 space. 



But as these considerations might lead us too far into the re- 

 gion of Metaphysics, whither Professor Norton is perhaps little 

 inclined to follow me, I will dismiss the idea of space altogether 

 and fall back on the purport of my objection concerning the 

 continuity of matter. In that objection I said indeed that con- 

 tinuous matter is an impossibility : this was the shortest way of 

 proving that the existence of extended and indivisible atoms 

 was not " an established truth." But to prove this last point it 

 is not necessary to argue from the very impossibility of continue 

 ous matter: and therefore, even though it were true that Pro- 

 fessor Norton conceives continuous matter as easily as the space 

 coextensive with it, the assumption of the existence of continu- 

 ous matter in nature would not become " an established truth," 

 but would remain "an arbitrary assumption." I say arbitrary, 

 because no science whether speculative or experimental, whether 

 inductive or deductive, whether ancient or modern, affords any 



