Jan. 185U. MILITARY OPERATIONS AT DORJILING. 239 



repeated, and additional reinforcements were moved on to 

 Dorjiling. The general officer in command at Dinapore 

 was ordered to Dorjiling to conduct operations : his skill 

 and bravery had been proved during the progress of the 

 Nepal war so long ago as 1S15. From the appearance of 

 the country about Dorjiling, he was led to consider Sikkim 

 to be impracticable for a British army. This was partly 

 owing to the forest-clad mountains, and partly to the fear 

 of Tibetan troops coming to the Rajah's aid, and the 

 Nepalese * taking the opportunity to attack us. With 

 the latter we were in profound peace, and we had a resi- 

 dent at their court ; and I have elsewhere shown the 

 impossibility of a Tibet invasion, even if the Chinese or 

 Lhassan authorities were inclined to interfere in the affairs 

 of Sikkim, which they long ago formally declined doing in 

 the case of aggressions of the Nepalese and Bhotanese, the 

 Sikkim Rajah being under British protection.! 



* Jung Bahadoor was at this time planning his visit to England, and to his 

 honour I must say, that on hearing of our imprisonment he offered to the govern- 

 ment at Calcutta to release us with a handful of men. This he would no doubt 

 have easily effected, but his offer was wisely declined, for the Nepalese (as I 

 have elsewhere stated) want Sikkim and Bhotan too, and we had undertaken the 

 protection of the former country, mainly to keep the Nepalese out of it. 



t The general officer considered that our troops would have been cut to pieces 

 if they entered the country ; and the late General Sir Charles Napier has since 

 given evidence to the same effect. Having been officially asked at the time 

 whether I would guide a party into the country, and having drawn up (at the 

 request of the general officer) plans for the purpose, and having given it as my 

 opinion that it would not only have been feasible but easy to have marched a force 

 in peace and safety to Tumloong, I feel it incumbent on me here to remark, that 

 I think General Napier, who never was in Sikkim, and wrote from many 

 hundred miles' distance, must have misapprehended the state of the case. 

 Whether an invasion of Sikkim was either advisable or called for, was a matter 

 in which I had no concern : nor do I offer an opinion as to the impregnability 

 of the country if it were defended by natives otherwise a match for a British 

 force, and having the advantage of position. I was not consulted with reference 

 to any difference of opinion between the civil and military powers, such as seems 

 to have called for the expression of Sir Charles Napier's opinion on this matter, 

 and which appears to be considerably overrated in his evidence. 



The general officer honoured me with his friendship at Dorjiling, and to 



