6430 Reason and Instinct. 



We have already established, from the results of observation, that a 

 vast variety of animals, beginning with man at the head of the scale, 

 and proceeding downwards, manifest, in addition to the workings of 

 Instinct — whether more or less potential and operative — certain 

 peculiarities of conduct, which can only be attributed to the posses- 

 sion and the action of a power of Reasoning. And we have also 

 glanced at what appeared to be sufficient reason for arriving, a priori, 

 at the conclusion that such would be the case ; those reasons origi- 

 nating in the fact that there is valid ground for supposing the minds 

 of the inferior animals to be essentially of the same nature as that of 

 the human race ; and that therefore it would be strictly reasonable 

 to look for general features of resemblance in the different series of 

 actions performed by the animals in question ; the resemblance, 

 of course, — however variable in degree, — being such as must result 

 from the operation of the same or similar disposing causes, but com- 

 bined for operation in very variable degrees. And, from the results of 

 observation, thus reinforced by those of a course of independent rea- 

 soning, we deduced the conclusion that Instinct presupposes Reason ; 

 at least with certain limitations, and subject to certain definitions. 



Our first apparent difficulty is, — it may be from entire want of in- 

 formation, — that in not a few of not the lowest animals in the scale 

 of Creation, we find certain indications of Instinct as an influential 

 principle of action, but scarcely any of Reason ; I say, in not a few 

 of not the lowest, — for there seems to be but little reason for believing 

 that in many of the lowest gradations in animal life there is any 

 power of action, properly so-called — that is, of conscious action — at 

 all. Most of the movements of such creatures, perhaps even all their 

 movements — in other words, every individual evidence of their pos- 

 session of animal life — seem to be due to organic sensibility or irrita- 

 bility, and to that only. Take the familiar illustration of the oyster, 

 whose life even is almost made a jest of, — and there are hosts of other 

 creatures even lower than the oyster in Nature's animated chain, we 

 scarcely venture to raise the question that it may procure its food and 

 propagate its species, and by the use of the limited means for 

 that purpose at its disposal, avoid certain risks to its well-being or 

 continued existence, through Instinct. We seem forced to conclude 

 that it has no consciousness, but a faculty of Sensation we concede; 

 although, even in this, it must be observed, we are proceeding in the 

 dark ; for what do we know — not assume as known — but really know 

 of these and kindred matters, in connection with the oyster and other 

 similar, or lower forms of existence ? We reason from what we do 



