2336 Reason and Instinct. 



" the result of a train of reasoning in the mind of the animal," — at the 

 same time acknowledging that their reasoning and thinking powers 

 are " remarkably deficient when compared with those of men ; that 

 they cannot take so full a review of the past, nor look forward with so 

 penetrating an eye to the future ; that they do not accumulate obser- 

 vation upon observation, or add the experience of one generation to 

 another;" and so on. While yet another writer of eminence says, 

 " We shall readily allow that some of the inferior animals seem to 

 have perceptions of particular truths, and, within very narrow limits, 

 the faculty of reason." 



Now I propose, in the following remarks, to inquire how far it may 

 be truly alleged of the brute creation, or of any part of it, that they 

 are possessed of the faculty of reason. And, in the conduct of this 

 inquiry, it appears to me the best plan to ascertain clearly what is 

 meant by Reason, and what by Instinct ; in other words, to lay down 

 such definitions, both of the one and the other, as may suffice to show 

 most plainly the difference there is between them; and then, by 

 bringing the actions of animals to the test thus afforded, to prove 

 whether they are not — at least in some cases and in some degree — re- 

 ferable to Reason, and not simply to mere Instinct. 



In the first place, as to Reason. The same writer from whom we 

 have already once quoted speaks thus : " The perception of Truth, as 

 it is in itself, is commonly ascribed to our rational faculties; and 

 these have, by Locke and others, been reduced to two, — Reason and 

 Judgment. The former is said to be conversant about certain truths ; 

 the latter chiefly about probabilities." Dr. Reid says, " We ascribe 

 to Reason two offices, or two degrees: the first is, to judge of things 

 self-evident ; the second, to draw conclusions that are not self-evident 

 from those that are." 



Secondly, as to Instinct. Instinct is a certain power or disposition 

 of mind, " by which, independent of all instruction or experience, 

 without deliberation and without having any end in view, animals are 

 unerringly directed to do spontaneously whatever is necessary for the 

 preservation of the individual or the continuation of the kind." " In- 

 stinct," writes the author of c Ancient Metaphysics,' " is a determina- 

 tion given by Almighty Wisdom to the mind of the brute to act in 

 such or such a way, upon such or such an occasion, without intelli- 

 gence, without knowledge of good or ill, and without knowing for what 

 end or purpose he acts." One more quotation, which serves as it 

 were to bring together and contrast these two sets of definitions, and 

 we will be content : " Actions performed with a view to accomplish a 



