Reason and Instinct. 5459 



imminent way of resolution. Let me succeed in proving that the dog 

 or the horse, which has been for three generations, or for ten, or for 

 thirty, brought under the direct influence of the mental superiority of 

 man, has been thereby benefitted in his own intellectual or apparently 

 intellectual qualities, and I think a great step is taken in showing that 

 the original dog or horse was possessed of the same attributes (for 

 otherwise man must have implanted or created them), though we may 

 say that, for all we know, they were originally latent or nearly so. 

 And this argument becomes immensely more conclusive when applied 

 in the case of an animal itself the first in the series of domestication, 

 or the offspring of the first, — a seal, for instance, or an otter. 



But to grapple more closely and methodically with our subject: — 



I. The metaphysical distinction between what is animal and what 

 is not is stated by Locke as follows : — " The faculty of perception 

 (which he defines as being the first step and degree towards know- 

 ledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it) seems to be that which 

 puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts 

 of Nature:" and his arguments in support of the statement are not 

 easily to be answered. 



II. "The next faculty of the mind," he continues, "whereby it 

 makes a further progress towards knowledge is that which I call 

 retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which, from sensation 

 or reflection, it hath received. And this it does in two ways; first, 

 by means of contemplation; second, by means of memory;" which 

 latter term he takes to signify " that the mind has a power, in many 

 cases, to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional 

 perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. This 

 faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the 

 mind several other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as 

 man." 



III. " Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that 

 of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has. * * 

 How far brutes partake in this faculty is not easy to determine. 

 I imagine they have it not in any great degree. For though they 

 probably have several ideas distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be 

 the prerogative of human understanding, when it has sufficiently dis- 

 tinguished any ideas so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, 

 and so, consequently, two, to cast about and consider in what circum- 

 stances they are capable to be compared. And, therefore, I think 

 beasts compare not their ideas further than some sensible circum- 

 stances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of 



