2340 Reason and Instinct. 



as regards this family of the brutes, our questions are answered in the 

 affirmative. 



Now I do not know that it is altogether necessary to adduce re- 

 corded instances of the sagacity of divers other animals, — for instance, 

 the horse or the elephant. Every one knows there is no lack of them. 

 And I think it an assertion which may be very safely made, that if we 

 apply the same test to these instances as we have already done in the 

 case of the dog, we shall meet with the same result ; that is to say, 

 we shall make good the point that both the horse and the elephant, 

 in multitudes of recorded cases (and in multitudes more unrecorded, 

 doubtless), have manifested by their conduct that they are not only 

 impelled by instinct in general, but also capable of rational actions. 

 Again, as regards the pig : when you see one or more of these ani- 

 mals, having lost their companions, and engaging in a regular search 

 for them by scent, on their coming to the meeting of three or four 

 tracks, try first one and then another, and, if in vain, take the remain- 

 ing one without similar trial, — what are you to infer ? That they act 

 as they do by instinct ? Nay, surely, but by induction ; by drawing 

 conclusions from things self-evident, viz., that since their missing 

 companions have not taken either of the roads they have tried by 

 scent, they must have taken the other : and this is an observed fact. 



Now it may have occurred to the reader, that all the instances 

 which have been adduced or referred to are in connexion with a pecu- 

 liarly designated class of the brute creation ; namely, such families 

 and species as are more or less familiarised with man, more or less ac- 

 customed to his society, as it were, or to his influence. I believe, 

 from the results of observation which has been directed to the subject 

 now for many years, that you will meet with comparatively but few 

 instances of what we believe is reason in the brute, among such as 

 have not been domesticated, or at least accustomed to feel the influ- 

 ence or observe the actions of man. The wild elephant and horse — 

 how different the history of their demeanour and actions from that af- 

 forded in the case of the same animals when domesticated ! You may 

 certainly meet with what looks like — if I may be allowed the use of 

 such language — untutored intelligence, or nascent power of reasoning, 

 in some of the actions of certain wild animals under certain circum- 

 stances ; the horse and the buffalo, for instance, when their herds are 

 exposed to the attacks of beasts of rapine, or the fox in pursuit of its 

 prey. But still they are very far from coming up to such instances of 

 evident and close ratiocination as those upon which we have been 

 commenting. In fact, we believe that the thoroughly developed power 



