5452 Reason and Instinct. 



the question, as ihe connecting thread was so strong, although quite invisible, that 

 with it I was enabled to draw the animal with some rapidity through the water, 

 and, from its tenacious nature, the stick could only be disengaged by passing it round 

 the edge of a rough bit of stone. I could find nothing on the surface uf the water to 

 which the thread might have been attached. Left to itself the worm started off tail 

 foremost on another voyage of discovery, and was soon lost to sight among the 

 crevices of the rock. — E. W. H. Holdsworth ; 26, Osnaburgh Street, January 21, 

 1857. 



Reason and Instinct. By the Rev. J. C. Atkinson, M.A. 



PART THE FIRST. 



In a former paper (Zool. 2341) I stated my impression (reasoning 

 of course from our existing knowledge of, and observations on, 

 the habits of animals), " that the thoroughly developed power" — of 

 reasoning, namely, so far as developed in brutes — is confined "to 

 those creatures which have come into contact with man:" and there 

 is added " the question, How far, or to what degree, are they possessed 

 of the power of reasoning ? is one by no means easy satisfactorily to 

 answer. It involves comparisons which require the nicest calculation 

 and considerations of a highly complex character; and perhaps, 

 after all, it might not be practicable to arrive at any very definite 

 conclusion." 



The question mooted above, or at least a modification of it, has 

 been, for some time past, much in my thoughts, and in the present 

 paper 1 propose to offer something towards an attempt at its 

 discussion. 



At the very outset of our inquiry a question of much interest 

 presents itself; viz., assuming that brutes do reason, in what mode 

 do they reason ? Are we to say that they reason in a mode analogous 

 to that in which man reasons ? or, is it identical with it ? In other 

 words, Is the anima brutorum, or the intellectual capacity in the 

 brute creation, of the same essence with man's mind or intellectual 

 powers, or merely resembling it in some parts of its action and 

 manifestations? But, although this question presents itself here 

 naturally and inevitably, we shall possibly be in a much better 

 position for entertaining it when we have arrived at a somewhat more 

 advanced stage of our inquiry. 



I am quite aware that many will be ready to suggest a reference to 

 the pages of Holy Writ, for, in some part at least, an answer to the 

 inquiry we are engaged upon ; and I do not, for a moment, seek to 



