Reason and Instinct. 2339 



done by mere instinct ? — or, rather, was not this judging of and draw- 

 ing conclusions from self-evident things, and truly acting for a given 

 end or under a given motive ? Once again : a gentleman connected 

 with the Newfoundland fishery was possessed of a dog of singular 

 fidelity and sagacity. On one occasion a boat and crew in his employ 

 were in circumstances of considerable peril, just outside a line of 

 breakers, which—owing to some change in wind or weather — had, 

 since the departure of the boat, rendered the return-passage through 

 them most hazardous. The spectators on shore were quite unable to 

 render any assistance to their friends afloat. Much time had been 

 spent, and the danger seemed to increase rather than diminish. Our 

 friend, the dog, looked on for a length of time, evidently aware of there 

 being great cause for anxiety in those around. Presently, however, 

 he took to the water and made his way through to the boat. The 

 crew supposed he wished to join them, and made various attempts to 

 induce him to come aboard ; but no ! he would not go within their 

 reach, but continued swimming about a short distance from them. 

 After a while, and several comments on the peculiar conduct of the 

 dog, one of the hands suddenly divined his apparent meaning: "Give 

 him the end of a rope," he said, " that is what he wants." The rope 

 was thrown, — the dog seized the end in an instant, turned round, and 

 made straight for the shore ; where, a few moments afterwards, boat 

 and crew — thanks to the intelligence of their four-footed friend — were 

 placed safe and undamaged. Was there no reasoning here ? no acting 

 with a view to an end or for a given motive ? — or was it nothing but 

 ordinary instinct ? Nay, a man who had acted with such forethought 

 and presence of mind would have been thought worthy of high com- 

 mendation for the intellectual superiority so manifested at the hour of 

 need. And will it not savour something of unfairness if we deny si- 

 milar credit to the sagacious and intelligent dog ? 



So far, then, and going on the sure ground of laying down precise de- 

 finitions of Reason and Instinct, — definitions, moreover, not framed by 

 ourselves, or with any reference to any particular theory of our own 

 or other men's, — and then testing, by a reference to these definitions, 

 actions which must come under the one or the other of them, so as to 

 prove under which of them they do come, I think we may venture to 

 say that instances have been alleged in which individuals of the dog 

 tribe evidently performed " rational " actions. These instances might 

 be multiplied to an almost indefinite extent from the volumes and 

 parts of volumes which have been composed on the subject of the in- 

 telligence and sagacity of the dog. May we not therefore assert, that. 



