1564 Insects, 



ask, — can Mr. Turner ? If he can, he has done what everybody else 

 has failed in doing, and ought to have immediate credit for the disco- 

 very. I am quite sure he would not wish the facts he has adduced to 

 be considered sufficient proof that "feeling and neurine are sepa- 

 rable," inasmuch as we know that the insects he experimented on 

 possessed neurine, and, by his own confession, he does not deny them 

 feeling. Hence, if he has made the discovery, I presume he has a 

 host of facts, as yet unmentioned and of an entirely novel description, 

 in order to prove his point. If he has not made the discovery, i. e. to 

 say, if he has failed in proving that feeling and neurine are separable, 

 why does he attack me if I have failed in proving that they are insepa- 

 rable ? It is very certain (and his own confessions show it) that he has 

 not proved them to be separable ; and if (as he asserts) / have not 

 proved them to be inseparable, we have both failed in our endeavours, 

 and he has attacked me unjustly. For, after having failed on his part, 

 Mr. Turner, as though he had demonstrated his own point satisfac- 

 tory, coolly requires me to bring forward proofs of mine {viz,, that 

 feeling and neurine are inseparable), otherwise, he says, 1 shall be 

 liable to the charge of " building on probabilities and theories." 

 Now, I would ask Mr. Turner, how is this to be proved ? There are 

 evidently two ways. The first is, by observing that the insects in 

 question possess neurine, and then proving from experiment that they 

 have feeling. The second is from analogy. 



Regarding the first of these methods, we know that all insects 

 "possess neurine"; — it has been my object in the present paper to 

 prove (as far as possible, independently of analogy) that they " have 

 feeling." 



Regarding the second of the above-mentioned proofs, let us say one 

 word, ere we conclude, upon analogy. It was my intention in the ar- 

 ticle Mr. Turner has attacked, to endeavour to demonstrate my point 

 simply and purely from analogy ; the fact of the contrary proposition 

 not being proved by such observations as those we have examined, 

 forming in truth but a subsidiary part of my argument. Now, it is 

 evident from Mr. Turner's attack on my former paper that he rejects 

 analogy altogether, otherwise he could not have possibly considered 

 me " building on theories and probabilities" in arguing from the anal- 

 ogy of the nervous system of insects to our own, that they must 

 possess feeling; i, e., that "neurine and feeling in insects are insepa- 

 rable." But let me warn Mr. Turner of the fearful effects of once de- 

 nying the existence of analogy. So far from being "theoretical," it 

 is the very basis of all inductive reasoning, — the cement which holds 



